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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1. Relevance of the study 
 
In a still state-dominated international legal order, states act as the enforcement arm of international 
courts. Like the ad hoc Tribunals, the ICC depends on the cooperation of states (including through 
international organizations) in all phases of its activities and, above all, in arresting suspects and 
conducting investigations. Increasingly, cooperation issues are at the centre of the debate regarding 
the ICC. The Court is facing serious hurdles in getting the custody of defendants due to the lack of 
cooperation of certain States.  
The most famous case is the one of Omar Al-Bashir, the first sitting head of State indicted 
by the Court on genocide charges, who keeps travelling around the world undeterred by the arrest 
warrants1 issued by the Court against him. In 2014, ICC Chief Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda informed 
the Security Council – which had referred the situation to the Court ten years earlier – that she was 
‘hibernating’ her investigations in Darfur due to the sheer obstruction and non-cooperation of the 
Government of Sudan, as well as the lack of support from the Security Council.2 More recently, all 
the Kenya cases relating to the 2007/08 post election violence collapsed due to a combination of 
lack of cooperation from the Government of Kenya, witness tampering and poor case construction 
on the part of the OTP.3 This is possibly the most evident failure of the ICC so far. 
In light of the recent events, global media attention and public interest have focused on 
urgent questions regarding the credibility of the Court, the adequacy of Prosecutorial strategies and 
the achievability of the Court’s mission. In the same fashion, the great part of the literature on 
cooperation to date is in the ‘ameliorative mode’. It analyses how the lack of cooperation on the part 
of certain States and international organizations impedes the ICC’s achievement of its mission, the 
ending of impunity for international crimes, and seeks to improve the current legal framework 
regulating cooperation so as to improve the effectiveness of international criminal justice.4 
                                                
1 On 4 March 2009 the ICC issued an arrest warrant against Bashir for crimes against humanity and war crimes. On 12 
July 2010 the ICC issued an additional warrant adding 3 counts of genocide for the ethnic cleansing of the Fur, Masalit, 
and Zaghawa tribes. 
2 Mrs. Fatou Bensouda, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Statement to the United Nations Security 
Council on the Situation in Darfur, pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005), 4. Available at: https://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/stmt-20threport-darfur.pdf. 
3 See Mark Kersten, ‘Justice for Post-Election Violence in Kenya- An Obituary’, on 
https://justiceinconflict.org/2016/04/08/justice-for-post-election-violence-in-kenya-an-obituary/. 
4 See, among others, Michele Caianiello, ‘Models of Judicial Cooperation with Ad Hoc Tribunals and with the 
Permanent International Criminal Court in Europe’, Transnational Inquiries and the Protection of Fundamental Rights 
 7 
In the midst of this debate, what is often overlooked is the impact that cooperation with the 
Court – a well as the lack thereof – has on defendants. Traditionally, the defence side and the 
accused have largely been overlooked in cooperation law and practice, both transnationally and 
internationally.  
In transnational cooperation, the relationship between the requesting and the requested State 
has long been conceived as a merely bilateral one, based on equality, reciprocity and the protection 
of the interests of the states involved. For the longest period, the individual has been considered a 
mere object of international legal practice. A major shift occurred in 1989, when the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) issued a seminal decision in the Soering case. Since the Soering 
judgment, the individual is no longer considered an object of the proceedings whose rights are to be 
determined exclusively by the States involved, but a subject of an international legal practice, 
entitled to independently claim certain rights guaranteed under international law.5 
In international criminal trials, the defence side and the accused are rarely at the centre 
Instead, the focus is often on victims and the ‘fight against impunity’ for heinous crimes. However, 
cooperation with international tribunals is vertical in nature, and based on the hierarchical and 
supranational relationship of international courts with national authorities. It imposes stricter 
obligations to States and affords them less capacity to protect their interests. Moreover, from 
Nuremberg on, the rights of defendants have progressively been given more importance.  
This is so much true that the assumption was that many of the worries that gave rise to the 
horizontal model of cooperation (interference, arbitrariness, violations of human rights) would not 
occur at the hands of international courts, because they are independent entities with no political 
agenda, that are bound by the highest standards of protection of individual rights.6 A clear example 
is the obligation of States to ‘surrender’ individuals to international criminal tribunals, which is 
absolute and foresees no exceptions. The drafters construed surrender obligations on the basis that 
                                                                                                                                                            
in Criminal Proceedings (Springer Berlin Heidelberg 2013); Göran Sluiter, International Criminal Adjudication and the 
Collection of Evidence: Obligations of States (Intersentia 2002); Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto, ‘A Giant Without Limbs: 
The International Criminal Court’s State-Centric Cooperation Regime’ (Social Science Research Network 2004); Rod 
Rastan, ‘Testing Co-Operation: The International Criminal Court and National Authorities’ (2008) 21 Leiden Journal of 
International Law; Göran Sluiter and Bert Swart, ‘The International Criminal Court and International Criminal 
Cooperation’ in Herman von Hebel (ed), Reflections on the International Criminal Court: Essays in Honour of Adriaan 
Bos (TMC Asser Press 1999). 
5 On the topic of individual rights in transnational cooperation, see, among others: Giulio Illuminati, ‘Transnational 
Inquiries in Criminal Matters and Respect for Fair Trial Guarantees’ in Stefano Ruggeri (ed), Transnational Inquiries 
and the Protection of Fundamental Rights in Criminal Proceedings (Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013), 15-24; 
Robert J. Currie, ‘The Protection of Human Rights in the Suppression of Transnational Crime’ in Neil Boister and 
Robert J. Currie (eds), Routledge Handbook of Transnational Criminal Law (Routledge 2015) 27-40. 
6 Frederic Megret, ‘In Search of the “Vertical”: Towards an Institutional Theory of International Criminal Justice’s 
Core’ in Carsten Stahn and Larissa van den Herik (eds), Future Perspectives on International Criminal Justice (TMC 
Asser Press 2010) 219. 
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individuals do not have to fear violations of their rights by the tribunals, due to the importance 
accorded to fair trial guarantees under their founding instruments. 
With specific reference to the ICC, it is undeniable that the Rome Statute represents a clear 
improvement in the protection of the human rights of the accused, especially in the pre-trial phase. 
It not only contains an overarching principle that the Statute be interpreted and applied in 
accordance with internationally recognized human rights (Article 21(3)), but it also imposes human 
rights obligations upon national authorities conducting investigations on behalf of the Court. 
Among others, individuals have the right not to be subject to arbitrary arrest and detention (Article 
55(d)) and, once arrested on behalf of the ICC, to be brought promptly before a national judge who 
must verify that the their rights have been respected (Article 59(2)). These norms clearly break with 
the law of the ad hoc Tribunals, where the execution of arrest warrants and the protection of persons 
in arrest proceedings by national authorities has traditionally received little attention. 
By observing the Court’s practice in more than fourteen years, however, one cannot fail to 
notice some worrying developments regarding cooperation and human rights. In particular, the 
practice of the Court has shown that human rights violations can occur both by virtue of compliance 
with a request for cooperation by States and by virtue of non-compliance with such requests.  
When States are cooperative with the Court and welcome its intervention, the Prosecutor has 
often managed to obtain custody of defendants and have them transferred to the seat of the Court. 
This has been the case for the situations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the 
Central African Republic (CAR) and the Ivory Coast. In some of these instances, human rights 
issues arose due to the fact that defendants had already been in the custody of national authorities 
when the Prosecutor applied for an arrest warrant to the Pre-Trial Chamber against them. Upon their 
transfer to the Court, they complained that their initial detention by national authorities had been 
unlawful and motivated by political reasons. They lamented several violations of their basic rights 
by local authorities, such as being deprived of their liberty in the absence of an arrest warrant, 
without being informed of the charges against them, and being denied prompt access to a lawyer. 
One of them also alleged grave physical ill treatment, abuses, and torture. As a consequence, 
defendants requested the Court to take responsibility for the above violations and dismiss its 
jurisdiction. 
Conversely, when States oppose the intervention of the Court, they are much less willing to 
allow either the Prosecutor or the Defence on their territory for the purpose of conducting 
investigations, let alone provide the necessary assistance to transfer the suspects to the Court. 
Undoubtedly, this undermines the Court’s credibility and the Prosecutor’s capacity to build his/her 
case. However, one must not forget that non-cooperation can be equally harmful for the suspect and 
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accused. The first example that comes to mind is that of Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, who has been 
detained in solitary confinement in Libya since 2011 despite an outstanding arrest warrant by the 
ICC. Even if the person sought by the Court is not detained by national authorities, when his/her 
State of nationality does not wish to engage with the Court in any way, the Defence might face 
enormous difficulties in conducting its investigations and locating witnesses (see Banda and 
Jamus’s Defence in Sudan). The urgency of a study that puts fair trial and human rights of 
defendants at the core of the debate regarding cooperation with the Court is attested by the above 
examples. 
 
2. Research questions  
 
As Cogan has pointed out, the ‘fair trial question’ before international courts can be approached in 
two ways. First, are the substantive rights accorded to the accused adequate? This approach focuses 
on the rights delineated in the tribunals’ statutes, rules of procedure and evidence, and case law.7 
Within this approach, the conceptual background for discussing human rights in cooperation 
proceedings is that of the fragmentation of the criminal procedure over two or more jurisdictions, 
namely the international criminal tribunal and the relevant domestic jurisdictions. The starting point 
is the need to avoid loopholes in the protection of individual rights as a result of the division of 
labour between international courts and states authorities, as well as the claim that the requesting 
international criminal jurisdiction and the requested State have a shared responsibility for the rights 
of the suspects and accused. 8 Therefore, the question is framed as one of the extent to which the 
former should bear responsibility (in the sense of providing remedies) for human rights violations 
occurred in the framework of its proceedings.9  
Conversely, a second approach seeks to address the problem of fair trial from a systemic 
perspective. It asks whether ‘international courts have the independence and coercive powers 
necessary to ensure fair trials, regardless of the sufficiency of the paper rights accorded the accused 
in the tribunals’ statutes’.10 For example, some of the questions that are central to this approach are: 
‘can these courts make certain that the accused is able to obtain the evidence and witnesses 
                                                
7 Jacob Katz Cogan, ‘International Criminal Courts and Fair Trials: Difficulties and Prospects’ (2002) 27 Yale Journal 
of International Law 111, 114. 
8 Astrid Reisinger-Coracini, ‘Cooperation from States and Other Entities’ in Göran Sluiter and others (eds), 
International Criminal Procedure: Principles and Rules (Oxford University Press 2013) 111. 
9 Göran Sluiter, ‘Human Rights Protection in the ICC Pre-Trial Phase’ in Carsten Stahn and Göran Sluiter (eds), The 
Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court (Brill 2009) 459–474; Alexander Zahar and Göran Sluiter, 
International Criminal Law: A Critical Introduction (OUP 2007) 281. 
10 Cogan (n 7) 115. 
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necessary for a serious defence? Or do the courts’ judges have the independence necessary to 
withstand political pressure from the states on which they depend?’11 
The present research is concerned with the second approach and deals specifically with the 
ICC. The author believes that addressing human rights through a systemic perspective in the ICC 
context is particularly important, due to the symbolic and historical significance of the Court. The 
ICC is the most ambitious experiment in the history of international criminal justice so far, and 
comes as last in a series of international criminal jurisdictions. Its immediate predecessors are the 
ad hoc Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and for Rwanda (ICTR), crated by 
the UN Security Council in response to the disaggregation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
and the genocide in Rwanda respectively, as a means to restore international peace and security 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.12 The ad hoc Tribunals were subject to the criticism of being 
established – at least in part – ex post facto, only to save the conscience of the international 
community for its failure to act to stop the ethnic cleansing that had taken place in the Balkans and 
Rwanda.13 They were ‘special tribunals’ established by a political organ (the Security Council), as 
the organ’s sub-body.14 
Conversely, the establishment of a permanent International Criminal Court was meant to 
move international criminal justice onwards to new grounds, so as to avoid the criticisms that 
previously plagued the ad hoc Tribunals.15 Unlike its ad hoc predecessors, the ICC is not an organ 
of the UN Security Council and does not deal with specific conflicts in geographically limited areas. 
The ICC is an independent permanent Court ‘in relationship with the United Nations system, with 
jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole.’16 
Its Prosecutor has proprio motu powers of investigation and its jurisdiction can potentially cover 
international crimes committed in every part of the world after 2002.17 As Gerry Simpson has 
argued: 
 
                                                
11 ibid. 
12 On 25 May 1993, the UN Security Council passed resolution 827 formally establishing the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia; on 8 November 1994, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 955, 
establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.  
13 Dominic McGoldrick, ‘Criminal Trials Before International Tribunals: Legality And Legitimacy’ in Dominic 
McGoldrick, Peter J Rowe and Eric Donnelly (eds), The Permanent International Criminal Court: Legal and Policy 
Issues (Hart Publishing 2004) 24. 
14 Claus Kress, ‘The International Criminal Court as a Turning Point in the History of International Criminal Justice’ in 
Antonio Cassese (ed), The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice (Oxford University Press 2009) 143. 
15 ibid. 
16 See 9th paragraph of the Preamble to the Rome Statute. 
17 The Rome Statute of the ICC was adopted at the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court on 17 July 1998. 120 States voted in favour of the treaty, seven voted 
against (US, China, Libya, Iraq, Israel Qatar and Yemen) and 21 abstained. 
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[t]he ICC was meant to transcend the political. Correspondingly, its trials would resist the 
appellation, ‘political trials’. These trials would be international, impartial, non-selective, (…) 
ad hocery would be eliminated for good and instead there would be a permanent system of 
universal justice.18 
 
Yet, without enforcement powers of its own, the ICC is entirely reliant on States’ cooperation for 
the implementation of its ambitious mission. Inevitably, this means that the Court’s action is- to a 
greater or lesser degree – influenced by the interests of States and by the much-deprecated 
‘realpolitik’. In this respect, it has rightly been argued that the pertinent question does not concern 
the role played by politics in international criminal justice, but rather the possibility that politics, in 
playing its role, corrupts the integrity of the judicial process and compromises the latter’s 
independence.19 It is believed that a systemic approach to the fair trial issue before the ICC cannot 
avoid this question.  
The present study locates the challenges faced by defendants during cooperation 
proceedings in the context of the unique structural system of the Court, and the inherent tensions 
and limitations that characterize the ICC’s functioning. In particular, the study seeks to answer the 
following research questions: to what extent the unique structural limitations of the Court influence 
and shape Prosecutorial strategies regarding cooperation? What are the consequences for the 
accused’s right to liberty and equality of arms? Do ICC judges sufficiently engage with the 
structural tensions and limitations of the Court with a view of protecting the rights of suspects and 
accused? 
 
3. Structure of the study 
 
The present research is divided into two parts. The first part sets out the institutional and 
jurisdictional context in which cooperation plays out at the ICC and, by so doing, it provides a 
background against which considerations regarding violations of defendants’ rights can be made. 
Chapter II addresses the ICC dependence on cooperation from an institutional, a political 
and a normative dimension. It explores the salient features of the Court as an international 
organization founded by a treaty, and its relationship with the world in which it operates (namely, 
States Parties to the Rome Statute, States non-parties, and international organizations). 
                                                
18 Gerry Simpson, ‘Politics, Sovereignty, Remembrance’ in Dominic McGoldrick, Peter J Rowe and Eric Donnelly 
(eds), The Permanent International Criminal Court: Legal and Policy Issues (Hart Publishing 2004) 51; see also, 
Andrea Bianchi, ‘Ad-Hocism and the Rule of Law’ (2002) 13 European Journal of International Law 263. 
19 Daphne Shraga, ‘Politics and Justice  : The Role of the Security Council’ in Antonio Cassese (ed), The Oxford 
Companion to International Criminal Justice (Oxford University Press 2009) 168. 
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Subsequently, the Chapter delves into the salient features of the Court’s cooperation regime. On the 
one hand, it considers some of the so-called ‘weaknesses’ of the regime, which derive from the 
consensual base upon which it lays. On the other hand, it addresses cooperation matters not 
foreseen in Part 9 of the Statute. In the last two sections, the Chapter addresses the politics of 
cooperation. First and foremost, it engages with the paradox of an independent Prosecutor who 
often finds himself/herself in the difficult position of having to investigate and prosecute the very 
national authorities on whose cooperation s/he depends; secondly, it addresses the means at the 
disposal of the Court in case of non-compliance by States, showing that compliance with requests 
for cooperation is ultimately tied to State political willingness and international political pressure. 
Chapter III delves into the connection between cooperation and jurisdiction. The 
complementarity nature of the ICC implies that the Court is allowed to step in only in case national 
authorities remain inactive or, where there are domestic proceedings, those authorities appear 
unwilling or unable to genuinely prosecute international crimes themselves.20 Cooperation with an 
international court that has a complementary jurisdiction unfolds differently, and poses unique 
challenges to the rights of defendants whose conduct the Prosecutor decides to investigate and 
charge. Complementarity is a principle that the Prosecutor has to respect while deciding whether to 
start an investigation and, once the investigation has been opened, in the selection of cases.21 On a 
practical level, the complementarity assessment implies communication with national authorities 
and a careful planning on whether and how to divide labour with them. The Chapter critically 
evaluates the ‘positive approach’ to complementarity endorsed by the OTP in order to enhance 
states cooperation, highlighting the consequences that this has had for the selection of cases. 
Moreover, it scrutinises the judges decisions on the challenges to the admissibility of the case made 
by some accused. 
The second part of the study addresses the impact that cooperation occurring in the above-
explained context has on the selected rights of defendants. It analyses the ICC’s law on the right to 
equality of arms and the right to liberty, as well as the practice regarding allegations of violations of 
these rights brought forward by some defendants.  
Chapter IV addresses cooperation in relation to the right to liberty of defendants. It 
addresses two specific components of the right to liberty: the right not to be subject to arbitrary 
arrest and detention (i.e., habeas corpus rights) and the right to interim release. With respect to the 
former, the Chapter assesses whether the law and practice of the Court sufficiently acknowledge the 
position of suspects detained by national authorities throughout part of the ICC investigation, and 
                                                
20 Article 17 of the Statute. 
21 Article 53 and 17 of the Statute. 
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the risks to their liberty that the division of labour between the Court and States entails. The Chapter 
scrutinises how the Prosecutor has intended his/her responsibility toward the suspect from the 
opening of a preliminary examination on a situation to the request of the issuance of an arrest 
warrant from the Pre-Trial Chamber. Subsequently, it criticises the way in which the judges have 
intended their supervisory role vis-a-vis the Prosecutor and national authorities, and their 
responsibilities in guaranteeing the right to liberty of defendants. 
With respect to interim release, the Chapter measures the advanced protection afforded to 
this right by the Statute against the reality that States Parties are not obliged to accept provisionally 
released persons on their territories. The Bemba case (as well as the cases regarding the offences 
against the administration of justice related to it) demonstrate that, despite the protection afforded to 
this right ‘on paper’, the willingness of States to accept provisionally released persons on their 
territory is ultimately the only factor capable of ensuring the effectiveness of the right of suspects to 
be freed pending trial. 
Chapter V addresses cooperation in relation to the principle of equality of arms. First, it 
assesses the structural inequality between the Prosecution and the Defence within the institutional 
framework of the Court and critically analyses the features of the ICC’s support structure for the 
Defence. Second, the Chapter assesses whether the law and practice of the Court endows the 
accused with ‘adequate time and facilities’22 for the preparation of his/her defence. In particular, it 
scrutinises the Court’s interpretation of Article 57(3)(b) of the Statute, empowering the Pre-Trial 
Chamber to assist the person arrested or summoned with the preparation of his/her defence; 
subsequently, it addresses the difficulties encountered by the Defence in conducting on-site 
investigations in Sudan, in the absence of a clear legal framework of the Statute to that effect, and 
given the sheer non cooperation from the Government of the country. 
                                                
22 Article 67(1)(b) of the Statute. 

CHAPTER II 
THE ICC DEPENDENCE ON COOPERATION: INSTITUTIONAL 
NORMATIVE AND POLITICAL DIMENSION 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This Chapter addresses some of the distinctive structural constrains that characterize 
proceedings at the ICC and, in particular, the functioning of cooperation. It is aimed at 
understanding in what way the unique institutional setting, normative framework and political 
context of the Court influence and shape cooperation before it. The overall goal of the 
Chapter is setting forth the background against which the selected rights of defendants 
(Chapter IV and V) will be assessed. Although the focus of the Chapter is on the ICC, the 
legal framework and experience of the ad hoc Tribunals will be used as terms of comparison, 
so as to illuminate the distinct challenges confronting the Court. 
Like its ad hoc predecessors, the ICC depends on the cooperation of States (including 
through international organizations) for every aspect of its functioning, i.e., for all matters 
pertaining, inter alia, to the collection of evidence, the compelling of persons, the execution 
of arrests and the surrender of persons. Borrowing the words of the former President of the 
Court Philip Kirsch ‘[t]he Court itself is the judicial pillar…The other pillar of the ICC 
Statute – the enforcement pillar – has been reserved to states and, by extension, to 
international organizations’.1 
However, the Court distinguishes itself from its ad hoc predecessors in at least two 
structural aspects. First, the ICC is an unprecedented experiment in the history of international 
criminal law, in that it is a global Court that was not imposed over a particular group or 
society by the victors of a war or a Resolution of the UN Security Council, but was set up by 
an international treaty. As a consequence, its judicial authority is based on consent and binds 
solely the States that have accepted it. So far, 124 States have acceded to the Statute, that is, 
almost two thirds of the States in the world. This can be considered a great success. However, 
one must not forget that three of the five permanent members of the Security Council (China, 
Russia and the US), as well as some of the States with the worst human rights record, remain 
                                                
1 Philip Kirsch, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, 1 November 2007, available at: 
https://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/2007/Pages/icc%20president%20%20judge%20
philippe%20kirsch%20%20addresses%20united%20nations%20general%20assembly.aspx 
 16 
outside the Rome Statute’s system. As Peskin has argued, ‘what was given to the ICTY and 
ICTR, by virtue of their Security Council mandate that binds all UN members to support these 
tribunals, must be earned by the ICC through its campaign for universal ratification of the 
Rome Statute.’2 In other words, the Court faces bigger challenges in obtaining cooperation 
than its ad hoc predecessors.  
Another important distinctive feature of the Court relates to its ex ante nature. 
According to the definition given by Mahnoush Arsanjani and Michael Resiman, ex ante 
tribunals ‘are established before an international security problem has been resolved or even 
manifested itself, or are established in the midst of the conflict in which the alleged crimes 
occurred’.3 Indeed, the Court’s permanent mandate covers international crimes committed 
after 2002, and thus necessarily extends to a number of different situations, each with its own 
geopolitical context and various interests at stake. This also implies that the Court operates in 
an environment where other ‘political entities’ are dealing with the crisis so as to re-establish 
order, and that the Court’s ‘various options for decision may influence these political and 
often military actions’.4 In other words, the Court is exposed to politics in a new way. 
It seems pertinent, thus, to contextualise cooperation proceedings within these broader 
institutional features. Accordingly, the first section of the Chapter explores the salient features 
of the Court as an international organization (relationship with the UN, international legal 
personality and treaty making powers, privileges and immunities). Second, the Chapter looks 
at the Court’s relationship with the world in which it operates, namely, States Parties, States 
non-party, and international organizations. It begins with States Parties (section 3.1) and 
assesses the salient features of the Court’s cooperation regime. On the one hand, the section 
considers some of the so-called ‘weaknesses’ of the regime, which derive from the consensual 
base upon which the Rome Statute lays. On the other hand, it addresses cooperation not 
foreseen in Part 9 of the Statute. Subsequently it moves on to consider States not-party 
(section 3.2) and international organizations (section 3.3). 
Finally, the Chapter addresses the politics of cooperation in the last two sections. 
Section 5 engages with the paradox of an independent Prosecutor who often finds 
                                                
2 Victor Peskin, ‘Caution and Confrontation in the International Criminal Court’s Pursuit of Accountability in 
Uganda and Sudan’ (2009) 31 Human Rights Quarterly 662. 
3 Mahnoush H Arsanjani and W Michael Reisman, ‘The Law-in-Action of the International Criminal Court’ 
(2005) 99 The American Journal of International Law 385, 385. In the same article, the authors point out that 
both the ICTR and the ICTY are ex post tribunals. The former was established in November 1994 to judge 
persons responsible for the atrocities committed during the Rwandan Genocide, between 1 January and 31 
December 1994. The latter was established in 1993 and its jurisdiction covers the crimes committed during the 
Balkan war from 1991. 
4 ibid. 
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himself/herself in the difficult position of having to investigate and prosecute the very 
national authorities on whose cooperation s/he depends. Section 6 addresses the means at the 
disposal of the Court in case of non-compliance by States, showing that compliance with 
requests for cooperation is essentially tied to State political willingness and international 
political pressure. 
 
2. The ICC as an independent international organization 
 
Unlike the ad hoc Tribunals, the Court does not partake in the structure of a long-established 
international organization, but is itself an international organization, independent from both 
the States that created it and from the system of the United Nations (UN).5 The Assembly of 
States Parties (ASP) is the management oversight, legislative and political body of the Court,6 
but it is not one of its organs7 and it cannot influence decisions relating to the practical 
execution of the Court’s mandate. Equally, the ICC is not a subsidiary organ of the Security 
Council, nor is it an organ of the UN. 
The present section addresses the significance of the nature of the Court as an 
international organization. In particular, it explores the relationship of the Court with the UN 
system and with the host State (the Netherlands). Moreover, it analyses the legal framework 
relating to the international legal personality and the treaty making powers, as well as the 
scheme of privileges and immunities of the Court. 
 
2.1 The relationship with the UN system 
 
Although the drafters of the Statute created the Court as a separate institution, placed outside 
of the UN framework and its political workings, they also realized that, to be effective, the 
Court would need the active support of the UN.8 Moreover, the ICC and the UN were 
expected to closely cooperate in order to reinforce the shared goal of preventing the future 
                                                
5 Kenneth S Gallant, ‘The International Criminal Court in the System of States and International Organizations’ 
(2003) 16 Leiden Journal of International Law 553. 
6 See Article 112 of the Statute. The ASP has adopted the Elements of Crimes pursuant to Article 9 of the Statute 
and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence pursuant to Article 51 of the Statute. It elects officials of the Court, 
approves its budget, and adopts amendments to the Rome Statute. 
7 Pursuant to Article 34 of the Statute, the Court is composed of four organs: the Presidency, the Judicial 
Divisions, the Office of the Prosecutor, and the Registry. 
8 War Crimes Research Office, ‘The Relationship between the International Criminal Court and the United 
Nations’ (2009), 1, available at: 
https://www.wcl.american.edu/warcrimes/icc/documents/WCRO_Report_on_ICC_and_UN_August2009.pdf 
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commission of international crimes, which obstruct the maintenance of international peace 
and security and, therefore, justice.9 
Article 2 of the Statute mandates that the Court be brought into relationship with the 
UN through an agreement. The Negotiated Relationship Agreement with the UN (NRA) was 
signed on 4 October 2004 by the President of the Court Philippe Kirsch, and the UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan.10 It provides for institutional relations, cooperation and 
judicial assistance between the Court and the UN, establishing a ‘quasi-political’ relationship 
between the two organizations.11 
In addition to Article 2, the Rome Statute contains a number of more specific 
provisions relating to the relationship between the Court and the UN Security Council.12 First, 
the Security Council can trigger the jurisdiction of the Court. Pursuant to Article 13(b) of the 
Statute, the Council may refer to the Court situations concerning crimes committed on the 
territory of States (including States not-party), as a measure to maintain or restore 
international peace and security under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Moreover, under 
Article 16, the Council has the crucial power of suspending investigations and prosecutions 
for a period of one year if the Council believe that such suspension is necessary to restore or 
maintain international peace and security. Finally, the Security Council has an important role 
with respect to the enforcement of requests arising from referrals, which will be addressed in 
section 6 of this Chapter. 
 
2.2 The Host State 
 
Article 3(2) of the Statute mandates that the Court enters into a headquarters agreement with 
the State that hosts its premises, the Netherlands. The Headquarters Agreement between the 
Court and the Netherlands entered into force on 1 March 2008.13 It governs the legal status 
and juridical personality of the Court, its privileges and immunities, and the inviolability and 
                                                
9 Olympia Bekou, ‘International Criminal Justice and Security’ in Mary E Footer and others (eds), Security and 
International Law (Bloomsbury Publishing 2016) 99–100. 
10 Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the Court and the UN, 4 October 2004. 
11 Gallant (n 5) 567. 
12 See generally P Gargiulo, ‘The Relationship between the ICC and the Security Council’ in F Lattanzi and W 
Schabas (eds), The International Criminal Court: Comments on the Draft Statute (Napoli: Il Sirente 1998), 95–
119; L Yee, ‘The International Criminal Court and the Security Council Articles 13(b) and 16’ in R Lee, The 
International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute Issues, Negotiations, Results, ed. Roy Lee (The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International 1999), 143–52; J Trahan, ‘The Relationship between the International 
Criminal Court and the UN Security Council’ (2013) 24 Criminal Law Forum 417–73.  
13 Headquarters Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the Host State, ICC‐BD/04‐01‐08, 1 
March 2008. 
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protection of its premises. Chapter V of the Agreement deals with ‘cooperation between the 
Court and the Host State’. Among other things, it contains provisions on the issuance of visas 
and permits for officials of the Court and other participants in its proceedings, including 
witnesses, victims and experts.14 Special provisions govern the entry and legal status of 
accused persons, including their departure and return if granted interim release and their 
transfer to another State after the sentence of acquittal or conviction.15  
 
 2.3 International legal personality and treaty-making powers  
 
Article 4(1) of the Statute endows the Court with ‘international legal personality’ and the 
legal capacity for the exercise of its functions and the fulfilment of its purposes. This means 
that the Court is a subject of international law, and States Parties are legally bound to 
recognize its independence and autonomy in international relations.16 This is an important 
distinction between the ICC and the ad hoc Tribunals. The latter, being organs of the UN 
Security Council, do not posses international legal personality, and all their international 
activities are attributed to the political organ that established them.17 
An important consequence of the international legal personality of the Court is its 
capacity to enter into agreements with States (both parties and not party) and international 
organizations for securing their cooperation. Such capacity is divided among the constituent 
organs of the Court on a functional basis.18 In particular, it is possible to distinguish between 
agreements concluded by the Court as a whole (framework agreements), so as to regulate 
matters of interest to more than one of its organs, and agreements concluded by the Office of 
the Prosecutor (OTP) with a specific investigative purpose.  
This distinction is enshrined in Regulation 107(1) of the Regulations of the Court. 
According to it, framework agreements with States not party and international organizations 
shall be negotiated and concluded under the authority of the President of the Court, whereas 
the agreements for investigative purposes are an exclusive competence of the OTP. In this 
respect, the relevant provision is Article 54(3)(d) of the Statute, which empowers the 
Prosecutor to ‘enter into such arrangements or agreements, not inconsistent with this Statute, 
                                                
14 Section 2 of the Headquarters Agreement. 
15 Articles 46-48 of the Headquarters Agreement. 
16 Francesca Martines, ‘Legal Status and Powers of the Court’ in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta and John RWD 
Jones (eds), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: a Commentary, vol I (Oxford University 
Press 2002) 208. 
17 ibid 203. 
18 Gallant (n 5) 553, 567. 
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as may be necessary to facilitate the cooperation of a State, intergovernmental organization or 
person’.  
As opposed to the court-wide agreements concluded by the President on behalf of the 
Court, the agreements under Article 54(3)(d) are negotiated and concluded by the OTP. 
Consequently, the Prosecutor may enter into such arrangements also where a general 
framework agreement for cooperation already exists19 and is not obliged to inform the 
President of their conclusion for confidentiality reasons.20 
 
2.4 The Privileges and Immunities of the Court  
 
A strong set of privileges and immunities is essential for the Court’s functional independence, 
so as to protect it from the interference of States in the discharging of its functions, and 
particularly in the course of the investigation.21 Indeed, privileges and immunities serve to 
guarantee that states’ authorities will not condition, control or hamper the activities of the 
OTP, for example, by denying visas to its staff for the purpose of on-site investigations, or by 
prosecuting victims and witnesses who agree to cooperate with the Prosecutor.22 As Cecilia 
Nilsson has noted, ‘these guaranties are fundamental for the Court considering the strong 
reliance on cooperation with a potentially large number of states that will often take place in 
the context of unstable situations’.23 
Unlike the ICTY and ICTR, the ICC cannot rely on the privileges and immunities of 
the UN, which have been established over the last seventy years of the organization’s 
existence.24 As a consequence, a separate set of privileges and immunities has been created 
for the ICC.  
The legal framework is set forth by Article 48 of the Statute, integrated by the 
Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the Court (APIC). The latter is a separate 
international treaty drafted by the Preparatory Commission for the ICC (PrepCom), and 
                                                
19 Regulation 107(1) of the Regulations of the Court. 
20 Regulation 107(2) of the Regulations of the Court. 
21 Lindsay Zelniker, ‘Towards a Functional International Criminal Court: An Argument in Favor of a Strong 
Privileges and Immunities Agreement’ (2000) 24 Fordham Int’l LJ 988; Stuart Beresford, ‘The Privileges and 
Immunities of the International Criminal Court: Are They Sufficient for the Proper Functioning of the Court or 
Is There Still Room for Improvement’ (2002) 3 San Diego International Law Journal 83. 
22 Cecilia Nilsson, ‘Contextualizing the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the International 
Criminal Court’ (2004) 17 Leiden Journal of International Law 559, 560. 
23 ibid. 
24 Phakiso Mochochoko, ‘The Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the International Criminal Court’ 
(2001) 25 Fordham Int’l LJ 638, 639–640. 
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approved in its final version by the ASP.25 Interestingly, the APIC is open to accession also 
for States non-party.26 
Article 48 sets out the general framework for the privileges and immunities of the 
ICC, compelling States Parties to grant such privileges and immunities as are necessary for 
the fulfilment the Court’s purposes.27 The judges, the Prosecutor, the Deputy Prosecutors and 
the Registrar, are given privileges and immunities normally accorded to heads of diplomatic 
missions.28 Similarly, the Deputy Registrar, the staff of the Registry and the staff of the OTP 
enjoy ‘privileges, immunities and facilities necessary for the performance of their functions’, 
in accordance with the APIC.29 By contrast, counsel – who is equated to experts, witnesses 
and any other person required to be present at the seat of the Court - ‘shall be accorded such 
treatment as is necessary for the proper functioning of the Court’, in accordance with the 
APIC.30 
The imbalance in favour of the Prosecutor is clear. While the protections for the 
former are clearly defined under international law – by the Statute referring to international 
law of diplomatic protection - immunities of counsel are contained in a separate treaty that is 
only binding on States that have ratified it.31 The consequence is that, not being enshrined in 
the Statute, defence counsel immunity does not automatically apply to all State Parties to the 
Statute. At the time of writing, only 75 out of 124 States have ratified the agreement;32 among 
the countries that have not ratified it are also Sudan, Kenya and Ivory Coast, on whose 
territory ICC investigations are currently on-going. This is regrettable, as an appropriate set of 
privileges and immunities of counsel and his/her team is crucial for the effectiveness of 
defence investigations, as counsel may need to travel to countries that are hostile to their 
clients (with whom they are likely to be associated) and to unsafe areas  (such as refugee 
camps) where many potential witnesses might be found.33 
 
 
 
                                                
25 UN Doc. ICC-ASP/I/3 (2002), 215-232. 
26 Article 34 of the APIC provides that the APIC is open to ‘all States’. 
27 Article 48(1) of the Statute. 
28 Article 48(2) of the Statute. 
29 Article 48(3) of the Statute. 
30 Article 48(4) of the Statute. It is also important to note that the Statute makes no reference to the protection of 
the persons assisting counsel and investigators. 
31 Mochochoko (n 24) 654; Nilsson (n 22) 562–565. 
32See: https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-
13&chapter=18&lang=en 
33 Beresford (n 21) 126. 
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3. The relationship of the Court with the actors on whose cooperation it depends 
 
In order to discharge its functions, the Court must establish relationships and secure the 
cooperation of the actors on which it depends. First and foremost, the Court needs the 
cooperation of the States that believed in the ICC project in the first place, those that created it 
and subsequently acceded to its Statute.  
The Court might also need to rely on States that, for whatever reason, have decided to 
remain uninvolved in its system. As Kenneth Gallant has pointed out, ‘the ICC, both as an 
international organization and as a judicial entity, exists as an independent creation in the 
international legal system, which can interact with non-party States, not merely with those 
that have created it.’34 In this respect, the relationship between the Court and States that did 
not accede to its Statute is far more important to the ICC than to the ICTY and ICTR. Given 
the quasi-universal nature of the UN Charter, the question of cooperation with states not 
parties was not of great significance at the ad hoc Tribunals.35 
Finally, as investigations are often carried out in the midst of on‐going conflicts, the Court 
often operates at the same time that other actors are present on a territory and are engaged in 
conflict resolution activities, such as humanitarian help and peace building missions.36 The 
relationship of the Court with other international organizations, thus, is also crucially 
important. 
 
3.1 States Parties  
 
The ICC was established by an international treaty, the Rome Statute, which binds only the 
States that have ratified it. Pursuant to Article 13 of the Statute, the jurisdiction of the Court 
may be triggered by a State Party or the Security Council referring a situation to the Court, or 
by the autonomous initiative of the Prosecutor, subject to the authorization of the Pre-Trial 
Chamber.37  
Owing to the fact that States non-party have no duties to cooperate with the Court, the 
drafters of the Statute limited the Court’s jurisdiction to situations that occur on the territories 
                                                
34 Gallant (n 5) 568. 
35 Astrid Reisinger-Coracini, ‘Cooperation from States and Other Entities’ in Göran Sluiter and others (eds), 
International Criminal Procedure: Principles and Rules (Oxford University Press 2013) 101. 
36 OTP, ‘Report on the Activities Performed During the First Three Years’, 32, available at: https://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/D76A5D89-FB64-47A9-9821-
725747378AB2/143680/OTP_3yearreport20060914_English.pdf.  
37 Article 15(3) of the Statute. 
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of States Parties or are committed by their nationals.38 The only exception is contained in 
Article 13(b) of the Statute, which provides for jurisdiction irrespective of the ratification of 
the Statute when the Security Council has referred the situation to the Court. 
A major part of the provisions concerning investigations is embodied in Part 5 of the 
Statute,39 in which the rules regarding the commencement of investigations and prosecution 
of the suspect are set forth. Part 5 governs the internal part of investigation proceedings, 
addressing them from the perspective of prosecutorial powers. Part 940 complements it by 
governing the external part of the Court’s procedure, that is, the obligations to cooperate 
incumbent on States Parties.41 Part 5 and 9 of the Statute, thus, must be read in conjunction. 
Part 9 creates cooperation regime for the gathering of evidence and for the arrest and 
surrender of persons. According to Article 87(1)(a), the Court shall have the authority to 
request cooperation from State Parties. It is useful to remind that, when such cooperation is 
requested for the purpose of an investigation, the term ‘Court’ stands for ‘Office of the 
Prosecutor’. This is because Part 9 does not attribute substantive powers to each organ of the 
Court, but rather attributes to each organ the capacity to request cooperation in the exercise of 
the powers conferred to them in other parts of the Statute.42 In this respect, the relevant 
provision of Part 5 is Article 54(3)(c), which empowers the Prosecutor to ‘seek the 
cooperation of any State or intergovernmental organization or arrangement in accordance with 
its respective competence and/or mandate’. This provision gives the Prosecutor the authority 
to activate the cooperation regime enshrined in Part 9. Rule 176 RPE specifies that the OTP, 
as an independent organ of the Court, can communicate directly with States and 
intergovernmental organizations.43  
Article 86 of the Statute obliges State Parties to cooperate fully with the Court in its 
investigations and prosecutions. State Parties are obliged to comply with requests for the 
types of assistance listed in Article 93(1), sub-paragraphs (a)-(k),44 and with any other type of 
requested assistance unless it is prohibited by the law of the State Party.45 Moreover, pursuant 
to Articles 89-92, they must comply with the requests for arrest and surrender of individuals. 
                                                
38 Article 12 of the Statute 
39 Articles 53 to 61 of the Statute. 
40 Articles 86 to 102 of the Statute. 
41 Reisinger-Coracini (n 35) 95. 
42 Göran Sluiter, International Criminal Adjudication and the Collection of Evidence: Obligations of States 
(Intersentia 2002). 
43 Rule 176(2) RPE reads: ‘the OTP shall transmit the requests for cooperation made by the Prosecutor and shall 
receive the responses, information and documents from requested States and international organizations’. The 
same is true for international organizations under paragraph 4 of the same Rule.  
44 Such as the taking of witness statements, the service of documents or the execution of searches and seizures. 
45 Article 93(1)(l) of the Statute.  
 24 
The obligation to cooperate also entails an obligation to adopt procedures under national law 
that will render such cooperation effective, giving States the means to comply with the 
Court’s requests.46 
 
3.1.1 Beyond the ‘horizontal’ v. ‘vertical’ classification of the cooperation regime 
 
As was the case with the ad hoc Tribunals, the ICC cooperation regime is a vertical one, in 
the sense that the Court is a supra-national institution in a hierarchical relationship towards 
national authorities.47 In the Blaškić subpoena decision,48 the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY 
clarified the distinction between the horizontal nature of inter-state cooperation and the 
vertical nature of cooperation with the Tribunals.  
In the horizontal relationship between sovereign States, cooperation is not mandatory 
in the absence of a treaty to that effect. In other words, general international law does not 
establish an obligation on States to assist each other in international criminal matters. 
Conversely, the Tribunals have the power to issue binding orders to States requesting their 
assistance, and States have an ensuing obligation to provide it.49 The duty of States to 
cooperate with the Tribunals is unconditional and absolute, as they may not invoke national 
interests, national law or competing obligations under international law as grounds for 
refusing to cooperate.50 More broadly, the vertical cooperation scheme is defined by stricter 
obligations, non reciprocity, and the right of the requesting party to interpret and determine 
the content and scope of a request for cooperation.51 
The verticality of the ad hoc Tribunals, however, is different from that of the ICC, and 
this has to do with the different source and legal base from which such verticality stems. The 
ICTY and ICTR cooperation regime draws upon the Tribunals’ status in the United Nations 
system.52 The Tribunals were established as subsidiary organs of the Security Council under 
                                                
46 Article 88 of the Statute. 
47 Sluiter, International Criminal Adjudication and the Collection of Evidence (n 42) 340; Frederic Megret, ‘In 
Search of the “Vertical”: Towards an Institutional Theory of International Criminal Justice’s Core’ in Carsten 
Stahn and Larissa van den Herik (eds), Future Perspectives on International Criminal Justice (TMC Asser Press 
2010). 
48 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blaškić, AC Judgment on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for review of the 
Decision of TC II of 18 July 1997, IT-95-14AR108bis, 29 October 1997, 47. 
49 Göran Sluiter and Bert Swart, ‘The International Criminal Court and International Criminal Cooperation’ in 
Herman von Hebel (ed), Reflections on the International Criminal Court: Essays in Honour of Adriaan Bos 
(TMC Asser Press 1999) 97–99. 
50 ibid. 
51 Reisinger-Coracini (n 35) 96–98. 
52 ibid. 
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Chapter VII of the UN Charter, as a means to restore international peace and security.53 
Decision under Chapter VII are legally binding on all members of the UN pursuant to Articles 
25 and 103 of the Charter, and requests for cooperation of the Tribunals ‘shall be considered 
to be the application of an enforcement measure under Chapter VII of the UN Charter’.54 In 
other words, the obligation to cooperate is an obligation placed, by the Security Council, on 
all UN members. The strictly vertical cooperation regime of the Tribunals corresponds to the 
general principle governing their jurisdiction, that is, the one of primacy over national 
courts.55 
Conversely, the ICC was established by a treaty negotiated by States and open to 
global accession. This means that ICC’s cooperation regime rests on a consensual basis.56 
Therefore, it is limited and opposable primarily only to States Parties to the Statute. This 
entails two consequences. On the one hand and consistent with the law of treaties, the Rome 
Statute does not create obligations for States that are not party to it.57 On the other hand, it 
foresees more concessions to the sovereignty of States and contains some exceptions from the 
duty to cooperate fully with the Court.58This corresponds to the general principle that the 
Court is complementary to national courts, which are vested with the primary right and 
obligation to prosecute international crimes.  
For these reason, the ICC cooperation regime has been defined as ‘a mixture of the 
horizontal and the vertical’59 or ‘a (weak) vertical cooperation regime.’60 Indeed, much of the 
debate surrounding the cooperation system established at Rome has focused on the distinction 
between its horizontal and vertical characteristics.61 
                                                
53 Article 39 of the UN Charter. 
54 Report of the Secretary General to the Security Council on the establishment of the ICTY, S/25704, 126. In 
accordance with the Security Council resolutions establishing the Tribunals (SC Res. 827/1993 for the ICTY and 
SC Res. 955 /1994 for the ICTR) and with Articles 29 and 28 of the Tribunal’s Statutes, all UN member states 
shall cooperate fully with the Tribunals and their organs, and shall comply with requests for assistance or orders 
issued by a Trial Chamber.  
55 Robert Cryer and others, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (2 edition, Cambridge 
University Press 2010) 510. 
56 Bert Swart, ‘General Problems’ in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta and John RWD Jones (eds), The Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court: a Commentary, vol II (Oxford University Press 2002) 1594. 
57 Rod Rastan, ‘Testing Co-Operation: The International Criminal Court and National Authorities’ (2008) 21 
Leiden Journal of International Law 434. 
58 Reisinger-Coracini (n 35) 96–98. 
59 Swart (n 56) 1594. 
60 Claus Kress, Kimberly Prost and Peter Wilkitzki, ‘Part 9. International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance: 
Preliminary Remarks’ in Otto Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (2nd edn, Beck/Hart 2008) 1507. 
61 Swart (n 56) 1591; Sluiter and Swart (n 49) 97–105; Sluiter, International Criminal Adjudication and the 
Collection of Evidence (n 42) 87. 
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The biggest concerns with respect to the weaknesses of the ICC cooperation regime – 
compared to that of the ad hocs - relate to the modalities of execution of the requests of the 
Court through the law of States, the limited capacity to conduct on-site investigations by the 
Prosecutor, and the impossibility to compel witnesses to testify. These problematic aspects 
will be addressed thoroughly in the following paragraphs.  
Distinguishing between the vertical and the horizontal features of the cooperation 
regime is a useful descriptive tool of the normative framework of the Court. However, it must 
be pointed out from the outset that the effectiveness of States’ cooperation with the ICC does 
not depend entirely on (nor is undermined solely by) such features of the regime. It has rightly 
been argued that ‘[t]he usefulness of distinguishing between horizontal and vertical powers 
breaks down (…) where the requested State ceases to engage with the Tribunal or refuses to 
cooperate’.62 This is because both the vertical and the horizontal model of cooperation hinge 
on an indirect enforcement system, in which compliance with the cooperation obligations 
depends primarily upon extra-judicial factors.63 
As will be seen in sections 5 and 6, the effectiveness of cooperation at the ICC 
depends on the acceptance of its authority by the requested State and, should that fail, by the 
active support and political pressure of the international community.64 In this respect, Astrid 
Coracini has rightly pointed out that the narrative regarding cooperation obligations ‘has 
shifted from emphasizing the compulsory element of the statutory duty of the requested party 
to the notions of partnership and shared responsibility’.65 
 
3.1.2 Execution of requests for assistance 
 
Contrary to the legal framework of the ad hoc Tribunals, which confer general power on the 
Tribunals to review national procedures for providing assistance and to pass judgment on the 
question of whether they satisfy their needs,66 the Rome Statute leaves considerable discretion 
to States in determining the modalities through which requests for cooperation are carried out. 
                                                
62 Rod Rastan, ‘The Responsibility to Enforce- Connecting Justice with Unity’ in Carsten Stahn and Göran 
Sluiter (eds), The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2009) 
166. 
63 Cryer and others (n 55) 528; Annalisa Ciampi, ‘Legal Rules, Policy Choices and Political Realities in the 
Functioning of the Cooperation Regime of the International Criminal Court’ in Olympia Bekou and Daley 
Birkett (eds), Cooperation and the International Criminal Court: Perspectives from Theory and Practice (Brill 
2016) 7–57. 
64 Rastan (n 62) 166. 
65 Reisinger-Coracini (n 35) 98. 
66 Swart (n 56) 1595. 
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Pursuant to Article 99(1), ‘requests for assistance shall be executed in accordance with 
the relevant procedure under the law of the requested State’. The ICC, thus, depends on the 
law of the requested state for the execution of a request for assistance.  
The same provision, however, allows the Prosecutor to require specific modalities of 
execution, including the permission for staff of the OTP to be present and assist during the 
carrying out of an investigative act by national authorities (for example, the exhumation of a 
grave site or the questioning of a witness). The procedure outlined in the request will have to 
be followed by the State unless its national law explicitly prohibits doing so. According to an 
Expert Paper commissioned by the OTP, ‘the Prosecutor should take full advantage of this 
exhortation, setting out in each request the manner in which the request should be executed, 
including with the direct participation of his staff and, if appropriate, defence counsel.’67  
 
3.1.3 The limited power of the Prosecutor to conduct investigations on the territory of States 
 
The Prosecutor needs to access the territory where the crimes occurred, as it is there that the 
majority of witnesses and physical evidence are located. The Prosecutor’s staff may need to 
conduct exhumations of mass graves, interview potential witnesses, gather DNA samples, or 
search public and private premises in order to seize relevant documents.  
Unlike the Statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals, which expressly lay down the power of 
the Prosecutor to conduct on-site investigations,68 the Rome Statute does not give the 
Prosecutor a general power to access the territory of States and collect evidence 
autonomously.69 This emerges clearly from Article 54(2) of the Statute. This provision 
empowers the Prosecutor to conduct investigations on the territory of a State according to two 
procedures: first, in accordance with the provisions on cooperation under Part 9 of the Statute; 
second, in the circumstances of the so-called ‘failed state scenario’ under Article 57(3)(d), 
subject to the authorization of the Pre-Trial Chamber. As will be seen, this latter circumstance 
is rather exceptional, as it presupposes the total collapse of the institution of a State.  
Considering the importance of on-site investigations, the scope under the Statute is 
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very narrow and reflects the horizontal approach to cooperation; the ICC is seen as a separate 
entity, not an extension of the national jurisdiction, and the Court’s activities on the State 
territory are therefore an intrusion on the sovereignty of the State.70 As will be seen, the 
Prosecutor’s power to access States Parties’ territory is limited and always mediated by the 
cooperation of the national authorities, subject to the only exception of the failed state 
scenario. As a rule, investigations are conducted by States, who either collect evidence on 
behalf of the Prosecutor or assist the OTP staff in the performance of the investigative 
activities. Article 99(4) foresees a partial exception to this scheme, in that it empowers the 
prosecutor to conduct certain investigative acts on the territory of States. However, this power 
is confined to non-compulsory measures such as taking voluntary witness statements, and 
may require consultations and sometimes adherence to reasonable State-imposed conditions. 
 
3.1.3.1 On-site investigations 
 
The power of the Prosecutor to directly access the territory of a sovereign State and perform 
investigative activities therein raised several concerns from the delegations to the Rome 
Conference, making the adoption of Article 99(4) particularly difficult.71 As a result of the 
compromise reached in Rome, the power to conduct on-site investigations has been subject to 
many limitations. Interestingly, the Statute does not contain the term ‘on-site investigations’, 
but instead refers to the ‘direct execution of a request on the territory of a State’, to imply the 
fact that this power remains within the cooperation regime of the Court and that judicial 
assistance from national authorities will still be required. 
Pursuant to the provision in discussion, the Prosecutor may conduct on-site 
investigations on the territory of States Parties only if the investigative act does not entail 
compulsory measures, that is, measures infringing on fundamental rights of individuals. Such 
non-compulsory measures may consist in voluntary interviews – that can be conducted 
without the presence of the national authorities if this is essential for the request to be 
executed - and the examination of public sites without their modification.  
Interviews with people and access to sites are an important part of an investigation. As 
of the first, the Prosecutor may only speak to people who agree to be interviewed and the 
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exclusion of national authorities will only be possible if this is ‘essential’ for the execution of 
the request (i.e. most likely when a witness is intimidated by national authorities and refuses 
to speak in their presence).72 The examination without modification of a public site or consists 
in the mere visit to a site without the possibility of collecting material evidence and having it 
examined or tested. The only activities that can be carried out, therefore, are the filming or the 
picture taking of the site. It follows from the clear wording of Article 99(4) that in no case 
national authorities can be excluded from the carrying out of these operations, and in no case 
can the Prosecutor access private premises without the authorization of the local authorities. 
Finally, Article 99(4) draws an obscure distinction n between on-site investigations on 
the territory of the State Party where the crimes occurred (territorial State), and those on the 
territory of any other State Party. In the former case, if there has been a determination of 
admissibility of the situation or the case pursuant to Articles 18 or 19, the Prosecutor may 
proceed ‘following all possible consultations with the requested State Party’. In the latter 
case, the Prosecutor may proceed following consultations and ‘subject to any reasonable 
conditions or concerns raised by that State Party’. Despite the ambiguity of this language,73 it 
is important to stress that in both cases the consent of the State is not required. Consequently, 
the State may not impose ‘unreasonable’ conditions and in particular those contrary to the 
express terms of Article 99(4) (i.e., requiring the presence of officials of the State during a 
witness interview).74 
In sum, on-site investigations pursuant to Article 99(4) are exceptional.75 It is implied 
that the preferable way for the Prosecutor to obtain direct access to witnesses or places will be 
via a request for assistance under Article 93. Article 99(4) will come into play only if the 
Prosecutor anticipates problems with direct access under a request submitted in the normal 
course.76 
 
3.1.3.2 The failed state scenario 
 
The only situation in which the Prosecutor may take ‘specific investigative steps’ on the 
territory of a State outside of the cooperation regime is the one of the ‘failed state’, that is, a 
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State whose institutions have collapsed and has lost control over its territory. Pursuant to 
Article 57(3)(d), however, such investigative steps must be authorized by the Pre-Trial 
Chamber, which must be satisfied that the State is ‘clearly unable’ to execute a request for 
assistance due to the ‘unavailability of any authority or any component of its judicial system 
competent to execute the request’. 
According to Rule 115 RPE, the Prosecutor’s request for authorization under Article 
57(3)(d) shall relate to specified investigative acts (‘certain measures’). This leaves no room 
for the authorization of vague and unspecified investigative measures.77 Upon receiving the 
request, the Pre-Trial Chamber shall, ‘whenever possible’, seek the view of the State 
concerned, so that it can be taken into account in arriving at its determination.78 The Pre-Trial 
Chamber’s authorization takes the form of an order and may specify the procedure to be 
followed in carrying out the collection of evidence.79 Notably, given the breakdown of any 
authority to whom a request of assistance could be directed, the sole legal basis for the 
execution of the measure will be the authorization of the Pre-Trial Chamber. 
Regarding the type of measures that can be executed on the territory of a ‘failed state’, it 
appears that, as opposed to Article 99(4), the Prosecutor may carry out directly any measures 
that are authorized by the Pre-Trial Chamber, including compulsory measures that would 
normally require a judicial authorization in the requested state (i.e. searches and seizures, 
exhumation of mass graves, interception of communications etc.).80 Even though a draft 
provision that explicitly allowed the Prosecutor to execute coercive measures in the territory 
of a failed state has been removed from the Statute, denying him/her such a power would 
seriously hamper the effectiveness of on-site investigations in these scenarios.81 As has been 
noted, Article 57(3)(d) represents the only exception to the principle of State consent under 
the Statute with respect to the enforcement of compulsory measures, which aims to remedy 
the void created by the absence of a domestic authority competent to authorize the measure 
itself.82 The stringent conditions imposed by Article 57(3)(d) are unlikely to manifest 
themselves in practice, even in the war-torn countries that capture the attention of the ICC 
Prosecutor.83 To date, the Prosecutor has never sought the authorization of the Pre-Trial 
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Chamber under this article. 
 
3.1.4 The limited power of the Court to compel witnesses to testify 
 
Until recently, scholars had been sharply divided on whether the ICC could compel witnesses 
to testify, due to the ambiguity of the relevant statutory provisions. Article 64(6)(b) of the 
Statute provides that the Trial Chamber may ‘require the attendance and testimony of 
witnesses and production of documents and other evidence by obtaining, if necessary, the 
assistance of States’. However, the Statute does not seem to contemplate an ensuing 
obligation of States to force reluctant witnesses to appear and give testimony before the 
Court. Article 93(1)(e) provides that States shall assist with ‘facilitating the voluntary 
appearance of persons as witnesses or experts before the Court’ [emphasis added]. Similarly, 
pursuant to Article 93(7)(a)(i), a person who is in custody in the requested State may be 
transferred to the ICC for the purpose of giving testimony only if that person freely consents 
to the transfer.84 Furthermore, Article 70 on offences against the administration of justice does 
not include the failure of a witness to respond to a request or summons from the Court to 
appear. 
According to many, these provisions clearly show that the Statute does not endow the 
Court with subpoena powers85 to compel the attendance of witnesses before it.86 This has 
been described as a ‘serious weakness within a system of international criminal justice 
wherein the Court lacks direct enforcement power, while being built upon the aspiration that 
the testimony of a witness at trial shall be given in person’.87 One scholar went as far as 
saying that this system entails, on top of the absence of a State duty to compel a witness to 
appear and testify before the Court – an individual right of persons not to do so.88 The 
prevailing opinion, however, seems to be that, pursuant to Article 64(6)(b) of the Statute, the 
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Court can indeed create an obligation of persons to appear and testify before it, but States do 
not have a duty to enforce such obligation.89 
Recently, the Court intervened on the matter. On 17 April 2014, the Trial Chamber 
granted the Prosecutor’s request to subpoena eight witnesses to appear before the Court in the 
trial of the case against Samoei William Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang (situation in Kenya).90 
According to the Prosecution, those eight witnesses were no longer cooperating or had 
informed the Prosecution that they were no longer willing to testify.  
The Chamber motivated its decision by stating, inter alia, that States Parties did not 
intend to create a Court that is ‘in terms a substance, in truth a phantom’.91 Rather, they must 
be presumed to have created a court with every necessary competence, power, ability and 
capability to exercise its functions and fulfil its mandate in an effective way. These include 
the power to subpoena witnesses.92 In the result, the Chamber found that the Government of 
Kenya had an obligation to cooperate fully with the Court: by serving the subpoenas to the 
witnesses and by assisting in compelling their attendance before the Chamber, by the use of 
compulsory measures as necessary.93 
The Appeals Chamber upheld the judgment of the Trial Chamber, however, it 
significantly restricted its scope.94 It first clarified that the question on appeal was not the 
general power of the Court to compel witnesses to come before it, as the Trial Chamber had 
implied, but whether the Court could summon unwilling witnesses to testify sitting in situ 
within Kenya or by way of video link to the ICC’s seat in the Netherlands.95 Second, the 
Appeals Chamber addressed the question of whether Kenya was obligated to cooperate by 
serving summonses issued by the Court, and whether it was required to assist the Court 
through coercive powers to facilitate the witnesses’ appearance in situ or through video link.96  
The Appeals Chamber rejected the defence argument that under Article 91(1)(e) States 
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are required to abide by an ICC order only when the witness chooses to give testimony 
voluntarily.97 The Chamber explained that the drafting history of that clause makes clear that 
the term ‘voluntary’ had been inserted to accommodate the concerns of the countries in which 
it was not constitutionally permissible to force witnesses to travel to another country to give 
testimony.98 However, the preparatory works revealed that negotiators had discussed 
alternative methods, such as in-country testimony and video link, by which the ICC could 
receive testimony from a witness who was unwilling to engage in overseas travel.  
In sum, the Court can legally compel witness evidence in the territory of the State Party or 
through video link to its usual seat in The Hague.99 Consequently, States Parties are required 
to assist the Court by compelling the witnesses to testify in situ or via video link. From this it 
follows that the Court may not require non-cooperating persons who do not wish to travel to 
The Hague to offer the required testimony.  
 
3.1.5 Cooperation not foreseen by Part 9 of the Statute 
 
The cooperation regime of the Rome Statute leaves out some matters that are crucial to the 
ICC’s effective functioning and the protection of fundamental rights of persons involved in its 
proceedings, such as the assistance that States must provide for receiving detainees on their 
territory after they have been granted interim release or following a conviction, and for the 
relocation of witnesses, victims and acquitted persons. As a consequence, these issues are left 
to voluntary cooperation agreements between the Court and States. 
As will be seen in Chapter IV, the absence of an obligation on States to allow interim 
released persons on their territory can de facto impede the realisation of the right to liberty of 
the accused. Regrettably, to date, only Belgium has entered into an agreement on interim 
release with the Court.100 Slightly more hopeful is the situation concerning the other forms of 
voluntary cooperation. To date, fifteen States have entered into witness relocation agreements 
and eight have signed an agreement on the enforcement of sentences with the Court.101 In this 
respect, it is important to remind that States always retain the discretion to enter into 
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voluntary cooperation agreements, and to make a final decision whether or not to accept a 
specific person (be him/her a witness, an accused or a sentenced person).  
With respect of sentences of acquittal, voluntary agreements only apply to individuals 
who were unable to return to their home country. In such cases, the Court must find a State 
that would receive the acquitted individual.102 Following the acquittal of Ngudjolo Chui in 
late 2012, the Court indicated that it would be unsafe for him to return to the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, and absent a voluntary release agreement for acquitted persons, Ngudjolo 
Chui had to make an asylum application in the Netherlands.103 
Recently, the Court concluded a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) on Building the Capacity of States to 
Enforce, in accordance with the international standards on the treatment of prisoners, 
sentences of imprisonment pronounced by the Court.104 The MoU establishes a framework for 
the Court and UNODC to cooperate in assisting those States Parties desiring to build their 
capacity to receive sentenced persons in accordance with international standards. To this end, 
it includes provisions on mutual consultations and exchange of information, as well as the 
possibility of UNODC providing technical assistance related to the treatment of prisoners and 
the management of facilities to States Parties.105 
 
3.2 States non-party  
 
The law that regulates the relations between the ICC and third States is embodied in the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 (‘the Vienna Convention’).106 The general 
principle is that a treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its 
consent.107 Third States, thus, are not bound by the cooperation regime in Part 9 of the Statute, 
in the absence of an explicit consent on their part.  
The Statute, however, foresees several ways in which States non-party might become 
engaged with the Court.108 First, Article 12(3) provides that third States may accept the 
jurisdiction of the Court with regard to a particular crime filing an ad hoc declaration to that 
end. In such case, they ‘shall cooperate fully with the Court without undue delay or exception 
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in accordance with Part 9’. A State not party accepting the Court’s jurisdiction, thus, is 
considered equivalent to a State Party for cooperation purposes. 
Second, pursuant to Article 87(5)(a), ‘[t]he Court may invite any State not party to this 
Statute to provide assistance (…) on the basis of an ad hoc arrangement, an agreement with 
such State or any other appropriate basis’.109 The word ‘invite’ shows that cooperation by 
non-party States is entirely ‘voluntary’ in nature.110 Some commentators noted that, in these 
cases, the third State concerned has a strong negotiation position, in that it can decide the type 
and the degree to which cooperation with the Court would be provided.111 To date, there is 
hardly any public information available with respect to the conclusion of such agreements.112 
Finally, there is one last way in which States not-parties might become engaged with 
the Court, and this can be without their consent. Pursuant to Articles 12(2) and 13(b) of the 
Statute, the Council may refer to the Court situations concerning crimes committed on the 
territory of every (UN member) State as a measure to maintain or restore international peace 
and security under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.113 To date, the Security Council has 
triggered the Court’s jurisdiction in relation to two third States. In 2005, it referred the 
situation on the Darfur region of Sudan, and, in 2011, the situation in the Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya.114  
One of the problematic aspects of these referrals concerns the scope of the duties of 
cooperation arising out of them.115 Referrals are an enforcement measure of the Council under 
Chapter VII and thus, in principle, they are binding on all UN members.116 In its current 
practice, however, the Council has limited the obligation to cooperate with the Court only to 
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the States concerned by the referral. In Resolution 1593, the Council obligated the Sudanese 
Government ‘and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur’ to ‘cooperate fully with and 
provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor.’ Resolution 1970 obligated 
‘the Libyan authorities’ to undertake the same kind of cooperation but did not include the 
language about ‘other parties to the conflict.’ Both resolutions are explicit that States not 
party have no duty to cooperate under the Statute and therefore they are merely ‘urged’ to 
cooperate fully.117 
 
3.3 International organizations 
 
Due to the fact that the investigations of the Court often take place in the midst or in the 
aftermath of a conflict,118 it is likely that the local institutions of a country will either be 
collapsed and therefore incapable of cooperating with the Prosecutor, or unwilling to do so 
because the perpetrators of the crimes still hold political positions or military commands.119 In 
such situations, the Court, lacking its own police force, might have no other options than 
turning to international forces for cooperation and assistance. 
First and foremost, international forces deployed in conflict and post conflict 
situations - such as UN or EU peacekeeping missions, and AU troops- could be the only 
entities capable of enforcing arrest warrants without the involvement of States.120 More 
broadly, UN missions and NGOs operating on the territories where crimes occurred are a 
crucial source of information and evidence for the Court. Given the constraints on its time and 
resources, the Prosecutor needs to build partnerships with local actors who understand the 
geography of the region, have access to the local networks, and are able to provide logistical 
support, as well as facilitate the access to evidence and witnesses.  
The Court, thus, would greatly benefit from the cooperation of international or 
regional forces that are already deployed on the territory with peacekeeping or law 
enforcement functions.121 However, the normative framework of the Statute regulating the 
relationship between the Court and international organizations does not facilitate the 
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obtaining of such assistance. In this respect, it will be seen that the Rome Statute clearly 
departs from the ad hoc Tribunals’ regime. 
Article 29 of the ICTY Statute and Article 28 of the ICTR Statute, imposing an 
obligation on States to cooperate with the Tribunals, did not refer to a similar duty for 
international organizations. However, in Simić, the ICTY used its inherent powers to extend 
the obligation to cooperate to SFOR – the NATO-led multinational peacekeeping force 
deployed to Bosnia and Herzegovina after the Balkan war122 - and NATO. 
 As the judges stated: ‘a purposive construction of the Statute yields the conclusion 
that [an order of the Tribunal] should be as applicable to collective enterprises of States as it 
is to individual States (…) There is no reason why Article 29 should not apply to collective 
enterprises undertaken by States, in the framework of international organizations and, in 
particular, the competent organ such as SFOR (i.e., the NATO force deployed in Bosnia 
Herzegovina)’.123 
Faced with chronic lack of cooperation and obstruction by the Serbian and Croatian 
authorities in the aftermath of the signature of the Dayton Peace Agreement, the ICTY had no 
other option than resorting to the help of NATO, the only armed force in the region capable of 
enforcing arrest warrants.124 Indeed, international forces have carried out most of the arrests 
on behalf of the Tribunal, their cooperation proving to be indispensible.125 
 
3.3.1 The normative framework of the Statute 
 
Despite the experience of the ICTY and the major role played by international organizations 
in the achievement of its mission, the drafters of the Rome Statute departed from the above 
regime. The Statute’s provisions determining the relationship between the Court and 
international organizations are the following.126 
Pursuant to Article 15(2) and Rule 104 RPE, the Prosecutor may, even before the 
commencement of an investigation, seek information from ‘organs of the United Nations, 
intergovernmental or non-governmental organizations’ that will assist him in determining 
whether there is a reasonable basis to initiate the investigation. Once the investigation has 
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started, Article 54, dealing with the duties and powers of Prosecutor, states that the Prosecutor 
may: i) seek the cooperation of any State or intergovernmental organization or arrangement in 
accordance with its respective competence and/or mandate;127 ii) enter into such arrangements 
or agreements, not inconsistent with the Statute, as may be necessary to facilitate the 
cooperation of a State, intergovernmental organization or person.128  
The cooperation regime of the Statute, however, differentiates cooperation obligations 
of States from those of international organizations. Whereas Article 86 imposes upon States 
Parties a clear and general obligation to fully cooperate with the Court, Article 87(6) more 
modestly states that: 
 
The Court may ask any intergovernmental organization to provide information or 
documents. The Court may also ask for other forms of cooperation and assistance which 
may be agreed upon with such an organization and which are in accordance with its 
competence or mandate [emphasis added].  
 
From this provision it follows that international organizations are not obliged to cooperate 
with the Court.129 As is the case with non-party States, cooperation by international 
organizations is voluntary, and its terms are left to the agreements between the Court and the 
respective organization.130 This is also confirmed by the fact that, whereas Article 87(7) 
empowers the Court to make a finding of non-compliance when States Parties do not comply 
with its requests and refer the matter to the ASP or the Security Council, Article 87(6) does 
not foreseen a similar power with respect to international organizations.131 Moreover, the 
cooperation and assistance that the organization provides to the Court must be explicitly 
envisaged in the organization’s mandate. 
The most important agreement between the Court and an international organization is 
the one concluded with the UN (see supra paragraph 2.1). Article 15 of the Agreement, 
entitled ‘General provisions regarding cooperation between the United Nations and the 
Court’, provides that the UN ‘undertakes to cooperate with the Court and to provide to the 
Court such information or documents as the Court may request pursuant to Article 87(6) of 
the Statute’. 
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In addition to the Agreement with the UN, formal cooperation agreements have been 
concluded with the European Union (EU)132 and Interpol. The cooperation agreement with the 
EU marks the first time a regional organization has ever signed such an agreement with the 
Court. The agreement underlines a general obligation to cooperate and provide assistance to 
the Court through, for example, a regular exchange of information,133 cooperating with and 
providing information to the Prosecutor,134 the development of training and assistance for 
Court’s officials and counsel135 and to take the necessary measures to waive any privileges 
and immunities of alleged criminals responsible for a crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Court.136 Further to the EU-ICC Cooperation and Assistance Agreement, a EU-ICC 
Implementing Arrangements was finalized in March 2008 for the exchange of classified 
information.137  
The OTP has also entered into a cooperation agreement with Interpol in 2004, for the 
exchange of police information and criminal analysis, as well as the search for fugitives and 
suspects138 The agreement further gives the Prosecutor access to the Interpol 
telecommunications network and databases. 
Since, to date, nine out of ten ICC investigations concern African States, a similar 
cooperation agreement with the African Union would be extremely important. The current 
political situation, however, does not leave much hope. Increasingly, African countries have 
come to be critical of the ICC because of the perceived bias that the Court focuses only on 
Africa and the perceived threats to their sovereignty following the issuance of arrest warrants 
against some African heads of States.139 The African Union has gone so far as to ask member 
countries to implement a policy of non-compliance and non-cooperation with the ICC and has 
attempted (unsuccessfully) to withdraw from the Rome Statute.140 
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3.3.2 Cooperation with peacekeeping missions in the field 
 
The significance of the cooperation of peacekeeping missions in the field with the ICC has 
been described by Margherita Melillo with the following three reasons: i) first, the mandate of 
peacekeeping missions and the jurisdiction of the Court often overlap, as they both operate in 
conflict and post-conflict situations; ii) since peacekeeping missions are often requested to 
report on human rights violations, they possess valuable information for the Court; iii) they 
possess law enforcement powers which the Court does not have.141 
Article 15(2) of the NRA stipulates that the UN or its ‘programmes, funds and offices’ 
may agree to provide to the Court other forms of cooperation and assistance compatible with 
the provisions of the Charter and the Statute. Similarly, Article 18 of the NRA, regulating the 
cooperation that the UN shall provide to the Prosecutor, contemplates special agreements 
between the latter and various programs, funds and offices of the UN.142  
These provisions have been the legal base for the conclusion of a number of subsidiary 
agreements, in the form of Memoranda of Understanding (MoU), between the Court and 
several UN peacekeeping missions operating on the territories subject to the Prosecutor’s 
investigations, such as MONUSCO (previously called ‘MONUC’) in the DRC143 and the 
United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI).144 A Memorandum of Understanding 
with MINUSMA- the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in 
Mali - was signed on 20 August 2014.145 Since the MoU with MONUSCO is the only 
agreement that has been disclosed to the public, the following subparagraphs will refer to it in 
discussing the cooperation of peacekeeping missions in ICC investigations.146  
 
3.3.2.1 The Memorandum of Understanding with MONUSCO in the DRC 
 
As has been seen, the power to carry out arrests or investigations on behalf of the Court must 
be explicitly envisaged in the UN mission’s mandate. So far, this has happened only in the 
context of proceedings before the Special Court of Sierra Leone (SCSL), where the Security 
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Council explicitly mandated a UN peacekeeping force to arrest a suspect of an international 
crime (Charles Taylor).147 
With respect to the ICC, the UN has been reluctant in allowing its peacekeeping 
missions to enforce arrest warrants and other forms of cooperation on behalf of the Court.148 
Due mainly to US opposition to the Court, initially, the mandate of the UN peacekeeping 
forces in the DRC (MONUSCO) did not refer to the ICC.149 Only in 2004, the mandate of the 
mission was specifically revised to enable the possibility for ICC cooperation.150  
The MoU between the ICC and MONUSCO foresees the assistance of the Mission, 
inter alia, in tracing witnesses, preserving physical evidence, carrying out arrests, searches, 
seizures and securing of crime scenes.151 However, it does not envisage the OTP directly 
requesting the aid of MONUSCO, but instead, views the territorial State (DRC) to be the 
party with the obligation to request support to the Mission.152 In other words, the enforcement 
powers of MONUSCO are made available at the request of the DRC Government, rather than 
that of the ICC.153  
Moreover, cooperation can take place only following a request by the Court and prior 
written consent from the Government of the DRC, the MoU reserving ample flexibility for 
MONUSCO to consider such requests on a case by case basis (taking issues of security, 
operational priorities, consistency of the requested measure with its mandate, as well as the 
capacity of the DRC authorities themselves to render the assistance sought). From this it 
follows that cooperation between the ICC and MONUSCO is conditional, indirect and 
inherently limited.154 
In 2013, however, the Security Council revised the mandate of MONUSCO following 
a new escalation of violence that took place in the country in 2012. With Resolution 
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2098/2013, the Security Council authorised the formation of ‘Intervention Brigades’, 
empowered to provide more proactive assistance to the Court.155 Moreover: 
 
[it] authoris[ed] MONUSCO, through its military component […] to take all necessary 
measures to […] [s]upport and work with the Government of the DRC to arrest and bring 
to justice those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity in the country, 
including through cooperation with […] the ICC.156  
 
As argued by Melillo, ‘this new explicit mandate sounds revolutionary’.157 According to her, 
MONUSCO is no longer prevented from entering into direct contact with the Court without 
having to seek an explicit authorisation from the Government.158 Although the Resolution 
2098 makes clear that the creation of ‘Intervention Brigades’ in the DRC was ‘on an 
exceptional basis and without creating a precedent or any prejudice to the agreed principles of 
peacekeeping’,159 in 2014, the Council established the UN Multidimensional Integrated 
Stabilisation Mission (MINUSCA)160 in the Central African Republic (CAR). One of the 
‘priority tasks of this mission is: 
 
Support[ing] and work[ing] with the Transnational Authorities to arrest and bring to 
justice those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity in the [CAR], 
including through cooperation with States of the region and the ICC [emphasis 
added].’161 
 
This mandate, thus, significantly strengthens the UN-ICC cooperation regime in the CAR. It 
has been argued that this suggests an evolving pattern in the way in which the Security 
Council envisages the fulfilment of its obligation to cooperate with the Court under the Rome 
Statute and the UN-ICC NRA.162 
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3.4 Final Remarks 
 
As noted by the Court in its Report to the ASP on the status of on-going cooperation with the 
UN, including in the field, the ability to frame and carry out broader, more proactive 
mandates requires a willingness to cooperate not only on the part of the UN and the ICC but 
also from the situation-State.163 This system may work well in case the State is willing to 
cooperate, as is the case with the DRC or the CAR. 
However, once can see the shortcomings of this system in situations where the UN 
mission is deployed against the will of local authorities, and where the government opposes 
the intervention of the ICC. This is the situation of Sudan. There, any links between the ICC 
and the international peacekeeping mission (UNAMID) have been avoided and UNAMID’s 
mandate contains no reference to international criminal investigations or prosecutions.164 
As has been argued, ‘[i]n these situations, a direct transfer from international custody 
to ICC custody, without the State acting as an intermediary, appears desirable. There is no 
legal basis in the State-cantered Statute for such a method, though. If the territorial State is 
indeed not willing to cooperate, a possible solution could however be for the international 
forces to have the arrestee first transferred to a State that is willing to cooperate. After all, 
persons could be surrendered to the ICC by any State on the territory of which that person 
may be found, arguably irrespective of how their presence on that territory was brought 
about’.165 
 
5. The politics of prosecutions 
 
The independence of the Prosecutor is crucial for guaranteeing the right to a fair trial. Article 
42(1) of the Statute affirms the principle of prosecutorial independence in stating that the OTP 
‘shall act independently as a separate organ of the Court’ and that ‘a member of the Office 
shall not seek or act on instructions from any external source’.  
Prosecutorial independence, thus, relates to both the institutional division of powers 
within the Court (internal independence) and the relationship of the Prosecutor with States 
and international organizations, first and foremost, the Security Council (external 
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independence).166 Clearly, the latter is the most delicate and difficult to safeguard, due to the 
very nature of international criminal prosecutions, which usually concern perpetrators who 
hold top-level positions in the institutional or military hierarchy of a State. In order to protect 
the external independence of the Prosecutor, the Statute has endowed her/him with a 
considerable degree of discretion.  
Prosecutorial discretion has been described as ‘the cornerstone of prosecutorial 
independence’, in that it is indispensible for holding perpetrators accountable, irrespective of 
their position in the political or military hierarchy of States and regardless of the interests 
involved in their prosecution.167 Prosecutorial discretion relates to the choice of the situations 
over which the investigation is commenced, and, subsequently, to the selection of persons to 
investigate and prosecute within the situation selected. In this respect, it must be reminded 
that the jurisprudence of the Court distinguishes between ‘situations,’ which may be defined 
in terms of temporal, territorial or personal parameters, and ‘cases,’ which comprise specific 
incidents within a given ‘situation’ during which one or more crimes within the jurisdiction of 
the Court may have been committed, and whose scope are defined by the suspect under 
investigation and the conduct that gives rise to criminal liability under the Statute.168 
Pursuant to Article 15 of the Statute, the Prosecutor has the power to initiate criminal 
proceedings proprio motu, subject to judicial authorization. In addition to a State or the 
Security Council referring situations to the Court, thus, the ICC intervention can be triggered 
by the Court itself through the decision of its Prosecutor, sanctioned by the Pre-Trial 
Chamber. This is an unprecedented power for an international criminal prosecutor and, 
undoubtedly, the most difficult compromise reached at the Rome Conference.169 
In practice, this provision entitles the Court to act and request cooperation from States 
even in situations and cases where States or the Security Council have not requested its 
intervention,170 and thus, possibly, even when they are hostile to it. Such capacity 
significantly distances the Court from all the previous international criminal justice 
experiences, which operated in execution of a specific mandate from a political body.171 
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Moreover, once the investigation has commenced and irrespective of the mechanism 
that prompted the Court’s intervention (referral or initiative of the Prosecutor), the Prosecutor 
has complete discretion over the temporal and geographical frame of the investigation,172 as 
well as the selection of persons to target for a prosecution. 
In two policy papers, the OTP has set out the considerations which guide the exercise 
of its discretion both in the opening of investigations into situations as a whole, and in the in 
the selection of cases within a given situation.173 Both papers stress the importance of the 
general principles of ‘independence’, ‘impartiality’ and ‘objectivity’.  
With respect to the principle of independence, the OTP made clear that 
‘[i]ndependence goes beyond not seeking or acting on instructions: it means that decisions 
shall not be influenced or altered by the presumed or known wishes of any party, or in 
connection with efforts to secure cooperation’.174 This also means that where a referral or a 
communication under Article 15 is accompanied by documentation that identifies potential 
perpetrators, ‘the Office is not bound or constrained by the information contained therein 
when conducting investigations in order to determine whether specific persons should be 
charged’.175 With respect to impartiality, ‘the Office will examine allegations against all 
groups or parties within a particular situation to assess whether persons belonging to those 
groups or parties bear criminal responsibility’.176 
 
5.1 The dependence on cooperation 
 
At the same time, however, this broad institutional independence of the Prosecutor relies on 
the same state-dominated enforcement system that determined the successes and the failures 
of the previous international criminal justice experiences, that is, the cooperation of States and 
the Security Council. The Prosecutor does not have a police force at his/her disposal to 
conduct the investigation and to arrest suspects, and has only limited powers to perform 
investigative activities on the territory of States without their consent and assistance. As a 
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consequence, investigations can only be conducted with the support of the State in which the 
investigation is being carried out. The ‘intractable paradox of independence and 
dependence’177is particularly visible in relation to the States where the crimes occurred 
(territorial states). Darryl Robinson explained the core of this tension very clearly: 
 
Territorial states - from the eyes of the international prosecutor - have a duality of nature. 
As a matter of international law, a territorial state is the lawful authority in the territory, 
whose cooperation is required to carry out meaningful operations on its soil. As a matter 
of criminal law, those authorities are also potential targets of investigation. Combining 
these strands, in international criminal law, territorial states are both lawful authorities 
whose cooperation is valuable, and also objects of analysis and investigation.178 
 
Since the beginning of his tenure, the ICC Prosecutor acknowledged that such duality changes 
the notion of prosecutorial independence, as traditionally understood.179 The above-described 
tension puts the Prosecutor in a position that is substantially different from that of national 
prosecutors, who may be seen to prejudice their independence if they engage with the 
political authorities of a State.  
Conversely, the very nature of an ICC investigation demands that the Prosecutor 
enters into dialogue with heads of State and Governments and with agencies of a State. 
Particularly, the Prosecutor ‘may have to have such meetings in order to receive referrals of 
situations, in order to discuss the modalities of cooperation with the Court (…) and in order to 
discuss prospects for a State’s own authorities taking proceedings themselves.’180 
In the absence of strong institutional safeguards of prosecutorial independence 
provided elsewhere in the Statute, however, one cannot count on much more than the 
Prosecutor’s own assurance that s/he ‘will carry out his responsibilities in this way without 
jeopardizing his independence and impartiality’.181 
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5.2 The Prosecutor as a political strategist 
 
Referring to the role of the Prosecutor at the ad hoc Tribunals, Victor Peskin said that the 
Prosecutor is not only ‘the trial lawyer who marshals evidence to convict war crimes 
suspects’, but is also ‘the political strategist who manoeuvres through the relatively 
unchartered shoals of the trials of cooperation to obtain state compliance for his or her 
courtroom mission to convict.’182 
The ‘trials of cooperation’ are the political interactions between the international 
tribunal’s Prosecutor, States and the international community over such matters as ‘whether 
and how many nationals or members of a particular ethnic group will be indicted; how far up 
the political and military hierarchy will such indictments reach; and how many nationals of 
enemy nations or opposing ethnic or political groups will face indictment and prosecution’.183 
Ultimately, these virtual trials will determine the level of cooperation that the Tribunals will 
receive from States and, consequently, the outcome of the trials of the accused.184 
This is even more true for the ICC Prosecutor, who, due to Court’s forward-looking 
jurisdiction, must often intervene in the midst or in the aftermath of armed conflicts, 
impacting on very complex political processes. The word ‘politics’ is often met with 
suspicion and disapproval when associated to international criminal justice. International 
lawyers conceptualize politics as the antithesis of justice, arguing that the Prosecutor should 
base her/his decisions solely on the norms of the Statute. Indeed, it has rightly been pointed 
out that Article 53 of the Statute, governing the commencement of the investigation, ‘does not 
leave room for the OTP to consider pragmatic issues of state cooperation - an inherently 
political issue - which may hinder its ability to conduct an investigation or prosecution’.185 
Undoubtedly, a Prosecutor who intended her/his role as a means to foster a particular 
political agenda would be ad odds with the ICC’s mission of delivering independent and 
impartial justice. However, this is only one possible definition of ‘politics’. Allen Weiner has 
endorsed a different definition of the term ‘political’, which could also mean ‘showing 
sensitivity to promoting the institutional well-being of the court in light of the prevailing 
geopolitical context’. According to him, international prosecutors should develop political 
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strategies that ‘include an evaluation of what will enhance the international status, legitimacy, 
and effectiveness of their tribunal in the international system’.186 
Paragraph 5.1 has shown that the OTP has been very clear in stressing that political 
considerations and cooperation issues play no role in its strategy for the selection of situations 
and cases. At the same time, however, the 2016 Policy Paper on Case Selection introduces the 
concept of ‘prioritisation’, pursuant to which the OTP will give precedence to ‘those cases in 
which it appears that it can conduct an effective and successful investigation leading to a 
prosecution with a reasonable prospect of conviction’.187  
Interestingly, among the criteria for prioritizing a certain case are: (i) the security 
situation on the ground ‘or where the persons cooperating with the Office reside’,188 (ii) the 
‘international cooperation and judicial assistance to support the Office’s activities’189 and (iii) 
‘the impact and the ability of the Office to pursue cases involving opposing parties to a 
conflict in parallel, weighed against the impact and the ability of the Office to do so on a 
sequential basis’.190  
These criteria, and the latter in particular, are clearly the result of fourteen years of 
prosecutorial experience in the above-mentioned ‘trials of cooperation’ with states authorities 
conceptualized by Peskin. In other words, the Prosecutor seems to be developing a framework 
for prosecutorial discretion that accommodates both legal and policy considerations. 
 
5.3 The Prosecutor’s investigations so far 
 
As has been seen, the willingness of States to engage with the OTP is essential for the success 
of the investigation. In the early years of the ICC’ s functioning, some scholars predicted that 
matters of cooperation would influence the Prosecutor’s discretion whether to open an 
investigation. As Cale Davis put it: 
 
[i]t seems unlikely that the Prosecutor would open an investigation into a situation where 
they knew, due to a lack of state cooperation, that no meaningful investigation could be 
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performed. Opening an investigation in such circumstances would only re-enforce the 
argument the Court is incapable of fulfilling its mandate.191 
 
Indeed, the early years of the Court’s functioning seemed to confirm this prediction. Fourteen 
years into the Court’s existence, however, it is interesting to look at how the paradox of 
independence/ dependence has played out in the investigations that the Prosecutor has 
commenced. 
 
5.3.1 Self-referrals  
 
At the beginning, the Prosecutor was cautious in using his proprio motu power. Instead, he 
entered into negotiations with some governments over potential self-referrals. The Prosecutor 
publicly declared his ‘interest’ for the events occurring in some countries, encouraging their 
government to refer the situation to the Court, and threatening to resort to his proprio motu 
powers in case they failed to do so.192  
The Prosecutor explicitly admitted that this strategy was aimed at facilitating 
cooperation.193 Between 2003 and 2004, three States followed the Prosecutor’s suggestion, 
namely, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Uganda, and the Central African 
Republic (CAR).194 By self-referring the situation on their territory, these countries welcomed 
the ICC’s intervention and promised their full cooperation with the OTP.  
Indeed, cooperation from these countries has been forthcoming. On 20 July 2004, 
Uganda signed the ‘Agreement on Cooperation and Assistance’ and an agreement on 
protective measures towards witnesses with the OTP,195 which enabled the OTP staff to 
conduct over 50 missions to the field.196 The government of the DRC has been the most 
cooperative. The Prosecutor reported that members of its staff have been deployed in the Ituri 
region of the country since shortly after the start of the investigation, and have conducted 
more than 70 missions inside and outside of the DRC. A Judicial Cooperation Agreement 
between the Office and the DRC was signed on 6 October 2004 to facilitate the missions, and 
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joint field offices with the Registry were established in Kinshasa and Bunia.197 Similarly, the 
CAR entered into a cooperation agreement with the OTP on 18 December 2007.198 More 
recently, other two African states (Mali and Ivory Coast), referred their situation to the Court 
and promptly entered into a cooperation agreement with the OTP.199  
In each of the above situations, the Prosecution has focused the investigation 
exclusively on non-state actors (i.e. rebels) and the referring government’s adversaries. Not 
once has the OTP targeted a leader or government official from any of these States. As Mark 
Karsten put it on his blog: ‘whom prosecutors target is largely determined by the cooperation 
of states. Put simply, states cooperate in order to implicate their adversaries while those actors 
that the court depends on for such cooperation tend to be shield from prosecution’.200 
At an event held by the Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC), newly 
appointed ICC Deputy Prosecutor James Stewart, commented on the OTP’s choice of 
charging only the opponents of the government in power in Ivory Coast, assuring that the 
Prosecutor’s intention has always been to target all sides of the conflict. However, he added, 
‘sometimes you just can’t do everything at once. You have to make a choice between action 
and paralysis and between pragmatism and ideals’.201 
 
5.3.2 Security Council referrals 
 
The opposite can be seen in the context of referrals of situations from the Security Council.  
So far, the Council has twice referred situations to the ICC: in March 2005, the Darfur region 
of Sudan, and in February 2011, the situation in Libya.  
In the Darfur conflict of 2003, Janjaweed militias backed by the Sudanese government 
began a murderous campaign against the African tribes in the Darfur region, which has left 
thousands of people dead, and at least one million people displaced from their homes. The 
international community remained largely inactive to the horrors in Darfur until March 2005, 
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when the Security Council referred the situation to the Court.202 The ICC investigation 
revealed that many high-ranking Sudanese officials were involved in the crimes committed in 
Darfur. In 2007, the Pre Trial Chamber issued arrest warrants against several leaders of the 
Sudanese government, among which, President Omar Al-Bashir, the first sitting head of 
States to face charges before the ICC.203 
In February 2011, in the wake of the violence waged by the regime of Muammar 
Gaddafi against protesters, the UN Security Council referred the situation in Libya to the ICC. 
The OTP responded with unprecedented speed. Just days after the Security Council 
Resolution was passed, the OTP opened an official investigation and made clear that it was 
targeting senior figure of Gaddafi’s regime. Within three months, the Court had issued arrest 
warrants against Gaddafi,204 his son Saif and his intelligence and security chief, Abdullah al-
Senussi.205 
Acting on behalf of the Security Council, the OTP has focused almost exclusively on 
government actors and the Security Council’s enemies.206 Not surprisingly, cooperation from 
these countries, which are not party to the Rome Statute, has been nothing short of disastrous. 
Sudan has refused to recognize the jurisdiction of the Court, and has committed never to 
surrender any citizens to The Hague. It has called the Court a neo-colonial plot aimed at 
overthrowing the regime. Not only the arrest warrants against government members and pro-
government militia leaders have not been executed, but Sudan has mounted a campaign to 
discredit the Court, discouraging international support for the ICC and pressing African States 
Parties to the Rome Statute to withdraw from it.207 
Libyan authorities have rejected the ICC’s demands to hand over Saif Gaddafi and 
Abdullah al-Senussi,208 claiming they were willing and able of trying them in Libya. 
Curiously, the non-cooperation of Libyan and Sudanese authorities is due to opposite reasons. 
In one case (Sudan), the ICC investigation targets the regime in power, which not surprisingly 
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refuses to be judged by an international court; in the other case (Libya), the newly established 
government is eager to prosecute and try the exponents of the former regime without 
interferences from the international community. Be that as it may, the first years of the ICC 
operations, have been marked by the perception that the Court is an institution that only 
delivers selective justice and that would ‘always side with governments and the Security 
Council in their political missions to discredit, delegitimize and dismiss their opponents.’209  
 
5.3.3 Proprio motu investigations 
 
It is probably (also) for tackling this perception that, in 2010, the Prosecutor decided to use 
his proprio motu powers for the first time, in relation to the violence that sprung after the 
disputed Presidential elections of 27 December 2007 in Kenya.210 In the investigation that 
followed, the Prosecutor targeted both sides of the conflict, and, on 23 January 2012, obtained 
the confirmation of the charges for two members of the opposition party at the time of the 
elections (Ruto and Sang), as well as for two members of the then incumbent party (Muthaura 
and Kenyatta).211 The four accused were allowed to remain at liberty pending trial. 
The ICC’s intervention in Kenya has helped to shape political alliances ahead of the 
Presidential elections of March 2013. Kenyatta and Ruto were in opposing camps in the 2007 
elections, but, following the confirmation of charges against them, they joined hands to form 
an alliance for the subsequent elections, in a clever anti-ICC political move.212 Kenyatta won 
the elections and became President of the country, with Ruto as his deputy. Kenyatta became 
the first sitting head of State to appear voluntarily before the Court pursuant to a summons. 
However, the experience of Sudan has shown that prosecuting a sitting head of State and his 
entourage is fraught with all kinds of obstacles. The Kenya cases were all terminated prior to 
sentence due to witness intimidation, political interference and lack of cooperation from the 
Government.  
On 11 March 2013, the Prosecutor announced the dropping of all charges against 
Muthaura, due to the loss of a key witness who had recanted testimony and claimed to have 
received bribes from defendants in the case and a lack of cooperation from the Kenyan 
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government in gathering testimony.213 On 5 December 2014, the Prosecutor announced it was 
withdrawing all charges against Kenyatta. In the withdrawal notice, the Prosecutor cited a 
lack of cooperation from the Kenyan government in handing over documental evidence vital 
to the case as part of the reason for dropping the charges.214 On 5 April 2016, Trial Chamber 
terminated the case against Ruto and Sang in deciding on a ‘no case to answer’ application of 
the Defence.215 This decision came after the Appeals Chamber forbid the use of prior 
recorded testimony by the Prosecutor, that is, it denied permission to use the initial 
declarations of a number of witnesses who later recanted their testimony under pressure.216 
The collapse of the Kenyan cases marked a huge setback for the Court and proved the 
impossibility of prosecuting State officials while depending on their cooperation, in the 
absence of a strong international support.  
On 27 January 2016, the Pre-Trial Chamber authorized the Prosecutor to investigate 
war crimes and crimes against humanity allegedly committed in South Ossetia in 2008 during 
the armed conflict between Georgia and Russia. 
 
5.4 Final remarks 
 
The present section has shown how the OTP has tried to reconcile the duality between its duty 
to act independently and the political realities within which its investigations and prosecutions 
take place. The vital need of cooperation from States has influenced the way in which the 
OTP has conceptualised and exercised its prosecutorial discretion. 
In particular, the section has shown that the main influence on the Prosecutor’s decision to 
commence an investigation into a situation and to target specific individuals is exercised by 
the actors who trigger the jurisdiction of the Court, especially when they are self-referring 
States or the Security Council.  
 
6 Addressing non-compliance: a political process 
 
Like its ad hoc predecessors, the ICC is unable to issue sanctions on persons or States in case 
of non-cooperation, but must, instead, rely on political bodies to enforce the administration of 
justice. In the Blaškić case at the ICTY, where the Croatian government refused to comply 
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with the Tribunal’s order to turn over documents, the Appeals Chamber denied the existence 
of an inherent power of the Tribunal to issue a subpoena to States and state officials.217 
However, it acknowledged an ‘inherent power to make a judicial finding concerning a State’s 
failure to observe the provisions of the Statute or the Rules’ and ‘the power to report this 
judicial finding to the Security Council’.218  
Similarly, pursuant to Article 87(7) of the ICC Statute, where a State Party fails to 
comply with a request to cooperate by the Court, the latter may make a finding to that effect 
and refer the matter to the ASP or, where the Security Council referred the matter to the 
Court, to the Security Council. The two addressees of the Court’s information or finding of 
non-compliance, the ASP and the Security Council, disclose the link of the judiciary to the 
political body, which holds the primary responsibility for enabling the Court to work 
effectively.  
Pursuant to Article 87(5)(b), the same regime applies to States not parties which have 
entered into an ad hoc arrangement or agreement with the Court, and to States not parties that 
have lodged a declaration in accordance with Article 12(3) of the Statute, which provides that 
‘the accepting State shall cooperate with the Court without any delay or exception in 
accordance with Part 9’. No similar powers are available in relation to the non-cooperation of 
international organizations.219  
The Court has given a very restrictive interpretation of the scope of Article 87(5) and 
(7) of the Statute. According to it, referral to the ASP or the Security Council is not an 
automatic consequence of a Chamber’s finding of a failure to comply with a request for 
cooperation. Rather, that Chamber has the discretion to determine whether it is necessary to 
refer the State concerned to the ASP (or to the Council).220 
 
6.1 The Assembly of States Parties 
 
The ASP is not empowered in the Statute with specific sanctioning powers, and must only 
‘consider (…) any question relating to non-cooperation’ pursuant to Article 112(2)(f). The 
Statute is silent regarding the scope of the ASP’s consideration and potential consequences. 
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As Sluiter has noted, ‘this calls into question the effectiveness of the Assembly’s responses to 
violations of the duty to cooperate’.221 
At its tenth session, the ASP adopted the ‘Assembly procedures relating to non-
cooperation’, which provide for informal and formal diplomatic and political measures to 
respond to situations of non-cooperation referred to the Assembly in accordance with Article 
87(5) and (7) of the Statute.222 The procedures includes the holding of an emergency meeting 
of the Bureau of the Assembly; an open letter from the President of the Assembly to the State 
concerned requesting a written response; consultations with the State concerned at the 
ambassadorial level; a public meeting at the Assembly; the issuing of recommendations as a 
result of the dialogue with the State concerned; and the adoption of a resolution by the 
Assembly with the concrete recommendations.223 They also provide that, exceptionally, the 
ASP may act informally without a referral from the ICC when ‘there are reasons to believe 
that a specific and serious incident of non cooperation in respect of a request for arrest and 
surrender of a person is about to occur or is currently on-going and urgent action by the 
Assembly may help bring about cooperation’.224 
In the two years after the procedures were established, the Court referred to the ASP 
and the Security Council the non-compliance of Malawi and Chad, which, on separate 
occasions, had failed to cooperate with the arrest and surrender of Sudan’s president Al-
Bashir during his visits to their territories.225 A fourth referral on non-cooperation was made 
following Bashir’s visit to the DRC in February 2014.226 The ASP acted on these referrals 
mainly by exercising diplomatic pressure on the States concerned, obtaining different 
outcomes. While Malawi denied to Sudan’s President access to its territory, Chad reacted 
negatively to diplomatic pressure granting immunity to Al-Bashir.227 
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6.2 The Security Council 
 
To ensure compliance, the Security Council has full discretion to make recommendations or 
decide upon appropriate measures available under Chapter VII. Although the Security 
Council has an array of coercive and non-coercive measures at its disposal, it has a poor 
record of enforcing international court orders and arrest warrants.228 The experience of the ad 
hoc Tribunals shows the absence of any political will on the part of the Council to enforce 
compliance with the Tribunals’ requests by means of Chapter VII.229 Although, following 
judicial findings by the ICTY, the Security Council adopted a number of decisions reiterating 
the duty to cooperate, the Council never imposed sanctions on the Serbian and Croatian 
authorities.230 
 In this respect, one commentator noted that ‘reliance on this mechanism (…) has been 
unpredictable, unduly time-consuming and often ineffective’.231 This is because ‘submitting 
the matter before the Security Council transforms a legal finding of non-compliance by the 
Tribunal into a political question and the resolution of such questions, if any, is complex and 
time-consuming’.232  
So far, the Council has maintained a similar disappointing inaction towards the ICC’s 
denounces of non-compliance. As has been seen, decisions by the Council to refer a situation 
to the Court are mostly made without the consent of the territorial state involved, which is 
often a State not-party to the Rome Statute.233 Not surprisingly, therefore, the cases arising 
out of the two Security Council’s-referred situations of Sudan and Libya have been extremely 
contentious, and have proven that only a decisive action by the Council would ensure the 
effectiveness of investigations and prosecutions.234  
The ICC’s findings of non-compliance,235 however, have fallen on deaf ears. Despite 
the Council’s experience in using financial, travel and diplomatic sanctions as part of its post 
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9/11 counterterrorism strategy, it has never done so in the context of crimes under the Rome 
Statute. This is regrettable, as these measures have, next to their practical aim of limiting 
individuals’ ability to escape ICC’s proceedings, also an important symbolic value.236  
In sum, the Security Council has taken no action to support the Court in 
accomplishing the judicial mandate that it had triggered. As has been noted, ‘[t]his inaction is 
driven by the Council’s political imperatives and divides with regard to the ICC’s 
investigations. This ‘on again, off again’ support makes the ICC seem like an instrument for 
achieving political ends through judicial means.’237 
 
6.3 The support of the international community 
 
There is a crucial difference in the practice of enforcement of cooperation at the ad hoc 
Tribunals and at the ICC, i.e., the role played by the international community outside the 
framework of the Security Council. 
The ad hoc Tribunals faced serious hurdles in obtaining cooperation from territorial 
States. For example, Serbia and Republika Srpska have a long history of refusing to execute 
arrest warrants by the ICTY.238 Despite the inaction of the Security Council, however, 
compliance with the Tribunal’s request for cooperation was prompted by powerful 
international actors, such as the United States, the European Union and NATO, who exercised 
a great deal of political pressure by diplomatic and economic means, outside the framework 
of the Security Council. For example, the United States and the European Union conditioned 
their financial aid to Belgrade and the prospect of EU membership to the surrender of 
Slobodan Milošević to the ICTY.239 More broadly, it is widely agreed that, at the ICTY, 
successful compliance was secured ‘because of a common, unified position adopted by the 
international community with regard to the values represented by the Tribunal’.240 
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By contrast, in the case of many of the situations before the ICC, the interests of the 
international community and the state concerned are typically far more disparate.241 Due to 
the ICC’s open-ended jurisdiction, the constant support of the international community is 
much more difficult to obtain. Whenever the Court seeks to prosecute individuals without the 
consent of the State on whose territory the crimes have been committed (and/or against whose 
nationals arrest warrants have been issued), it is very unlikely that the government will 
cooperate with the Court (as the situations of Sudan, Libya, and Kenya clearly demonstrate). 
Lacking the means to enforce the arrest warrants at its own initiative, and lacking any credible 
threat mechanism, the OTP will necessarily turn to other powerful actors: other States and 
international organizations, or, put differently, ‘the international community’.242  
The early practice of the ICC, however, has demonstrated that, if the interests of the 
Prosecutor in having certain alleged perpetrators arrested are not in line with those of the 
international community, cooperation from the latter will hardly be forthcoming. Peskin has 
explained this situation very clearly with respect to the situation in Sudan, comparing the 
political context surrounding the indictment of Prime Minister al-Bashir with the one 
surrounding the indictment of Milošević at the ICTY: 
 
the Milošević  indictment had a greater prospect of international support, since it came 
during the NATO assault to reverse Serbia’s military gains in Kosovo and the mass 
expulsions of Kosovar Albanian refugees that followed the beginning of the NATO air 
war. In contrast, Moreno-Ocampo’ s bid to prosecute Bashir has not occurred in the 
context of military intervention or substantial international pressure against Sudan’s 
president to reverse the situation in Darfur.243 
 
Peskin outlines that the international community – despite publicly portraying the Bashir 
government as a criminal and violent regime – ‘has engaged [it] in a long-running effort to 
find a negotiated solution to the Darfur crisis’. Similarly, the EU has been reluctant to press 
the Khartoum government to hand over suspects, due to its ‘interest in persuading the 
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government to allow an expanded peacekeeping force into Darfur and bring a resolution to the 
conflict’.244 
This makes it extremely difficult for the Prosecutor to obtain a constant and effective pressure 
on the Sudanese government and, thus, seriously undermines its efforts to bring Sudanese 
crimes suspects to trial. Generally speaking, it is a fact that the political priorities of the 
international community are often shifting. Its willingness to enforce the Court’s cooperation 
requests, therefore, will be informed by political calculations and its pressure will ultimately 
be selective. 245 
 
7. Conclusion  
 
This Chapter addressed some of the distinctive structural and normative constrains that 
characterize cooperation at the ICC, setting out the context for a proper understanding of the 
challenges that cooperation poses to the rights of defendants. As the ad hoc Tribunals, the 
ICC relies on an indirect enforcement system and is dependent on the cooperation of States 
(both party to the Statute and not-party) and international organizations (first and foremost, 
the UN and its peacekeeping missions in the field) for conducting investigations and arresting 
suspects. Therefore, just like its predecessors, the ICC is bound to be faced – and in fact, on 
several occasions, has been faced - with instances of non-cooperation.  
Unlike the ad hoc Tribunals, however, the Court is an independent international 
organization that does not have the backing of the UN Security Council. Its jurisdiction is not 
related to one geographically limited area/conflict, but can potentially cover crimes 
committed in every part of the world. Moreover and most often, the ICC intervenes in the 
midst of a conflict, where many other political actors are involved and conflicting interests are 
at stake.  
Having been established by a treaty, its regime is based on and legitimised by the 
‘consent’ of sovereign States who have accepted its jurisdiction and its cooperation norms by 
adhering to the Rome Statute. States not-party are not obliged to cooperate with the Court, 
unless they explicitly consent to do so or the Security Council triggers the Court’s jurisdiction 
on their territory. Similarly, international organizations remain outside of the reach of the 
Court’s cooperation regime. Their cooperation is entirely voluntary in nature and its terms are 
left to the agreements between the Court and the respective organization. 
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From a normative perspective, the ICC cooperation regime is ‘weaker’ than that of the 
ad hoc Tribunals. The Prosecutor has more limited powers to access the territory of States and 
the Court has no power to compel witnesses to testify before it. Moreover, the cooperation 
regime of the Court leaves out very important matters, such as the obligation of States to 
allow interim released persons on their territory. 
However, the Chapter has endeavoured to demonstrate that the real weakness of the 
ICC cooperation system lies elsewhere.246 Regardless of the norms enshrined in the Statute, 
the effectiveness of the ICC is largely dependent on whether the broader interests of the 
requested State coincide with those of the Court, and, should that fail, on the support of the 
international community. 
Accordingly, the Chapter has explored the paradox of an independent Prosecutor who 
often finds himself/herself in the difficult position of prosecuting the States’ authorities on 
whose cooperation s/he depends, and the role of the power politics at play in influencing the 
discretion of the Prosecutor in the selection of cases. When the government in power is 
supportive of the ICC’s intervention, the Prosecutor has opted for targeting persons that are 
hostile to the government, so as not to put cooperation at risk. In such situations, the 
effectuation of arrest is selective, and this inevitably casts a shadow over the universal, blind 
justice that the Court is supposed to administer.247 
When the government in power opposes the ICC’s investigation, it will not cooperate. 
States’ hostility to the Court can be due to a number of reasons. Sudan and Kenya are not 
cooperating with the Court because warrants of arrests have been issued against the highest 
exponents of their government. Conversely, Libya is not executing the request of surrendering 
Saif-Gaddafi because the newly established regime is eager to prosecute the members of the 
former government without any interference from the outside. 
The Chapter has thus analysed the role played by the ASP, the Security Council and 
the broader international community in case of non-compliance with requests of the Court. It 
concludes that, in a state-dominated enforcement system, ICC investigations and prosecutions 
remain tied to a political process that is, by nature, selective and mostly inefficient. As has 
been argued, such process ‘pays little or no heed to the imperatives of a pending investigation, 
trial or to international standards relating to the rights of an accused.248
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CHAPTER III 
COOPERATION WITH A COMPLEMENTARY COURT: A HUMAN RIGHTS 
PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Chapter II has explored the relationship of the ICC with the world in which it operates from a 
systemic perspective. It has addressed the law on cooperation in the context of the ICC’s 
unique institutional design and the political realities that inevitably condition its functioning. 
It is now time to explore the relationship between cooperation and the jurisdictional regime of 
the Court, in that its significance is often underappreciated. 
Traditionally, manuals of international criminal procedure address the cooperation 
regime in connection with the law of the investigation, as international criminal tribunals do 
not have enforcement means of their own, but depend on the assistance of states for gathering 
evidence and arresting suspects. Rarely, the analysis of cooperation is associated to that of the 
jurisdiction of the international tribunal in question. This is regrettable, as together these two 
regimes profoundly impact on individual rights (as well as on State sovereignty), and they are 
critical to the fairness and the expeditiousness of international trials. Recently, the 
‘ontological need’ for cooperation of international courts and the jurisdictional regime were 
defined as ‘the two fundamental pillars of international criminal justice that bolster the entire 
edifice of international criminal procedure.’1 
Part 2 of the Statute – on ‘Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Applicable law’ – and Part 9 
on cooperation are closely inter-related. The rules on cooperation are shaped by and mirror 
the fundamental choices of the Statute in terms of jurisdiction. Early on, scholars recognized 
that jurisdiction and cooperation are linked at the level of ‘fundamental legal principles’, in 
that their analysis ‘offers guidance to what degree the Statute is directly individual-related 
instead of constituting a purely inter-state instrument’.2 In other words, it is in light of the 
rules on cooperation and jurisdiction that a determination can be made as to whether, in the 
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development of international criminal law, ‘a state-sovereignty oriented approach has been 
gradually supplanted by a human-being oriented approach’.3 
The present Chapter investigates the relationship between these two regimes, and 
explains how the cooperation of states occurring within the complementary system of the 
Court affects the rights of defendants. The ICC is complementary to domestic courts, in the 
sense that, as a rule, genuine national investigations and prosecutions have priority. Therefore, 
unlike the ICTY and ICTR,4 the Court is precluded from requesting a state to defer on-going 
criminal investigations, but can step in only if states remain inactive, or if they show 
unwillingness or inability to genuinely deal with international crimes on their territory.5  
It seems pertinent to start with a brief enquiry on the nature of complementarity, 
highlighting the distinction between complementarity intended as the overarching principle 
governing the relationship between the Court and states, and complementarity as an 
admissibility rule codified in Articles 17 et seq. of the Statute. Moreover, it is important to 
distinguish between the concepts of admissibility and jurisdiction, as defendants are entitled 
to challenge them both under Article 19(2)(a) and, by so doing, they are offered an avenue to 
denounce violations of their rights occurred in cooperation proceedings. This discussion will 
also include a reflection on the overall position of defendants’ rights in the complementarity 
structure of the Court, so as to frame them in the context of a triangular relationship between 
States, individuals and the Court. 
Second, the Chapter describes the ways in which complementarity shapes the nature 
and procedure of the investigation. Due to complementarity, ICC investigations are not only 
concerned with building a case against an individual, but also with an assessment of the ‘job’ 
that national authorities are doing. This implies a peculiar proximity between the Prosecutor 
and national authorities (circumstance that is absent in any other international tribunal), which 
has inevitable repercussions on the position of defendants. 
Third, the Chapter examines the influence that complementarity has on the obligation 
of States to cooperate with the Court. The priority of national criminal prosecutions demands 
a particular regulation of issues such as simultaneous proceedings in the requested State, 
competing requests of assistance from other States, and, most importantly, cooperation duties 
pending admissibility challenges. Although, as rule, a decision of the Court on admissibility is 
decisive of the matter of whether States have to comply with requests for cooperation, the 
                                                
3 ibid. 
4 Rule 11bis ICTY and ICTR RPE. 
5 Article 17 of the Statute. 
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Libya situation demonstrates that, when a State opposes the intervention of the Court, it is 
very unlikely to cooperate with it, both before and after the Court’s determination on 
admissibility. As the Gaddafi and Al-Senussi cases demonstrate, this might entail serious 
consequences for ICC suspects who are detained by national authorities in violation of their 
obligation to cooperate and surrender persons to the Court. 
Finally, the Chapter critically evaluates the interpretation of complementarity adopted 
by the organs of the Court in their practice. It concludes that the ‘positive approach’ to 
complementarity endorsed by the OTP in order to enhance States cooperation has resulted in 
investigations that have targeted persons disfavoured by their government, and whose rights 
had been violated in the context of national proceedings. The judges, for their part, have 
refused to engage with the structural tensions and limitations of the Court with a view of 
protecting the rights of suspects and accused. Rather, they have given narrow/legalistic 
answers to broader policy questions.  
 
2. The nature of complementarity 
 
2.1 Preliminary remarks: complementarity v. primacy 
 
As was the case with the ad hoc Tribunals, the ICC’s jurisdiction is concurrent to that of 
domestic courts,6 meaning that the ICC and States have jurisdiction over the same crimes. 
However, unlike the ICTY and ICTR, which enjoyed primacy over national courts, the ICC’s 
jurisdiction is complementary to them.7  
Primacy and complementarity are different allocation mechanisms adopted by the 
founding instruments of international courts for determining which jurisdiction shall prevail 
in a given case. Pursuant to the former, the Tribunals can request States to defer a criminal 
investigation to their competence under Rule 9 of their Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 
Conversely, under complementarity, the Court may take up a certain case only if States fail in 
                                                
6 An international jurisdiction may be exclusive or concurrent. When it is exclusive, states will not have 
jurisdiction over crimes that fall under the international court’s jurisdiction. Thus, there is no collision of 
jurisdictions. When the international jurisdiction is concurrent with national jurisdictions, however, the 
international court and states have jurisdiction over the same crimes. An allocation mechanism is needed for 
determining which jurisdiction shall prevail in a given case. See: Jo Stigen, The Relationship between the 
International Criminal Court and National Jurisdictions: The Principle of Complementarity (Brill/Nijhoff 2008) 
7. 
7 The question of allocation of trials between national and international courts has been answered on an ad hoc 
basis in relation to each of the instances in which States have decided to establish international or 
internationalized criminal courts. See: Jann K Kleffner, Complementarity in the Rome Statute and National 
Criminal Jurisdictions (International Courts and Tribunals Series 2008) 57. 
 65 
carrying out their duty to prosecute international crimes committed on their territory.8 
Complementarity, thus, entails a conditional primacy of national courts, in the sense that 
States have to meet certain criteria in order to pre-empt the Court’s intervention.9 Such 
criteria are set forth by Article 17 of the Statute, which prescribes that the Court may step in 
only if States remain inactive, or their proceedings show ‘unwillingness’ or ‘inability’ to 
genuinely prosecute international crimes. Article 17 will be discussed in more details below, 
at paragraph 2.3. 
 
2.2 Complementarity in the intentions of the drafters and the ‘complementarity paradox’ 
 
Despite being often referred to as the ‘cornerstone’ of the Rome Statute, the principle of 
complementarity does not find a definition therein, besides a reference in the tenth paragraph 
of the Preamble and in Article 1 of the Statute, according to which the ICC ‘shall be 
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions’. The difficulty of pinning down the concept 
of complementarity can be explained by the fact that such principle has no precedent in the 
jurisdictions of international criminal tribunals, but it was defined and shaped for the first 
time during the negotiations of the Statute of the ICC. 
The term ‘complementarity’ was introduced in the ILC discussions, where it was 
acknowledged that this notion was not a ‘established legal principle’.10 Frequently, however, 
States discussed complementarity referring to the entire set of norms governing the 
complementary relationship between the ICC and national jurisdictions.11 In particular, the 
drafters intended complementarity mainly as an instrument to regulate potential conflicts 
between the primary jurisdiction of national courts and the residual jurisdiction of the ICC, 
and they viewed it primarily as a means to overcome sovereignty fears against the 
intervention of the Court.12 By granting priority to genuine domestic proceedings, 
complementarity was meant to strike a balance between the necessity of effective prosecution 
of international crimes and the safeguard the sovereign right of States to prosecute their own 
nationals without external interference.13 
                                                
8 Article 17 of the Statute. 
9 Stigen (n 6) 5. 
10 ibid 24. 
11ibid., 187-188; Markus Benzing, ‘The Complemetarity Regime of the International Criminal Court: 
International Criminal Justice between State Sovereignty and the Fight against Impunity’ in Armin von 
Bogdandy and Rüdiger Wolfrum (eds), Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, vol 7 (Koninklijke Brill 
NV 2003) 592. 
12 Carsten Stahn, ‘Complementarity: A Tale of Two Notions’ (2007) 19 Criminal Law Forum 87, 88. 
13 Stigen (n 6) 12–13. 
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According to many scholars, this understanding implies an antagonistic relationship 
between states and the Court, with the latter threatening to intervene if the former fail to carry 
out their duty to prosecute.14 At the same time, however, one cannot forget that the Court 
depends on the support and cooperation of States – in particular, of those States on whose 
territory the crimes are committed – for all the crucial activities of the investigation. The ICC, 
in fact, does not have autonomous powers to contact suspects, witnesses and victims, and to 
gather material evidence. Nor does it have the coercive powers necessary in order to enforce 
such activities.15 
In brief, by acceding to the Rome Statute, States Parties have agreed to delegate their 
sovereign right to prosecute international crimes to the ICC, should they not be willing and 
able to do so. At the same time, they have also agreed to undertake obligations of cooperation 
and assistance without which the Court would be utterly impotent.16 It has rightly been 
observed that, conceptually, this amounts to a paradox, by which the Court depends on the 
cooperation of States that do not have the will or the ability to prosecute international crimes 
themselves. Early on, Paolo Benvenuti summarized this tension in a rhetorical question:  
 
[w]hy would these States [on whose territories crimes have been committed], genuinely 
unwilling to carry out investigation or the prosecution, be subsequently cooperative with 
the Court? Similarly the reasons that make a State unable to carry out investigation and 
prosecution may make the same State, in some cases, unable to cooperate with the 
court.17  
 
As will be seen in paragraph 5, this tension had to be resolved in the practice of the organs of 
the Court, first and foremost, the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP). 
 
 
                                                
14 William Schabas, ‘Complementarity in Practice: Creative Solutions or a Trap for the Court?’ in Mauro Politi 
and Federica Gioia (eds), The International Criminal Court and National Jurisdictions (Ashgate 2008) 25; 
Robert Cryer, ‘Darfur: Complementarity as the Drafters Intended?’ in Carsten Stahn and Mohamed M El Zeidy 
(eds), The International Criminal Court and Complementarity: from theory to practice, vol II (CUP 2011) 1097; 
Stahn (n 13) 89. 
15 Flavia Lattanzi, ‘The Rome Statute and State Sovereignty. ICC Competence, Jurisdictional Links, Trigger 
Mechanism’ in William Schabas and Flavia Lattanzi (eds), Essays on the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, vol I (il Sirente, 1999) 57. 
16 Michael Newton, ‘The Complementarity Conundrum: Are We Watching Evolution or Evisceration?’ (2010) 8 
Santa Clara Journal of International Law 115, 126. 
17 Paolo Benvenuti, ‘Complementarity of the International Criminal Court to National Criminal Jurisdictions’ in 
Flavia Lattanzi and William Schabas (eds), Essays on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, vol 
I (1999) 50. 
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2.3 The legal framework: admissibility v. jurisdiction 
 
Although it can be argued that complementarity was intended more as a synonym of 
‘sovereignty’, rather than a defined normative concept with an inherent meaning,18 the Statute 
does provide for a codification of this principle in Article 17, a provision regulating the 
admissibility of cases before the Court. Complementarity, thus, is also a legal norm, which 
operates as an admissibility rule determining when the Court may intervene with the 
investigation or prosecution of a case within its jurisdiction. The first paragraph of Article 17, 
titled ‘Issues of admissibility’, reads as follows: 
 
Having regard to paragraph 10 of the Preamble and article 1, the Court shall determine 
that a case is inadmissible where: 
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, 
unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or 
prosecution; 
(b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the State 
has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the 
unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute; 
(c) The person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is the subject of the 
complaint, and a trial by the Court is not permitted under article 20, paragraph 3; 
(d) The case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court. 
 
Article 17(1) lett. a) and b) embody the complementarity principle stricto sensu. They make 
clear that the ICC is not supposed to replace national judicial systems, but its intervention 
should be viewed as a ‘last resort’, only stepping in when States remain inactive or, when 
their proceedings show an ‘unwillingness’ or ‘inability’ to genuinely investigate or prosecute. 
Interestingly, the wording of this article suggests that the complementarity regime protects the 
sovereignty of any State with jurisdiction over a case, including States that are not party to the 
Rome Statute.19 Article 17(1) lett. c) envisages the situation where a person has been tried by 
another domestic court and makes a bis in idem a cause for inadmissibility. Finally, Article 
17(1)(c) enshrines the criterion of gravity. This is distinct from the other criteria, as it applies 
                                                
18 Robert Cryer, ‘Darfur: Complementarity as the Drafters Intended?’ in Carsten Stahn and Mohamed M El 
Zeidy (eds), The International Criminal Court and Complementarity: from theory to practice, vol II (CUP 2011) 
1100–1101. 
19 See also Article 19(2)(b)-(c) of the Statute. 
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to all cases that are brought before the Court, not just those with respect to which national 
authorities have already taken action.20 
While Articles 17 addresses the substantive conditions for admissibility, Article 19 
deals with the procedural aspects related to both jurisdiction and admissibility of a case, 
instituting a forum to litigate and adjudicate disputes over them. Before addressing such 
procedural framework, it is important to highlight the distinction between admissibility and 
jurisdiction.  
Complementarity/admissibility does not relate to the existence of jurisdiction, but 
regulates when the latter may be exercised by the Court. The admissibility criteria of Article 
17 embody the conditions for the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction in specific cases. As 
such, they must be distinguished from the conditions of existence of the ICC’s jurisdiction, 
which are a pre-requisite for the Court to act21 and consist in limitations ratione materiae, 
ratione temporis and ratione personae. 22 
The drafting history reveals that States debated on whether challenges should apply to 
both admissibility and jurisdictional matters.23 With regard to jurisdiction, it was widely 
accepted that it is Court’s duty to satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction over a case ‘throughout 
all stages of the proceedings’. As for admissibility challenges, the prevailing view was that 
admissibility ‘was less the duty of the Court to establish than a bar to the Court’s 
consideration of a case’.24 As a result, Article 19(1) provides that the Court ‘shall satisfy itself 
that it has jurisdiction in any case brought before it [emphasis added]’ and that it ‘may, on its 
own motion, determine the admissibility of a case in accordance with article 17 [emphasis 
added]’. This provision is compounded by Rule 58(4) RPE, according to which ‘the Court 
shall rule on any challenge or question of jurisdiction first and then on any challenge or 
question of admissibility’. A determination of jurisdiction by the Court is thus always 
mandatory in any case brought before it, and preliminary to the assessment on admissibility. 
Conversely, with respect to the latter, the wording of Article 19(1) – ‘may’ instead of ‘shall’– 
                                                
20 Benzing (n 11) 619; Bruce Broomhall, ‘The International Criminal Court: A Checklist for National 
Implementation’ [1999] Nouvelles études pénales 144. 
21 Benzing (n 11) 594. 
22 Pursuant to Article 24(1) of the Statute, the competence of the Court is limited to those crimes listed in Article 
5 of the Statute, committed after the entry into force of the latter in 2002. Pursuant to Article 12(2) and (3), 
outside of the hypotheses of referral from the Security Council, the Court does not have jurisdiction unless either 
the State in which the crime was committed (territorial state) or the State of which the accused is a national 
(State of nationality) is a party to the Statute or has accepted the jurisdiction of the Court with an ad hoc 
declaration. 
23 John T Holmes, ‘The Principle of Complementarity’ in Roy SK Lee (ed), The International Criminal Court: 
the making of the Rome Statute  : issues, negotiations and results (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1999) 61. 
24 ibid. 
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suggests that, in the absence of a challenge, the Court has the discretion to make a finding on 
admissibility. 
Finally, it is important to stress that Article 19(1) endows the Court with the exclusive 
authority to determine disputes on jurisdiction and admissibility. According to the judges, the 
Court’s obligation to satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction over the case and that the latter is 
admissible is an essential element in the exercise of its functions, and is derived from the 
well-recognised principle of the kompetenz-kompetenz of any judicial body.25 
 
2.4 The nature of the admissibility assessment 
 
Complementarity implies a determination by the Court on whether and how national 
authorities are conducting proceedings in respect of international crimes, so as to determine 
which forum is the most appropriate for the prosecution of certain cases. Here, it is argued, 
lies one of the most interesting features of ICC investigations, namely, the fact that they are 
not only concerned with building a case against an individual, but they also comprise an 
evaluation of the ‘job’ that national authorities are doing in dealing with international crimes 
on their territory.  
Although it is formally part of the criminal process, the complementarity assessment 
does not concern the guilt or innocence of a person, but the admissibility before a particular 
forum.26 As a consequence, it involves aspect of inter-state litigation and systemic 
considerations relating to the objectives of the Court, including the appropriate balance 
between its role as a watchdog and its function as gentle incentivizer of domestic 
proceedings.27 
The OTP Informal Expert Paper on Complementarity in Practice gives some 
interesting insights as to the specific characteristics of this enquiry. For example, it 
distinguishes the active monitoring (conducting interviews, sending observers) and the 
passive monitoring (receiving reports, transcripts, media) of national proceedings by the 
Office, and highlights the importance of acquiring information from a multiplicity of sources, 
                                                
25 See, among others, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba, PTC II, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of 
the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08-424, 
15 June 2009, 23; Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony et al., PTC Decision on the admissibility of the case under article 
19(1) of the Statute, ICC-02/04-01/05-377, 10 March 2009, 45.  
26 OTP, Informal Expert Paper: The Principle of Complementarity in Practice (2003) 51-52. 
27 Carsten Stahn, ‘Admissibility Challenges before the ICC: From Quasi-Primacy to Qualified Deference?’ in 
Carsten Stahn (ed), The Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court (OUP 2015) 231. 
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namely, the prosecuting State, other actors (media, NGOs, experts, other States, international 
organizations), and the OTP itself.28 
As of the ‘evidence’29 required for this type of assessment, the Expert Paper mentions 
official documents (such as legislation and judgments) and non-official documents (such as 
reports of observers, monitors and expert opinions on the political and legal system of the 
country concerned, or on the handling of the relevant case or cases).30 
 
2.5 The rights of defendants in the complementarity system  
 
Complementarity can be invoked not only by States, but also by defendants. Article 19(2)(a) 
endows an accused or a person for whom an arrest warrant or a summons to appear has been 
issued with the procedural right to challenge admissibility pursuant to Article 17(1)(a)-(d). As 
can be seen, this right attaches at the point where the person’s liberty is at stake, through, for 
example, a summoning to a foreign court,31 and even before s/he has been arrested and 
transferred to the ICC.32 However, it is not unlimited. It can be exercised only once and prior 
to the initiation of trial, unless leave of the Court is granted and the challenge is based on a 
double jeopardy claim.33 
The procedural right of suspects and accused persons raises fundamental questions 
about the rationale of complementarity and the very nature of admissibility as a legal 
construct.34 Mainly, it shows the complexity of the complementarity architecture, which could 
arguably be seen not only as a means to protect States sovereignty and a basic limitation to 
the power of the Court, but also as a personal right of defendants.35 This vision is premised on 
the idea that the accused has a right to be prosecuted by domestic authorities and tried by 
his/her home court, where such a court is able and willing to do so.36 
As compelling as this perspective might be, the truth is that it could hardly be 
sustained. Burke-White and Kaplan have rightly observed that, in a variety of occasions, 
                                                
28 OTP, Informal Expert Paper (n 26) 37. 
29 They are not really ‘evidence’ in the traditional sense. 
30 OTP, Informal Expert Paper (n 26) 36. 
31 William W Burke-White and Scott Kaplan, ‘Shaping the Contours of Domestic Justice: The International 
Criminal Court and an Admissibility Challenge in the Uganda Situation’ in Carsten Stahn and Göran Sluiter 
(eds), The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2009) 93. 
32 Situation in the DRC, AC Judgment on the Prosecutor’s Appeal against the Decision of the PTC I entitled 
“Decision o the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest, Article 58”, ICC 01-04, 13 July 2006, 51. 
33 Article 19(4) of the Statute. 
34 Burke-White and Kaplan (n 31) 86, 91. 
35 ibid. 
36 Benzing (n 11) 598; Burke-White and Kaplan (n 31) 92–94. 
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States have waived their sovereign right to exercise jurisdiction in favour of other States or 
other judicial bodies. Moreover, pursuant to the principle of universal jurisdiction, 
international crimes offend humanity as a whole, and, therefore, any State has a right to try 
the perpetrators. Hence, since States Parties to the Rome Statute have transferred their 
territorial or national jurisdiction to the Court, ‘there is no reason for the accused to expect to 
be tried by his home court’.37 To the contrary, ‘the Rome Statute must be viewed as 
conferring new rights or supplementing existing rights of the accused with respect to the 
appropriate forum for prosecution’.38 
Along these lines, it has also been argued that the accused right to challenge 
admissibility under Article 17(1)(a) and (b) – as opposed to a challenge based on the ne bis in 
idem principle embodied in Article 17(1)(c) and 20(3) – does not amount to a right of an 
individual, but merely provides an individual with a ‘standing to raise an issue that relates to 
State sovereignty’.39 
Another important question is whether human rights of defendants can be invoked as a 
ground to challenge admissibility pursuant to complementarity, that is, whether a State could 
be considered ‘unwilling’ or ‘unable’ to genuinely prosecute because, instead of shielding 
perpetrators of international crimes from justice, it fervently and overzealously prosecutes 
them disregarding their fair trial rights. Some scholars have endorsed this view based on the 
wording of Article 17, according to which, in determining whether a State is unwilling to 
prosecute, the court shall have regard to the ‘principles of due process recognized by 
international law’.40 
In a recent decision, however, the Appeals Chamber sanctioned the opposite view 
according to which the determination under Article 17(1)(2) does not involve an assessment 
of whether the due process rights of a suspect have been breached per se.41 In particular, the 
                                                
37 Burke-White and Kaplan (n 31) 94. 
38 ibid. 
39 Jann K Kleffner, ‘Auto-Referrals and the Complementary Nature of the ICC’ in Carsten Stahn and Göran 
Sluiter (eds), The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2009) 52; 
Benzing (n 11) 599. 
40 Kevin Jon Heller, ‘The Shadow Side of Complementarity: The Effect of Article 17 of the Rome Statute on 
National Due Process’ (2006) 17 Criminal Law Forum 255; Federica Gioia, ‘State Sovereignty, Jurisdiction, and 
International Law: The Principle of Complementarity in the International Criminal Court’ (2006) 19 Leiden 
Journal of International Law 1095; for a contrary opinion see Enrique Carnero Rojo, ‘The Role of Fair Trial 
Considerations in the Complementarity Regime of the International Criminal Court: From to  ?’ (2005) 18 Leiden 
Journal of International Law 829; see also Elinor Fry, ‘Between Show Trials and Sham Prosecutions: The Rome 
Statute’s Potential Effect on Domestic Due Process Protections’ (2012) 23 35. 
41 Prosecutor v. Abdullah Al-Senussi, AC Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Al-Senussi against the decision of Pre-
Trial Chamber I of 11 October 2013 entitled ‘Decision on the admissibility of the case against Abdullah Al-
Senussi’, ICC-OI/II-OI/II OA 6, 24 July 2014. 
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concept of proceedings ‘being conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, is 
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice’ should generally be 
understood as referring to proceedings designed to make a defendant more difficult to convict, 
that is, sham proceedings aimed at protecting the person so that s/he can evade justice.42 In 
other words, ‘in the context of admissibility proceedings, the Court is not primarily called 
upon to decide whether in domestic proceedings certain requirements of human rights law or 
domestic law are being violated’; instead, ‘what is at issue is whether the State is willing 
genuinely to investigate or prosecute.’43 Doing otherwise would amount to consider the ICC 
as a human rights court, sitting in judgment over domestic legal systems to ensure that they 
are compliant with international standards of human rights, a role which is clearly not 
envisaged by the Rome Statute.44 
However, the Chamber acknowledged that in some circumstances, depending on the 
facts of the individual case, ‘violations of the rights of the suspect are so egregious that the 
proceedings can no longer be regarded as being capable of providing any genuine form of 
justice to the suspect so that they should be deemed, in those circumstances, to be 
‘inconsistent with an intent to bring the person to justice’.45 
More generally, the types of complaints set forth by Article 17(1)(a) and (b) do not 
apparently relate to the cooperation of States during the investigation. Rather, they have to do 
with the division of labour between the Court and States. Usually, admissibility criteria are 
conceptualized as an a priori set of conditions for the initiation of the investigation. The 
Rome Statute addresses them in its Part II regarding ‘jurisdiction, admissibility and applicable 
law’; manuals of international criminal procedure analyse them in their static and substantial 
dimension, before tackling the procedure of the investigation and cooperation.46 
The following paragraphs seek to address admissibility in its dynamic aspect. They 
contextualize admissibility criteria in the procedure of the investigation and, by so doing, they 
demonstrate that the division of labour between the Court and States is closely connected to 
cooperation, in that it influences the extent and the modalities in which the latter plays out in 
the course of the investigation. 
 
                                                
42 ibid., 218-221. 
43 ibid. 
44 ibid., 219. 
45 ibid., 230. 
46 Alexander Zahar and Göran Sluiter, International Criminal Law: A Critical Introduction (OUP 2007); 
Christoph Safferling, International Criminal Procedure (OUP 2012); Robert Cryer and others, An Introduction 
to International Criminal Law and Procedure (2 edition, Cambridge University Press 2010). 
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3. Cooperation for the purpose of the admissibility assessment in the course of the 
investigation 
 
3.1 The phases of the investigation: preliminary examination 
 
The Statute mandates the Prosecutor and the judges to carry out the complementarity 
assessment in different moments at the two phases of the investigation: the ‘preliminary 
examination’ of the information related to the crimes, and the actual investigation. Under the 
Statute, there is a clear demarcation between a preliminary examination and the formal 
investigation. They are different in purpose, investigative methods, as well as duties and 
powers of the parties involved. 
The Prosecutor may receive notitia criminis through a referral of a situation from any 
State Party or from the United Nations Security Council.47 In addition, individuals or groups, 
States and international organizations may submit ‘communications’ to the OTP containing 
information on crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.48 Upon receipt of a referral or a 
communication regarding the commission of crimes, the Prosecutor starts a ‘preliminary 
examination’ of the information received in order to determine whether a ‘reasonable basis’ to 
open an investigation exists.49 To this end, s/he is mandated to determine - in addition to the 
existence of the ICC’s jurisdiction and the interest of justice in the situation concerned - 
whether ‘the case is or would be admissible under Article 17’.50 
It is important to note that at this very early stage the Prosecutor has not yet developed 
a case against a specific individual. Thus, the assessment of national efforts is done ‘with 
respect to potential cases (...) that would likely arise from an investigation into the 
situation’.51 Moreover, since the investigation has not yet formally started, the Prosecutor 
does not enjoy the powers that Article 54 sets forth for the ‘investigation’.52  
The Prosecutor, thus, has only limited means of fact finding. According to Article 
15(2) and Rule 104 RPE, s/he may seek additional information on the alleged crimes from 
States, organs of the United Nations, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations 
                                                
47 Article 13(a) and (b) of the Statute. 
48 Article 15(1) of the Statute. 
49 Article 53(1) of the Statute. 
50 ibid; Article 15(3) of the Statute and Rule 48 RPE. 
51 OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations (2013) 43; See also PTC II, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 
of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-
01/09, 31 March 2010, 48; PTC III, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of 
an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, ICC-02/11, 3 October 2011, 191. 
52 OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations (2013) 85. 
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and other reliable sources, and may receive testimony at the seat of the Court. At this stage, 
thus, the OTP relies heavily on information from outside sources rather than its own 
investigators (i.e., UN inquiries, media reports and NGOs analysis).53 For the same reason, 
the cooperation regime under Part 9 seems not to be available yet. According to the Informal 
Expert Paper: 
 
it is only once a reasonable basis has been found by the Prosecutor under Article 53(1) or 
the Pre-Trial Chamber under Article 15(4), that an investigation would commence, and at 
that point Part 9 would become available to the Prosecutor (…) with the resulting 
obligations for the States Parties under Articles 86 and 93. Consequently, the measures 
taken during a preliminary examination are not measures within a formal 
‘investigation’.54 
 
The OTP has endorsed this view and, in its Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations of 
2013 confirmed that ‘at the preliminary examination stage, the Office does not enjoy 
investigative powers, other than for the purpose of receiving testimony at the seat of the 
Court, and cannot invoke the forms of cooperation specified in Part 9 of the Statute from 
States.’55 
In light of the above, one might have the impression that the preliminary examination 
is a static evaluation phase, which occurs mainly in The Hague behind the Prosecution staff’s 
desks, involving not much more than a careful study of the materials submitted with the 
referral and the reports published by the media and NGOs. It is submitted that this is often a 
misconception. Since the engagement of the Prosecutor into a situation, the Prosecution and 
states authorities work in close connection. In addition to collecting information regarding the 
commission of crimes, the Prosecutor has to verify whether genuine investigations and 
prosecutions have been or are being conducted in the State concerned. Moreover, it is during 
the preliminary examination that the Prosecutor endeavours to ensure the cooperation of 
States that will be so essential in the future, should an investigation commence.  
                                                
53 The OTP Expert Paper on Complementarity makes clear that ‘as a practical matter, it is expected that States 
Parties and other supportive States will choose to co-operate voluntarily with the OTP, and will likely respond to 
reason- able requests for information. Co-operation might also be further encouraged by courteously making 
States aware of the possibility that reasonable inferences might of necessity be drawn if information cannot be 
collected because of non-co-operation’, see OTP, Informal Expert Paper (n 26) 30. 
54 Bruce Broomhall et al., Informal Expert Paper: Fact-finding and Investigative Functions of the Office of the 
Prosecutor, Including International Co-operation (2003) 23, 25–29. 
55 OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations (2013) at 85. 
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Inevitably, this implies a certain degree of interaction and diplomatic efforts between 
the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) and national authorities; the OTP Policy Paper on 
Preliminary Examinations explicitly envisages the possibility for the OTP to ‘undertake field 
missions to the territory concerned in order to consult with the competent national authorities, 
the affected communities and other relevant stakeholders, such as civil society 
organizations’.56 On their side, States will have to allow the deployment of such missions on 
their territory, provide information to OTP officials regarding their judicial system and the 
proceedings that they might be conducting, as well as confirming their willingness to assist 
the possible investigation.  
It is submitted that, although it does not take the form of a formal cooperation 
envisaged by Part 9 of the Statute, the interaction between the OTP and national authorities in 
the pre-investigative stage implies a peculiar relationship between the Court and States which 
is absent in any other international tribunal. This relationship is significant for the rights of 
suspects. In this respect, it is important to underscore the fact that the Statute does not impose 
a deadline on the Prosecutor for completing the preliminary examination,57 nor does it foresee 
the involvement of the Pre-Trial Chamber in supervising the Prosecutor’s activities. This 
means that unsupervised negotiations between the Prosecutor and States can go on for years 
without a meaningful involvement of the judges in the situation of suspects until the issuance 
of an arrest warrant. As will be seen, this is especially problematic for those ICC suspects 
who are also subject to national proceedings at the time of the Prosecutor’s investigation. 
 
3.2 The ‘formal’ investigation 
 
Upon the conclusion of the preliminary examination, should the Prosecutor find the existence 
of a reasonable basis to proceed, s/he will open a formal investigation.58 It must be 
remembered, however, that in the absence of a referral from a State or the UN Security 
Council, the investigation has to be authorized by the Pre-Trial Chamber.59 It is from now on 
that the Prosecutor can make use of the powers set forth in Article 54, among which is the 
power to request cooperation and enter into agreements,60 and that States have the obligation 
                                                
56 OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, 2013, 85. 
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58 Article 53(1)(2) of the Statute. 
59 Article 15(3)(4) of the Statute. 
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to cooperate fully with the Court in the investigation and prosecution of crimes.61 Moreover, it 
is during this phase that the Prosecutor gathers allegations against one or more identified 
individuals and, when the evidence acquired satisfy the requirements under Article 58, applies 
to the Pre-Trial Chamber for an arrest warrant. The issuance of an arrest warrant marks the 
passage from the ‘situation’ to the ‘case’ stage of the investigation.62. 
It is important to underscore the fact that the Statute does not provide a deadline for 
the Prosecutor to apply the Pre-Trial Chamber for an arrest warrant. ICC investigations, thus, 
can be ended explicitly or implicitly, by deciding not to prosecute.63 The Chamber may 
review an explicit decision of the Prosecutor not to prosecute, but cannot to compel him/her to 
prosecute.64 
 Once the investigation has commenced, facts relevant for determination of 
admissibility form part of the investigation.65 The importance of cooperation for the purpose 
of the complementarity assessment is reflected in the organization of the OTP, which 
comprises a specialized unit – the ‘Jurisdiction, Complementarity and Cooperation Division’ 
(JCCD), composed by experts advising on both issues.66 This unit has the functions to: i) 
analyse the information received with the communications or the referrals; ii) provide the 
factual and legal analysis to enable decisions on whether initiating an investigation; iii) 
encourage and assist national proceedings (where possible), and verify that national 
proceedings are genuine; iv) establish networks of international cooperation by ensuring that 
necessary agreements and arrangements are in place to secure the cooperation of States and 
international organizations67 and, throughout an investigation, maintain contact with relevant 
authorities to facilitate on-going cooperation.68 
The OTP Expert Paper on Fact-Finding and Investigations has rightly observed that 
‘the relationship with the State exercising jurisdiction under complementarity is critical to 
facilitating the admissibility determination by the Prosecutor’ and that ‘the degree to which 
                                                
61 Article 86 of the Statute. 
62 According to the Pre-Trial Chamber, ‘situations are generally defined in terms of temporal, territorial and in 
some cases personal parameters’ and ‘entail the proceedings envisaged in the Statute to determine whether a 
particular situation should give rise to a criminal investigation as well as the investigation as such’. Cases, on the 
other hand, ‘comprise specific incidents during which one or more crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court 
seem to have been committed by one or more identified suspects’ and ‘entail proceedings that take place after 
the issuance of a warrant of arrest or a summon to appear’, see Situation in the DRC, PTC I Decision on the 
Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 and VPRS 6, 
ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr, 17 January 2006, 65. 
63 Sarah Nouwen, Complementarity in the Line of Fire (CUP 2013) 78. 
64 Article 53(2)(c) and (3)(a)(b) of the Statute. 
65 OTP, Informal Expert Paper (n 26) 32. 
66 OTP, Annex to the Paper on Some Policy Issues before the Office of the Prosecutor (2003) 6. 
67 Article 54(3)(d) of the Statute. 
68 OTP, Annex to the Paper on Some Policy Issues (n 66) 6. 
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there is a cooperative arrangement established may determine how successful the Prosecutor 
is in discharging his responsibilities’.69 In this respect, the experts acknowledged that, 
although the standards set forth by Article 17 are of an unambiguously legal nature, ‘there 
may be need to be political discussions and arrangements undertaken in order to facilitate 
decisions based on those legal standards.’70  
 
3.3 Admissibility as an issue of litigation and judicial determination 
 
During the situation and the case stage of the investigation, admissibility can become an issue 
of litigation and judicial determination. Whereas Article 19 of the Statute permits a State to 
challenge admissibility after a case has been initiated before the ICC, the process delineated 
in Article 18 permits a State to block the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over potential cases 
in a pre-emptive manner, if the State in question is investigating or has investigated these 
potential cases.  
 
3.3.1 Admissibility at the situation stage 
 
Article 18 of the Statute governs challenges to the initiation of an investigation into a situation 
as a whole.71 It provides that, following the notification of the commencement of the 
investigation from the Prosecutor, a State may seek a deferral of the investigation by 
informing the Court that it is investigating or it has investigated the crimes concerned. The 
Appeals Chamber has clarified that the wording ‘crimes concerned’ should be interpreted 
relatively broadly, particularly as ‘[o]ften, no individual suspects will have been identified at 
this stage, nor will the exact conduct nor its legal classification be clear.’72  
This Procedure is only available when the Prosecutor decides to open an investigation 
proprio motu or after a referral of a situation by a State, but not if the situation was referred 
by the Security Council.73 It is apparent from the wording of Article 18 that its regime also 
applies to investigations conducted by States not party. This Article, thus, evinces a broad 
                                                
69 Broomhall et al. (n 54) 35. 
70 ibid. 
71 William Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (Oxford University 
Press 2010) 365. 
72 Prosecutor v. William Ruto, Judgment on the appeal of the Republic of Kenya against the decision of Pre-Trial 
Chamber II of 30 May 2011 entitled "Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the 
Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute", ICC-01/09-01/11-307, 30 August 2011, 
39. 
73 Article 18(1) of the Statute. 
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recognition that the Court should only intervene where domestic jurisdictions are either 
unwilling or unable to do so.74  
The Prosecutor shall comply with the State’s request to defer the investigation, unless 
the investigation is authorized by the Pre-Trial Chamber.75 Pursuant to Rule 53 RPE, the State 
seeking deferral will have to provide information concerning its investigation, and the 
additional information requested by the Prosecutor. Moreover, nothing prevents the 
Prosecutor from seeking information from other sources, such as NGO’s court monitors.76 In 
case of a deferral, the Prosecutor will follow up the national development of the case in 
question and the State may be asked to submit periodical information on its progress pursuant 
to Article 18(5) of the Statute.  
As can be seen, notwithstanding the overarching presumption that national courts have 
priority over the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, the procedural requirements 
delineated in the Article in discussion place a relatively strict burden on States to assert their 
right to prosecute in a diligent and expeditious manner. As enunciated by the Appeals 
Chamber: 
 
[t]he complementarity principle, as enshrined in the Statute, strikes a balance between 
safeguarding the primacy of domestic proceedings vis-à-vis the International Criminal 
Court on the one hand, and the goal of the Rome Statute to put an end to impunity on the 
other hand. If States do not or cannot investigate and, where necessary, prosecute, the 
International Criminal Court must be able to step in.77 
 
Whereas States have a very limited window through which to assert their primacy over a 
situation, the Appeals Chamber has nonetheless suggested that, outside of the framework of 
admissibility proceedings, the Prosecution should use its discretion to enter into dialogue with 
States concerning the division of labour between them: 
 
The Appeals Chamber accepts that there may be national legislation in existence or other 
impediments to a State being able to either disclose to the Court the progress of its 
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75 Article 18(2) Statute. 
76 Broomhall et al. (n 54) 35, 41. 
77 Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo, AC Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Germain Katanga 
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investigations, or to take all the necessary steps to investigate. In this case, Libya has 
asserted, inter alia, that it is a State in transition; it also asserts that it was prevented from 
disclosing to the Court evidence as to the investigations it was undertaking as a result of 
article 59 of its Code of Criminal Procedure, which it submits required it to maintain 
information as to investigations confidential; and it asserts that the appointment of a new 
Prosecutor-General was significant, therefore justifying more time. While accepting the 
reality that these situations can arise, the Appeals Chamber nevertheless considers that a 
State cannot expect that such issues will automatically affect admissibility proceedings; 
on the contrary, such issues should in principle be raised with the Prosecutor directly 
(prior to instigating admissibility proceedings), with a view to advising her as to the steps 
the State is taking, any impediments to those steps and allowing her to reach sensible 
decisions as to whether or not, in the circumstances, it is appropriate for her, at that time, 
to pursue a case, pending the progress of investigations by the State. It is, in principle, 
not the place for such issues to be raised with a Chamber in the context of admissibility 
proceedings.78 
 
To date, Article 18 has never been applied. Ambiguities thus remain as to whether the 
procedure enables States to invoke the article in an effective manner, how the Court will 
interpret the notion of a ‘potential case’, and where the burden of proof will lie. 
 
3.3.2 Admissibility at the cage stage of the investigation 
 
When a case against a suspect has been developed, that is, when the Prosecutor requests the 
issuance of an arrest warrant or a summons to appear, challenges to the admissibility of cases 
(as well as to the jurisdiction of the Court) can be made by several actors under Article 19(2) 
of the Statute. First, pursuant to Article 19(2)(a), the right to challenge the admissibility is 
granted to the accused79 and to any person in respect of whom the ICC has issued a warrant of 
arrest or a summons to appear. Second, Article 19(2)(b) and (c) afford the same right to ‘a 
State which has jurisdiction over a case’ and ‘a State from which acceptance of jurisdiction is 
required under Article 12’ respectively. In this case, the Prosecutor shall suspend the 
                                                
78 Prosecutor v. Saif Gaddafi, AC Judgment on the appeal of Libya against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I 
of 31 May 2013 entitled “Decision on the admissibility of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi", ICC-01/11-
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investigation pending the determination of the challenge by the Court80 (albeit orders and 
warrants ordered by the Court prior to the challenge continue to be valid) 81. Third, pursuant 
to Article 19(3), the Prosecutor may seek a ruling from the Court regarding a question of 
admissibility (or jurisdiction). Finally, Article 19(1) provides that the Court ‘may’, on its own 
motion, determine the admissibility of a case in accordance with Article 17.82  
So far, the Pre-Trial Chamber has mainly used this prerogative at the moment of the 
issuance of an arrest warrant.83 The Appeals Chamber, however, has criticized this approach, 
in that a determination of admissibility at such an early stage may jeopardize the right of the 
suspect to challenge admissibility of his/her case pursuant to Article 19(2)(a). This is 
especially true when the Prosecutor’s application for a warrant of arrest has been is made on a 
confidential and ex parte basis. The Appeals Chamber, therefore, has cautioned the Pre-Trial 
Chamber to exercise its discretion under Article 19(1) only when it is appropriate in the 
circumstances of the case – such as, for example, when a ‘ostensible cause’ or a ‘self-evident 
factor’ impels the exercise of such discretion - bearing in mind the interests of the suspect.84  
Pursuant to Article 19(5), the State challenging the admissibility of a case shall make 
the challenge at ‘the earliest opportunity’. The Court clarified that this means that a State must 
file the challenge ‘as soon as possible’ once it is in a position to actually assert that it is 
investigating the same case.85  
Under article 19(10), the prosecutor may submit a request for the review of the 
admissibility decision after being satisfied ‘that new facts have risen which negate the basis 
on which the case had previously been found inadmissible under article 17 by the Court’. The 
Appeals Chamber held that the inclusion of article 19(10) clarifies that any admissibility 
assessment must take into consideration the change of circumstances over time. It explained 
that ‘the admissibility of a case under article 17 (1)(a), (b) and (c) of the Statute depends 
primarily on the investigative and prosecutorial activities of the States having jurisdiction. 
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These activities may change over time’86 Thus, a case that was originally admissible may be 
rendered inadmissible by a change of circumstances in the concerned States and vice versa’.  
 
3.3.3 Provisional investigative measures 
 
In case of a deferral to a State’s investigation (or pending a ruling by the Pre-Trial Chamber) 
under Article 18, or a challenge to the jurisdiction or the admissibility according to Article 19, 
the Prosecutor may seek authorization from the Pre-Trial Chamber for provisional 
investigative measures ‘for the purpose of preserving evidence where there is a unique 
opportunity to obtain important evidence or there is a significant risk that such evidence may 
not subsequently be available.’87 
In case of a challenge under Article 19, the available measures are more extensive, and 
also include the taking of a statement or testimony from a witness, completing the collection 
of evidence already initiated, and preventing the absconding of persons subject to an arrest 
warrant in cooperation with the States concerned.88 Cooperation under Part 9 is available for 
the measures authorized by the Chamber.89 
 
4. The influence of the principle of complementarity on States’ obligation to cooperate 
with the Court  
 
The principles governing jurisdiction and admissibility have a great influence on the rules on 
cooperation. It is essential, thus, that the provisions on jurisdiction and admissibility in Part 2 
of the Statute are coherent with those on cooperation in Part 9. As has been stated, ‘in so far 
as a legal problem of cooperation arises that is directly interrelated with issues covered in 
Parts 2 and 5 and that is not specifically dealt with in Part 9, it appears advisable to resort to a 
systematical interpretation that guarantees the coherency between the solution found in Part 9 
and the relevant rule(s) in Parts 2 and/or 5.’90 
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Under complementarity, genuine domestic investigations and prosecutions have 
priority; at the same time, however, pursuant to the principle of kompetenz-kompetenz of the 
Court enshrined in Article 19(1) of the Statute, it is exclusively up to it to determine whether 
it has jurisdiction on a given case and whether a case is admissible. As a consequence, the 
provisions of Part 9 provide that a refusal to cooperate with the Court can never be based on 
the requested State’s unilateral assessment that the Court has no jurisdiction or that a case is 
inadmissible.91 In other words, a decision of the Court on admissibility is determinative of the 
issue of whether states parties have an obligation to cooperate with it. 
The interplay between jurisdiction and cooperation is especially reflected in the 
regulation of States’ obligations to cooperate in case of simultaneous domestic proceedings 
and competing requests for surrender or judicial assistance by other States.92 Consequently, 
Articles 95 and 89(2) that are about to be addressed, reflect the scheme of Articles 17 et seq.93 
 
4.1 The postponement of the execution under Article 95 
 
It has been seen that a complementarity challenge by a State under Articles 18 and 19 of the 
Statute has the effect that the Prosecutor must suspend the investigation,94 but the making of 
such a challenge does not affect the validity of any previous act performed by the Prosecutor, 
or any previous order or warrant issued by the Court.95  
Article 95 reflects the consequences of such suspension of the investigation for 
cooperation. It provides that a State may temporarily postpone the execution of any request 
under Part 9 while the Court is considering an admissibility challenge pursuant to Articles 18 
and 19, with the only exception of cooperation requests related to the provisional investigative 
measures that the Court has specifically ordered under Article 18(6) or 19(8). As the Pre-Trial 
Chamber has noted ‘it would be untenable for the Court to insist on compliance with a request 
(…), even at the risk of hampering the national proceedings, while its own investigation is 
suspended [due to an admissibility challenge].’96 
It is important to emphasize, however, that the suspension of the execution of the 
request is only temporary, and can only last until such time that a determination on 
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admissibility is made by the Court. Moreover, the request for cooperation remains valid in 
accordance with Article 19(9), and, during the postponement, the State must take all 
necessary measures in order to ensure an immediate execution of the request should the case 
be found admissible.97 As will be seen, Article 95 is consistent with Article 89(2),98 which 
regulates cooperation duties in case a suspect brings a ne bis in idem challenge before a 
national court. 
 
4.1.1 Application of Article 95 of the Statute in the situation in Libya: impact on the rights of 
suspects 
 
Libya was the first State to notify the Court its intention to make use of Article 95. It is worth 
taking a closer look at the situation in Libya and at the jurisprudence that originated from its 
decision to postpone a request for cooperation, as it provides a good example on how the 
rights of defendants risk to be ‘trapped’ and sacrificed by the interplay of cooperation and 
complementarity in the practice of the Court. 
In February 2011, a massive civil uprising and anti-government protests in Libya were 
met with brutal violence and repression from the 41-years regime of leader Muammar 
Gaddafi. In the midst of the upheaval, an interim opposition government, the National 
Transitional Council (NTC), was established, and eventually came to be universally accepted 
as the new governing body of the country.  
The ICC investigation in Libya, a State not party to the Statute, was opened on 3 
March 2011, following the UN Security Council Resolution 1970 (2011),99 which referred the 
situation to the Court.100 On 27 June 2011, the Pre-Trial Chamber I issued warrants of arrest 
for Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, his son Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, Libyan government 
spokesman, and Abdullah Al-Senussi, Director of Military Intelligence, for alleged crimes 
against humanity committed against the civilian population.101 Contrary to the majority of the 
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situations that are currently before the Court, in Libya the State of nationality of the suspects 
antagonizes the ICC, as the new government in power is very keen to prosecute the most 
high-ranking members of the old regime. Conversely, the Defence wishes to see them tried 
before the Court, as it is very unlikely that they would receive a fair trial in Libya.  
On 19 November 2011, Saif Gaddafi was arrested in the Libyan region of Zintan by 
rebel forces. On 17 March 2012, Al-Senussi was arrested in Mauritania and extradited to 
Libya on 5 September 2012. It was immediately clear that the suspects were not arrested on 
account of the ICC warrant, and that the new government did not intend to turn them over to 
the Court. Shortly after the arrest of Saif Gaddafi, on 23 November, the NTC wrote a letter to 
the Court stating that: ‘the National Transitional Council wishes to affirm that, in accordance 
with the Rome Statute, the Libyan judiciary has primary jurisdiction to try Saif al-­‐‑Islam 
Gaddafi and that the Libyan State is willing and able to try him in accordance with Libyan 
law’.102 Subsequently, similar affirmations were made by Libya’s Foreign Minister with 
respect to Al-Senussi.103 
Not surprisingly, thus, Libya never complied with its obligation to surrender Gaddafi 
and Al-Senussi to the Court. Moreover, it challenged the admissibility of the cases and 
simultaneously invoked Article 95 in order to postpone surrender pending the decision on the 
admissibility challenge.104 The Defence vehemently opposed such request, arguing that Libya 
was not entitled to hold the suspects while it challenged admissibility, but had to surrender 
them to the Court. The delay in the implementation of the surrender was seriously hampering 
the right of suspects to a fair trial, in particular, their right to be tried within a reasonable time 
and to be present and participate in the proceedings under Article 67(1)(c) and (d) of the 
Statute.105  
Al-Senussi’s Defence submitted that Senussi’s presence at the seat of the Court was 
required in order to ‘advance proceedings on admissibility and because it is the only way to 
give effect to his rights under the Court’s Statute and Rules’.106 More specifically, the 
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Defence averted that only if Al-Senussi is transferred to the Court, will he be in a position to, 
inter alia, provide instructions to his counsel, discuss with him factual issues relevant to the 
admissibility of the case, receive a copy of the warrant of arrest issued by the Chamber 
against him as well as of the admissibility filings, and attend the confirmation of charges 
hearing.107 
In the Gaddafi case, the admissibility challenge filed by the Libya’s Government came 
after 6 months from the initial arrest of Gaddafi by Libyan authorities; in the Senussi case, 
after more than one year.108 Throughout this period, suspects were held in isolation without 
the possibility to communicate with counsel, and were not brought before a judge,109 contrary 
to Articles 55 and 59 of the Statute. As a consequence, suspects were not able to effectively 
participate in admissibility proceedings, instruct counsel on a regular basis and attend court 
hearings.110 The Senussi’s Defence thoroughly explained how these violations resulted from 
Libya’s non-cooperation combined with the misuse of its prerogatives under the 
complementarity regime.111 In particular, the Defence pointed out that Libya, despite its own 
admission112 that it could have challenged admissibility already on 1 May 2012, waited nearly 
a year before it actually did so on 2 April 2013, contravening to Article 19(5), which requires 
States to challenge admissibility ‘at the earliest opportunity’.113 
Moreover, the Defence stressed that Libya had obtained custody of Al-Senussi from 
Mauritania in violation of Security Council resolution 1970 and the requests of the ICC for 
surrender. As a consequence, granting Libya the possibility to postpone the surrender of Al-
Senussi would amount to sanction its non cooperation, and allow it to benefit from its flouting 
of the Court’s requests.114 Finally, both the Defence of Gaddafi and of Senussi reported 
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statements of high-level Libyan authorities to the effect that Libya had no intention to 
surrender the suspects to the ICC, irrespective of the merits of their admissibility challenge.115 
 
4.1.2 Article 95 of the Statute in the rulings of the Court  
 
The Court refused to give weight to the Defence arguments in favour of a contextual reading 
of Article 95, but rigidly stuck to a literal interpretation of this provision. According to it, the 
only consideration that the Pre-Trial Chamber is called upon to make in deciding on a State’s 
request to postpone surrender is whether the admissibility challenge ‘has been properly made 
pursuant to Article 19(2) of the Statute and Rule 58(1)’.116 In both Gaddafi and Senussi, the 
Court found that this had been the case, and agreed to the postponement of the request for 
arrest and surrender of the suspects.117 It is worth taking a closer look to the Chamber’s 
decisions, as the Al-Senussi and Gaddafi cases had different admissibility outcomes. 
 
4.1.2.1 The Al-Senussi decision 
 
In Al-Senussi, the judges rejected in toto the arguments advanced by the Defence relating to 
the inapplicability of Article 95. However, they did not give any satisfactory reason in support 
of their findings. As of the timeliness of the challenge, the Pre-Trial Chamber simply stated 
that the mere chronology outlined by the Defence did not persuade it to consider the challenge 
tardy or abusive, and that the information before it did not ‘appear to indicate that Libya, 
despite being in a position to properly and timely challenge the admissibility of the case 
against Al-Senussi, unduly failed to do so in violation of Article 19(5) of the Statute.’118 
Moreover, the Chamber considered ‘immaterial’, for the limited purposes of Article 
95, a determination of whether Libya obtained and/or maintained custody of Al-Senussi in 
non-compliance with the Court’s request for his arrest and surrender. The purpose of the 
Court’s evaluation of the applicability of Article 95 ‘is not to determine whether or not the 
State has previously fulfilled its obligation to cooperate with the Court, but is rather limited to 
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preventing an abusive filing of an admissibility challenge automatically resulting in the 
illegitimate postponement of the execution of a cooperation request.’119  
Equally, the fact that domestic proceedings against Al-Senussi had not been 
terminated and that several statements by Libyan officials indicated Libya’s intention to try 
Al-Senussi domestically irrespective of the outcome of the challenge, did not persuade the 
Chamber. In this respect, it observed that ‘these mere facts do not, per se, amount to a 
violation of Libya’s obligation to cooperate with the Court, insofar as Libya must ensure that 
its on-going criminal proceedings do not hinder or delay Al-Senussi’s surrender to the Court 
should the case eventually be declared admissible’.120  
The most unsatisfactory answer, however, was given to the Defence’s complaint that 
the postponement of surrender would de facto deprive the accused of his rights under the 
Statute and the Rules. The Chamber ‘noted’ this argument. However, it held that ‘such 
argument, even if upheld, would not negate Libya’s entitlement to postpone the execution of 
the Surrender Request in the presence of an admissibility challenge that has been properly 
made consistently with the terms of the relevant statutory provisions’.121 It did not give 
further explanations.  
Nevertheless, the Chamber emphasizes that the postponement in no way affects 
Libya’s continuing obligation to cooperate with the Court, as decided by the Security Council. 
Accordingly, Libya remains under the duty to provide all assistance required by the Court in 
particular in order to ensure the full and effective exercise of Al-Senussi’s rights and to 
facilitate a timely determination of the admissibility challenge.122 The Chamber, thus, warned 
Libya to refrain from taking any action which could hamper the prompt execution of the 
surrender request should the case be found admissible.123 
The Defence appeal against this decision was dismissed after the Appeals Chamber 
confirmed the Pre-Trial Chamber’s finding that Al-Senussi’s case is inadmissible.124 Despite 
this finding, the Chamber observed that the Prosecutor may still submit a request for review 
of the decision in accordance with article 19(10).125  
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On 28 July 2015, the Tripoli Court of Assize convicted and sentenced Al-Senussi to 
death along with several other co-accused for their roles during Libya’s 2011 uprising.126 In 
its latest report to the UN Security Council, the OTP stated that ‘[t]he Office continues to 
collect and analyse relevant information in relation to Al- Senussi’s case within the 
framework of article 19(10) of the Rome Statute’. However, as of now, it ‘is not fully 
satisfied that new facts have arisen which negate the basis on which Pre-Trial Chamber I 
found Al-Senussi’s case inadmissible’.127 The Office recalled the Appeals Chamber’s finding 
that, for due process violations in a domestic trial to lead to a case being deemed admissible 
before the ICC, the violations must be ‘so egregious that the proceedings can no longer be 
regarded as being capable of providing any genuine form of justice to the accused.’128  
 
4.1.2.2 The Saif Gaddafi decision 
 
In Gaddafi, the Pre-Trial Chamber used similar arguments. It is, however, worth quoting the 
central reasoning by which the judges rejected the reading of Article 95 proposed by the 
Defence, in that it is particularly revealing of the Court’s tendency to entrench itself behind 
the literal interpretation of the Statute. To the objection that the delay in the implementation 
of the surrender was seriously hampering the right of Gaddafi to a fair trial, the judges replied 
that: 
 
the Court must fulfil its mandate in accordance with its legal framework and that the 
complementarity principle is a central aspect thereof and a key feature of the institution. 
The suspension of the [Court’s] investigation and the corresponding postponement of the 
cooperation requests is one major consequence of this principle. It would be untenable 
for the Court to insist on compliance with a request for arrest and surrender, even at the 
risk of hampering the national proceedings, while its own investigation is suspended.129 
 
It is interesting to note that the Court failed to engage with the thorny issue of individuals’ 
rights in complementarity/cooperation proceedings. The non-stated assumption behind the 
above quoted passage, however, is that individuals’ rights are not a counter-weight to the 
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distortions caused by the ‘legal framework’ (of cooperation) within the given ‘key feature’ 
(complementarity) of the institution.  
Just like in Senussi, the Pre-Trial Chamber remarked that the arrest warrant remained 
valid in accordance with Article 19(9) of the Statute, and that Libya must ensure that ‘all 
necessary measures are taken during the postponement in order to ensure the possibility of an 
immediate execution of the Surrender Request should the case be found admissible’.130 
Unlike the case of Senussi, however, the Court has eventually found the Gaddafi case to be 
admissible. Despite this finding, however, Libya has failed to comply with the request of the 
Court and, to date, has not surrendered Gaddafi to its seat. On 10 December 2014, Pre-Trial 
Chamber I made a finding of non-compliance by Libya and transmitted it to the Security 
Council, which so far has taken no action.131  
On 28 July 2015, the Tripoli Court of Appeal sentenced Gaddafi to death along with 
Senussi.132 The Prosecutor, thus, immediately requested that the Court ordered Libya to 
refrain from executing Gaddafi and surrender him to the Court.133 In its response to this 
request, Libya submitted that ‘Mr Gaddafi continues to be in custody in Zintan and is 
presently ‘unavailable’ to the Libyan State.’134 In its latest report to the UN Security Council, 
the Prosecutor stated that, in view of the fact that Libya remains unable to surrender Gaddafi 
to the Court, the OTP has been exploring ‘other avenues’ through which Gaddafi could be 
surrendered to the Court. The Prosecutor has confirmed that Gaddafi continues to be detained 
in Zintan where he is in the custody of the Abu-Bakr al-Siddiq Battalion commanded by Mr 
al-‘Ajami al-‘Atiri.135 On 26 April 2016, thus, the Prosecutor filed a request with Pre-Trial 
Chamber I for an order directing the Registry to transmit the request for surrender directly to 
Mr al-‘Atiri.136 The Pre-Trial Chamber has not issued a decision on the request at the time of 
writing. In the event that Mr al-‘Atiri and the Battalion decide not to cooperate, however, the 
Prosecutor encouraged the Security Council to impose sanctions on them.137 
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4.2 Simultaneous national proceedings  
 
The provisions of the Statute regulating the impact of the obligation to cooperate with the 
Court on national proceedings are Article 89 and 94 of the Statute. The former is concerned 
with requests for arrest and surrender, whereas the latter is concerned with other forms of 
assistance, such as those envisaged by Article 93 of the Statute.138  
Article 89(2) and (4) regulate the hypotheses in which domestic investigations or 
prosecutions are underway with respect to the same person targeted by the Prosecutor. Article 
89(2) deals with the case of national proceedings that concern the same crime(s). It stipulates 
that, if the person sought for surrender by the Court brings a challenge before a national 
court139 based on the principle of ne bis in idem under Article 20 of the Statute, the requested 
State shall immediately consult with the Court to determine if there has been a relevant ruling 
on admissibility. If an admissibility ruling is pending, the requested State may postpone the 
execution of the request until the Court makes its determination. However, if and when the 
case is found admissible, the state shall proceed with the surrender of the person. As can be 
seen, Article 89(2) brings the obligation to surrender in line with the principle of ne bis in 
idem enshrined in Article 20, and the related possibility of an admissibility challenge pursuant 
to Article 17(1)(c) of the Statute.140 
Article 89(4) is concerned with national proceedings that deal with a different case.141 
It provides that the requested State, ‘after making its decision to grant the request, shall 
consult with the Court.’ This language is rather ambiguous. On the one hand, it seems to rule 
out the possibility to exploit domestic proceedings for a different case as a ground for refusal, 
making it clear that the obligation to surrender the person the Court prevails. On the other 
hand, though, it suggests that there is a decision to be made by the requested State to grant the 
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request.142 The Pre-Trial Chamber, however, clarified that Article 89(4) does not provide a 
basis for postponing surrender. Rather, it ‘requires the requested State to grant the request and 
then consult with the Court [emphasis added]’.143 Moreover, it has been suggested that the 
conflict is only apparent, as Article 89(4) must be interpreted in accordance with the general 
clause enshrined in Article 86, by which States Parties shall ‘cooperate fully’ with the Court 
in the investigation and prosecution of crimes. The decision to grant the request thus must be 
taken in accordance with this interpretative guideline.144  
Article 89(4) is complemented by Rule 183 RPE, according to which, following the 
consultations with the Court, the requested State may temporarily surrender the person 
sought. During his/her presence before the Court the person shall be kept in custody and shall 
be transferred to the requested State once his or her presence before the Court is no longer 
required. 
Finally, Article 94 deals with requests other than requests for surrender interfering 
with national proceedings relating to a different case.145 It provides that the requested State 
may postpone the execution of the request for a period of time agreed upon with the Court. 
However, the postponement shall be no longer than is necessary to complete the relevant 
investigation or prosecution in the requested State. Moreover, the State should also consider 
granting the request immediately subject to certain conditions. During the postponement 
period, the Prosecutor may seek measures to preserve evidence, pursuant to Article 93(1)(j) of 
the Statute. 
 
4.3 Competing request of another State 
 
The principle of complementarity also influences the relationship between cooperation duties 
that States Parties have towards the Court and obligations that they have towards other States 
under international law. 
As of the competing request to surrender a person of another State, Article 90 sets 
different regimes depending on: (i) whether the requesting State is a member to the Rome 
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Statute, (ii) whether the requesting State (regardless of it being a party to the Statute) seeks 
the extradition of the person for a different conduct than that selected by the ICC Prosecutor.  
 
4.3.1 The requesting State is (or is not) a party to the Statute 
  
If the requesting State is a party to the Statute, the requested State may postpone the execution 
of the request until the Court has decided on the admissibility of the case. If the Court decides 
that the case is admissible, though, the state has to surrender the person to the Court.146  
Conversely, if the requesting State is not a party to the Statute and the requested State 
is under an international obligation to extradite the person to that State, it is the requested 
State’s discretion to determine which of the two obligations shall prevail.147 In making this 
decision, it shall consider all the relevant factors, such as, for example, the respective dates of 
the requests, the interests of the requesting State (including, where relevant, whether the crime 
was committed in its territory and the nationality of the victims and of the person sought), and 
the possibility of subsequent surrender between the Court and the requesting State.148 
If, however, the requested State is not under an international obligation to surrender 
the person to the requesting State, it shall give priority to the request from the Court if the 
latter has determined that the case is admissible;149 in case the Court has determined that the 
case is inadmissible, though, the requested State has the discretion to deal with the request for 
extradition from the requesting State.150 
 
4.3.2 Competing request of another State for a different conduct 
 
If any State requests a State party the extradition of a person for a different conduct than that 
for which the person is sought by the Court, the requested State shall give priority to the 
request from the Court if it is not under an international obligation to extradite the person to 
the requesting State.151 Conversely, if such international obligation exists, the requested State 
has discretion to determine whether to surrender the person to the Court or to extradite the 
person to the requesting State.152 In making its decision, the requested State shall consider all 
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the relevant factors, and give special consideration to the relative nature and gravity of the 
conduct in question.153 
 
4.4. Competing request to provide other forms of assistance from another State 
 
Article 90 deals exclusively with competing requests for arrest and surrender. The situation of 
a competing request to provide other forms of judicial assistance by another State is regulated 
by Article 93(9)(a). According to it, the State shall endeavour to satisfy both requests. 
However, if this is not possible, the principles of Article 90 shall apply. 
 
5. Complementarity and cooperation in the practice of the organs of the Court 
 
Since the beginning of its functioning in 2001, the Court (and in primis, the Prosecutor) was 
confronted with the ‘terrible disadvantage’ referred to by Paolo Benvenuti,154 namely, the fact 
that ICC investigations depend on the cooperation of territorial States that are unwilling or 
unable to prosecute international crimes. Inevitably, this tension had to be reconciled in the 
practice of its organs. Therefore, it is now time to critically analyse the interpretation of 
complementarity adopted by the OTP and the Chambers.  
Paragraph 2.2 has shown that, at the Rome Conference, ‘complementarity’ was not a 
completely determinate concept. As Robert Cryer has pointed out, ‘the negotiations there 
perhaps worked on the basis that an incompletely theorized agreement could be reached 
amongst the various delegations about the use of the term.’155 This resulted in a fragmented 
legal framework and vague criteria that leave great interpretative leeway in determining the 
parameters of the concept. As a consequence, the practice of the various organs of the Court is 
decisive in giving content to this principle.156 
As the following paragraphs will show, contrary to what was anticipated by early 
scholars and commentators, in the practical application of the principle of complementarity 
the Court did not struggle so much with the ambiguous concepts of ‘genuineness’, 
‘unwillingness’ or ‘inability’, but rather with the question of ‘inactivity’ of States, and on 
what constitutes a ‘case’ for the purpose of the Rome Statute. Curiously, these concepts - 
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which had been quite neglected during the drafting process - have come to shape and 
dominate the current debate on complementarity.157 
 
5.1 ‘Positive complementarity’ as a prosecutorial strategy to enhance cooperation 
 
Twelve years ago, at the beginning of his tenure, the first Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-
Ocampo made clear that: ‘as a consequence of complementarity, the number of cases that 
reach the Court should not be a measure of its efficiency. On the contrary, the absence of 
trials before this Court, as a consequence of the regular functioning of national institutions, 
would be a major success.’158 This statement conveyed the idea that the complementarity 
system is aimed at establishing an international order wherein national institutions respond 
effectively to international crimes, thereby obviating the need for trials before the ICC. 
Over the years, the OTP elaborated on this understanding and developed its strategy 
on complementarity in several policy and expert papers. In the Paper on Some Policy Issues 
before the OTP released in 2003, the Office emphasized that, according to the Statute, 
national States have the primary responsibility for preventing and punishing atrocities in their 
own territories. In this design, intervention by the Office must be exceptional.159 Accordingly, 
in what appears to be a message of reassurance to States, the Paper explained that, ‘as a 
general rule, (…) the policy of the Office in the initial phase of its operations will be to take 
action only where there is a clear case of failure to take national action’.160 Within this 
understanding, the OTP envisaged a twofold approach in the fight against impunity. On the 
one hand, it would initiate prosecutions of the leaders who bear most responsibility for 
international crimes and, on the other hand, it would encourage national prosecutions for the 
lower-ranking perpetrators.161  
Later that year, the OTP commissioned an expert study on complementarity in 
practice, so as to seek advice on the legal, policy and management challenges entailed by the 
complementarity regime. Shortly thereafter, the expert group, coordinated by Darryl 
Robinson, submitted the Informal Expert Paper on Complementarity in Practice.162 This paper 
promotes quite a different conception of complementarity, whose purpose is coming to terms 
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with the environment in which the Court operates and with the structural constrains that 
characterize its functioning, first and foremost, the need for States cooperation. 
In the experts’ opinion, ‘the complementarity regime serves as a mechanism to 
encourage and facilitate the compliance of States with their primary responsibility to 
investigate and prosecute core crimes’.163 Accordingly, the Paper introduced (albeit without 
defining it as such) what has become known as ‘positive complementarity’.164 Pursuant to this 
approach, the Prosecutor’s objective is not to ‘compete’ with States for jurisdiction, but to 
help ensure that the most serious international crimes do not go unpunished.165  
The concept of ‘partnership’ with States, therefore, became a key aspect of the 
prosecutorial strategy.166 In brief, ‘partnership’ with States entails a positive and constructive 
relationship with national authorities that are genuinely investigating and prosecuting, by 
which the Prosecutor may encourage the latter to take action with respect to international 
crimes, help develop cooperative anti-impunity strategies, and even provide them with direct 
assistance and advice.167 
Undeniably, positive complementarity is based on a particular understanding of the 
relationship between the ICC and national jurisdictions, a relationship that is 
‘uncompetitive’168 and presupposes the ‘interdependency between two fora rather than the 
complete independence of the ICC from domestic courts’.169 This approach welcomes a 
‘consensual division of labour’ between the OTP and States, and claims that, in some 
circumstances, this might be the most appropriate course of action. 
In particular, there may be situations where a State expressly acknowledges that it is 
not carrying out an investigation or prosecution, so as to render the case admissible before the 
Court (uncontested admissibility scenario). This is perfectly consistent with a literal reading 
of Article 17, which clearly (albeit implicitly) provides that a case is admissible where no 
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State has initiated any investigation. In such cases there will be no question of ‘unwillingness’ 
or ‘inability’170 and the express acknowledgement of the State merely simplifies the factual 
determination of admissibility.171 
The Expert Paper clarifies that a consensual division of labour between the Court and 
a state does not remove the procedural right of the accused to raise challenges to 
admissibility. However, in the clear absence of any investigation or prosecution by a State, an 
admissibility challenge on the grounds of complementarity would have to be dismissed. 
Therefore, the accused would be left with the possibility of challenging admissibility only on 
the grounds of ne bis in idem and gravity.172 
Finally, it is important to remark that agreements between the Court and States 
regarding the most appropriate forum of adjudication will often go hand in hand with 
agreements on cooperation. The Expert Paper advises the OTP to develop ‘a form wherein the 
State acknowledges non-exercise of jurisdiction in favour of ICC jurisdiction and pledges its 
co-operation with the ICC investigation and prosecution’.173 This is especially important 
when the state concerned is not a party to the Statute and, therefore, does not have an 
obligation to cooperate arising from it. However, such arrangements may be equally useful 
with states parties, as they can ‘effectively bolster or make more effective compliance with 
obligations of Part 9.’ As has been seen in Chapter II, to date, the OTP has signed cooperation 
agreements with states that have referred situations on their territories.174  
The Expert Paper also suggests that these arrangements could be coupled with a 
referral of the situation to the ICC. In this respect, it is interesting to note that the OTP’s 
policy of encouraging states to refer situations on their territories – rather than using its 
proprio motu powers to open an investigation- is one of the most important practical 
expressions of the positive approach to complementarity. As early as 2003, the Prosecutor 
acknowledged that: ‘where the Prosecutor receives a referral from the State in which a crime 
has been committed, the Prosecutor has the advantage to knowing that that State has the 
political will to provide his Office with all the cooperation within the country that it is 
required to give under the Statute.’175 So far, five out of nine situations investigated by the 
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Court result from self-referrals, namely, the situations in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC), Uganda, Central African Republic (CAR), Ivory Coast176 and Mali.  
The consistency of the practice of self-referrals with the letter and purpose of the 
Rome Statute has been debated at length among scholars,177 and goes beyond the scope of this 
Chapter. However, it is submitted that this practice is a fundamental contextual element that 
has to be kept in mind when discussing rights of defendants in cooperation proceedings. It is 
now time to assess the impact that states cooperation obtained through the above-seen 
strategy has had on the rights of the suspects who have been targeted by the Prosecutor's 
investigation. 
 
5.2 The ICC’s case law on admissibility 
 
In the Katanga case the Appeals Chamber set forth the authoritative interpretation of the 
admissibility-test under Article 17, and, the facto, sanctioned the positive approach to 
complementarity of the OTP. 
According to the Appeals Chamber, when a State having jurisdiction remains inactive 
with respect to a case (that is, it is not investigating or prosecuting, or has not done so), the 
latter is admissible, and the question of unwillingness or inability does not arise.178 As a 
consequence, unwillingness and inability have to be considered only a) when there are 
domestic investigations or prosecutions that could render the case inadmissible before the 
Court, b) when there have been such investigations and the State having jurisdiction has 
decided not to prosecute the person concerned.179 
Despite the fact that some form of national proceedings was on-going before national 
courts, in its decisions on admissibility so far the Court has found cases to be admissible due 
to the inaction of the relevant state, and has not inquired on the issues of unwillingness and 
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the International Criminal Court: Are States the Villains or the Victims of Atrocities?’ (2010) 21 Criminal Law 
Forum 103; Andreas Th Müller and Ignaz Stegmiller, ‘Self-Referrals on Trial From Panacea to Patient’ (2010) 8 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 1267; Darryl Robinson, ‘The Controversy over Territorial State 
Referrals and Reflections on ICL Discourse’ (2011) 9 Journal of International Criminal Justice 355. 
178 Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, AC Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Katanga against the Oral Decision of 
Trial Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the Admissibility of the Case, ICC-01/04-01/07 OA 8, 25 September 2009, 
75-79. 
179 ibid., 78. 
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inability.180 These findings of inactivity are based on two reasons, which will be examined 
below. 
 
5.2.1 A narrow interpretation of the word ‘case’ under Article 17 of the Statute 
 
In the decision issuing an arrest warrant against the first defendant of the Court, Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo, the Pre-Trial Chamber held that ‘it is a conditio sine qua non for a case 
arising from the investigation of a situation to be inadmissible that national proceedings 
encompass both the person and the conduct which is the subject of the case before the Court’ 
(same conduct test).181  
The DRC authorities were prosecuting Lubanga for very serious charges, such as 
genocide and crimes against humanity; however, they did not include the one and only charge 
selected by the ICC Prosecutor, namely, the enlistment and conscription of child soldiers. 
Applying the ‘same conduct test’, the Pre-Trial Chamber considered that the DRC was 
‘inactive’ in relation to the Prosecutor's case and, as a consequence the latter was admissible 
before the Court. This standard has been applied in many subsequent decisions on arrest 
warrants (among others, the one against Katanga) 182, as well as in judgments on challenges to 
admissibility raised by states.183 
 
5.2.2 A decision of the State to close its national proceedings to the benefit of the Court.  
 
In its decision on the challenge to the admissibility of the case raised by Katanga’s Defence, 
the Court ruled that, if a state decides to relinquish its jurisdiction in favour of the ICC, the 
case is admissible regardless of the state’s willingness or ability to prosecute it.184 
The Appeals Chamber considered that, at the time of the challenge,185 no investigation 
regarding Katanga was taking place in the DRC, as the latter had closed any investigation that 
                                                
180 Nouwen (n 63) 45. 
181 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga, PTC I Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest, 
ICC-01/04-01/06, 10 February 2006, 31. 
182 Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, PTC I Urgent Warrant of Arrest for Katanga, ICC‐01/04‐01/07, 2 July 2007. 
183 See, for example, Prosecutor v Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein 
Ali, AC Judgment on the Appeal of the Republic of Kenya against the decision of PTC II of 30 May 2011 
entitled ‘Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case 
Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute’, ICC-01/09-02/11 OA, 30 August 2011. 
184 Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga (n 178) 80. 
185 Contrary to what the Defence had claimed, the Appeals Chamber found that the admissibility of a case must 
be determined on the basis of the facts as they exist at the time of the admissibility challenge, and not at the time 
of the issuance of the warrant of arrest. 
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may have been on-going when it decided to surrender Katanga to the Court in October 2007. 
There was no same conduct test to apply because there were simply no proceedings, and the 
DRC had to be considered inactive in relation to any investigations or prosecutions of any 
crime allegedly committed by Katanga.186 
The decision to end the national investigations did not constitute a decision not to 
prosecute under Article 17(1)(b) either, as its thrust was not that ‘the Appellant should not be 
prosecuted, but that he should be prosecuted, albeit before the International Criminal 
Court’.187 In the view of the Chamber: ‘if the decision of a State to close an investigation 
because of the suspect's surrender to the Court were considered to be a decision not to 
prosecute, the peculiar, if not absurd, result would be that because of the surrender of a 
suspect to the Court, the case would become inadmissible. In such scenario, neither the State 
nor the ICC would exercise jurisdiction over the alleged crimes, defeating the purpose of the 
Rome Statute.’188 
Finally, the judges acknowledged that, depending on the circumstances of each case, 
the decision of a State to relinquish its jurisdiction in favour of the Court may not be 
inconsistent with the duty to exercise its criminal jurisdiction under the sixth paragraph of the 
Preamble.189 
This reasoning has been applied for dismissing every challenge to admissibility 
brought up by accused persons so far. For example, in its decision on the admissibility 
challenge raised by Bemba, the Trial Chamber III expressly acknowledged that the CAR 
authorities were investigating the accused for the same case as the ICC Prosecutor’s.190 
However, on 16 December 2004 the Bangui Court of Appeal ordered the transfer of the case 
to the Court, which made the CAR inactive with respect to that case at the time of the 
admissibility challenge (2010).191 
In its document in support of the appeal, the Defence of Katanga made interesting 
observations concerning the impact that such conception of admissibility might have on the 
rights of the accused. According to it, the latter should be entitled to challenge consensual 
burden sharing when his/her rights are violated as a result of this or when the national ‘waiver 
                                                
186 Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga (n 178) 80. 
187 ibid., 82. 
188 ibid., 83. 
189 Ibid., 85. 
190 Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba, TC III Decision on Admissibility and Abuse of Process Challenges, ICC-
01/05-01/08, 24 June 2010, 218. 
191 ibid., 224, 238-242. 
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of prosecution’ would be unduly prejudicial.192 It rightly pointed out that ‘if the Court informs 
States that it will not inquire into the reason why the State is unwilling to investigate or 
prosecute, it will have the effect of encouraging the current practice of the DRC to simply 
keep detainees in detention indefinitely until the ICC decides whether or not it wants to 
prosecute them.’193 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This Chapter has shown how the Prosecution and the judges have dealt with the structural 
paradox that the principle of complementarity entails, and has pointed out the consequences 
that this has had on the rights of suspect and accused persons. Inevitably, the tension by which 
the Court depends on the cooperation of states that either remain inactive towards 
international crimes or are unwilling or unable to prosecute them, had to be reconciled in the 
practice of its organs. 
The Prosecution has interpreted the complementarity principle in a ‘positive’ way, 
seeking the partnership of states and agreeing on a division of labour with them. It has 
encouraged states to refer the situations on their territories so as to enhance their cooperation. 
The latter, however, has come to the price of directing the investigation towards persons 
disfavoured by their government, whose rights had been violated in the context of national 
proceedings against them. 
Defendants, for their part, have denounced the violations of their rights occurred in the 
division of labour with the Court and their state of nationality by challenging the jurisdiction 
of the Court and the admissibility of their case. This Chapter has exclusively dealt with the 
latter. It has shown that, although admissibility challenges were largely conceived as a 
safeguard for the protection of the sovereignty of states, in the cases where governments 
entertain a cooperative relationship with the Court, proceedings under Article 19 have been 
used primarily as an instrument of protection of defendants’ rights.194  
In addressing the merits of these challenges, ICC Judges have not engaged with the 
structural tensions and limitations of the Court with a view of protecting the accused. Rather, 
they have given narrow/legalistic answers to broader policy questions. Although the case law 
                                                
192 Prosecutor v Katanga, Defence Document in Support of Appeal of the Defence for Mr. Katanga against the 
Decision of the Trial Chamber ‘Motifs de la décision orale relative à l’exception d’irrecevabilité de l’affaire’ 
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on the challenges to jurisdiction and admissibility examined above is consistent with the letter 
of the Statute, these decisions are nonetheless problematic from a human rights perspective. 
The ICC Judges have adopted an interpretation of admissibility that is extremely obsequious 
towards the interests of states. By so doing, they have de facto sanctioned the policy of 
positive complementarity of the Prosecutor and have refrained from questioning the most 
problematic aspects of the practice of consensual burden sharing between the OTP and 
national authorities. 
 CHAPTER IV 
THE IMPACT OF STATE COOPERATION ON THE RIGHT TO LIBERTY 
OF SUSPECTS AND ACCUSED 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This Chapter aims at understanding the challenges that State cooperation poses to the right to 
liberty of suspects and accused in connection with the structural features of the ICC. It 
addresses two specific components of the right to liberty: the right not to be subject to 
arbitrary arrest and detention (i.e., habeas corpus rights) and the right to interim release.  
With respect to the former, the Chapter assesses whether the cooperation law and 
practice of the Court sufficiently acknowledge the position of suspects detained by national 
authorities throughout part of the ICC investigation, and the risks to their liberty that the 
division of labor between the Court and States entails. To this end, the Chapter starts by 
assessing the position of internationally recognised human rights in the legal framework of 
the Court and the Statute’s protection of the right to liberty of defendants. Second, it 
addresses the steps that lead the Prosecutor to focus on a specific person as the subject of the 
investigation, noting that they are largely unregulated. Third, the Chapter addresses the right 
of suspects and accused to challenge their detention before the Court; this right is not 
expressly provided, but defendants contest their detention through challenges to the 
jurisdiction of the Court and the admissibility of their case.1 The Chapter will focus on the 
challenges to the jurisdiction raised by three accused: Thomas Lubanga, Germain Katanga 
and Laurent Gbagbo, as they provide the clearest example of the problems that States’ 
cooperation with the Court in arresting suspects raises with respect of the right to liberty of 
the latter. Finally, the Chapter assesses the arguments used by the Court in its decisions 
concerning these challenges, as they are a clear indicator on how the judges have intended 
their supervisory role vis-a-vis the Prosecutor and national authorities, and their 
responsibilities in guaranteeing the right to liberty of defendants. 
With respect to the right to interim release, the Chapter weights the practice of the ICC 
against the advanced substantive protection that the Statute affords ‘on paper’ to this right. As 
                                                
1 The relationship between challenges to admissibility and defendants’ rights has been discussed in Chapter III. 
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will be seen, the Court has endorsed a policy by which the identification of a State willing to 
accept the person concerned is an essential prerequisite to granting conditional release. 
Regrettably, thus, the right of defendants to be freed pending trial is subject to the voluble and 
unpredictable inclinations of States. 
 
2. The right to liberty of defendants in the pre-trial phase 
 
2.1 The overarching principle in Article 21(3) 
 
The Rome Statute contains significant innovations in the codification of human rights, in 
particular during the pre-trial phase of the Court’s proceedings. At the outset, Article 21 must 
be mentioned. This provision is located in Part II of the Statute and follows the provisions 
governing the jurisdiction and the admissibility of the Court. It lists the sources of law 
applicable by the Court, establishing a clear hierarchy between them.2  
According to Article 21(3), such legal instruments (in primis, the Rome Statute) must 
be interpreted and applied in accordance with internationally recognized human rights. It 
follows from this provision that human rights law is set as a review mechanism for all the 
dispositions of the Statute. This is a significant innovation if compared to the law of the ICTY 
and ICTR, where no such hierarchy among the sources of law existed, and where the position 
of the Tribunals with respect to human rights norms was much more ambiguous.3 
One commentator noted that Article 21(3) has the potential to trigger a paradigm-shift 
in the interaction between human rights law and international criminal proceedings. In this 
respect, it is useful to recall that much of the debate before the ICTY and ICTR hinged on the 
question of whether the exceptional context and circumstances in which the tribunals operate 
justified a re-interpretation of the existing corpus of internationally recognized human rights.4 
It goes without saying that such a re-interpretation would often result in a reduction of 
protection for the accused, to the benefit of the Prosecution. Conversely, the existence of the 
                                                
2 Article 21(1) of the Statute reads as follows: ‘The Court shall apply: (a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements 
of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence; (b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable 
treaties and the principles and rules of international law, including the established principles of the international 
law of armed conflict; (c) Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of legal 
systems of the world including, as appropriate, the national laws of States that would normally exercise 
jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those principles are not inconsistent with this Statute and with 
international law and internationally recognized norms and standards.’ 
3 Göran Sluiter, ‘Human Rights Protection in the ICC Pre-Trial Phase’ in Carsten Stahn and Göran Sluiter (eds), 
The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court (Nijhoff 2009) 460. 
4 Krit Zeegers, International Criminal Tribunals and Human Rights Law: Adherence and Contextualization, vol 
5 (TMC Asser Press 2016). 
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overarching principle enshrined in Article 21(3) would prevent a similar jurisprudence to 
form at the ICC, in that: 
‘internationally recognized human rights’ are applicable fully, and thus need not be ‘re-
interpreted’ in light of the unique mandate and context of the ICC. More concretely, the 
mandatory and specific content of Article 21(3) of the Statute appears to prevent Judges from 
adjusting the content of human rights law to the unique ICC-context.5 
 
As will be seen, although the debate on re-contextualization of human rights law did not gain 
much traction at the ICC, this has not prevented the Court to adopt an interpretation of the 
Statute that, on occasions, has weakened the protection that internationally recognized human 
rights grant to the defendant. 
 
2.2 The right not to be subject to arbitrary arrest and detention 
 
Other provisions of the Statute protecting the right to liberty of suspects and accused are 
located in Part V of the Statute, dealing with the investigation and prosecution. Article 55 
contains an explicit codification of the rights of persons in the course of the investigation.6 
Along with other rights concerning mainly the questioning procedures, the second paragraph 
of this provision states that, ‘in respect of an investigation under this Statute, a person (…) 
shall not be subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention, and shall not be deprived of his/her 
liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as established in the 
Statute.’7 This provision must be read in conjunction with Article 85(1), which provides that 
anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an enforceable 
right to compensation. 
 
2.3 Arrest proceedings in the custodial State 
 
In the ICC Statute, the responsibilities of States in deprivation of liberty and the 
corresponding rights of detained individuals were given much more thought than was the case 
                                                
5 Sluiter (n 3) 463. 
6 Salvatore Zappalà, ‘Rights of Persons during an Investigation’ in A. Cassese and J. Jones (eds), The Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court: a Commentary, vol II (OUP 2002). 
7 Article 55(1)(d) of the Statute. 
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at the ad hoc Tribunals, where the arrest and surrender of suspects by States were mainly 
conceived as obligations of result.8 
The relevant provision is Article 59, regulating arrest and surrender proceedings in the 
custodial State. It provides that the latter immediately take steps to arrest the person in 
question in accordance with its laws and the ICC Statute.9 The arrested person ‘shall be 
brought promptly before the competent judicial authority in the custodial state which shall 
determine, in accordance with the law of that state that a) the warrant applies to that person, b) 
the person has been arrested in accordance with the proper process, c) the person’s rights have 
been respected.10 Moreover, it regulates interim release at the national level.11  
As has been noted, in this way national judges become ‘guardians’ of the lawfulness 
of the arrest.12 Importantly, however, Article 59(4) forbids them to rule on whether the 
warrant of arrest was properly issued under Article 58 of the Statute. This means that national 
judges cannot determine whether or not the detainee has committed a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court, neither can they establish that the detention of the person is 
necessary to ensure his/her presence at trial, or to prevent the person to obstruct ongoing 
investigations and proceedings, or to impede him/her from leaving this matter in the exclusive 
competence of the Court. Rule 117(3) RPE complement this provision by providing that the 
arrested person shall bring any challenge as to the issuance of the warrant directly to the Pre-
Trial Chamber. 
There are two main questions that this regime leaves unanswered. The first one relates 
to the role and powers of national judges in case they determine that a State has failed to 
comply with Article 59(2). For example, if they establish a manifest violation of the person’s 
rights in the execution of the arrest or an illegality in the detention. What are the remedies that 
national judges can provide to the suspect? Can they permanently release him/her? So far this 
issue has not arisen in the practice of the Court. Scholars, however, tend to respond in the 
                                                
8 Karel De Meester and others, ‘Chapter 3. Investigation, Coercive Measures, Arrest, and Surrender’ in Göran 
Sluiter and others (eds), International Criminal Procedure: Principles and Rules (Oxford University Press 2013) 
329; William Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (Oxford 
University Press 2010) 717. 
9 Article 59(2) of the Statute. 
10 Rule 117(2) RPE reads: ‘at any time after arrest, the person may make a request to the Pre-Trial Chamber for 
the appointment of counsel to assist with proceedings before the Court and the Pre-Trial Chamber shall take a 
decision on such request’.  
11 Article 59(3), see further. 
12 Carsten Stahn, ‘Arrest and Surrender under the ICC Statute: A Contextual Reading’, Future Perspectives on 
International Criminal Justice (TMC Asser Press 2010).  
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negative, stressing that the obligation to surrender the person to the Court must prevail and be 
fulfilled pursuant to Article 59(4).13 
This brings us to the second question, concerning the role of the Court with respect to 
violations committed by national authorities executing arrest warrants on its behalf. When 
national judicial authorities fail to rule on such violations, an arrested person may bring up the 
issue before the Court. Therefore, the question arises as to whether the ICC is competent to 
address and provide a remedy for such violations.14 This matter will be addressed thoroughly 
in section 4 of the present Chapter. 
Before delving into the Court’s practice, however, it is useful to make some final 
considerations on the Statute’ regime concerning the right to liberty. The protection of this 
right afforded by the Statute is premised on a clear distinction between proceedings before 
national authorities and proceedings before the Court. The right of persons not to be subject to 
arbitrary arrest and detention enshrined in Article 55 is specifically circumscribed to ‘an 
investigation under this Statute’. However, this framework does not take into account the 
possibility that a suspect may also have been subject to an investigation under national 
proceedings, which may or may not be related to that of the Court. ICC investigations do not 
take place in a vacuum, and the activities of the Court cannot always be separated from those 
of the States. More often than not, the ICC is involved in situations of ongoing conflict where 
crimes continue to be committed while local authorities are taking measures to deal with 
them. In some of the situations before the Court (DRC, CAR, Ivory Coast) the opening of an 
ICC investigation took place in the context of ongoing national criminal proceedings, which 
had to do with incidents falling within the broader situation investigated by the Court. 
Along the same line, in endowing States with the task of ensuring the lawfulness of 
the arrest, Article 59(2) appears to have been drafted on the assumption that suspects would 
be at large. All the guarantees enshrined therein apply from the moment in which the person 
is apprehended and arrested by local authorities on behalf of the Court, and are aimed to make 
sure that States respect the basic human rights of suspects while executing the request of the 
Court. The early practice of the ICC has proved that this is only one of the possible scenarios. 
As we will see in the following paragraph, in the situation in the DRC and Ivory Coast, some 
                                                
13 De Meester and others (n 8) 329; Sluiter (n 3) 469; Christopher K Hall, ‘Article 59’ in Otto Triffterer (ed), 
Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2nd edn, Beck/Hart 2008) 1152; contra 
see Mohamed M El Zeidy, ‘Critical Thoughts on Article 59 (2) of the ICC Statute’ (2006) 4 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 448, 455, according to whom ‘a violation of the person’s right may sometimes 
result in a decision by the competent authorities to release the person in question’. 
14 El Zeidy (n 13) 457; see generally Sluiter (n 3). 
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defendants had already been in detention due to national proceedings when the Prosecutor 
requested their arrest on behalf of the Court.  
 
3. From the investigation of a ‘situation’, to the development of a ‘case’ against a 
‘suspect’ 
 
3.1 From the preliminary examination to the investigation: Prosecutorial discretion 
 
Chapter III has described the two stages of the Court’s investigation, the preliminary 
examination and the actual investigation.15 A brief recap is in order here. As has been seen, 
upon the receipt of a referral by a State or the UN Security Council, a declaration under 
Article 12(3), or a communication pursuant to Article 15 of the Statute, the Prosecutor starts a 
‘preliminary examination’ of the situation at hand in order to determine whether there is a 
‘reasonable basis’ to open an investigation. To this end, pursuant to Article 53(1) of the 
Statute, s/he must consider whether the alleged crimes fall within the jurisdiction of the Court, 
whether the possible cases arising from the investigation would be admissible under Article 
17, and whether an investigation would serve the interests of justice. Upon the conclusion of 
the preliminary examination, should the Prosecutor find the existence of a reasonable basis to 
proceed, s/he will open a formal investigation (with the authorization of the Pre-Trial 
Chamber when necessary16). 
At the preliminary examination stage, the Prosecutor has no formal investigative 
powers, and consequently, no duty of care about the individuals that will be targeted by the 
investigation. At the same time, there is no involvement of the Pre-Trial Chamber in 
supervising the Prosecutor’s activities or safeguarding the rights of those people who might 
become future suspects. There is no time limit for a preliminary examination and the 
Prosecutor can keep evaluating the situation and the relevant national proceedings for years.17  
With the commencement of the investigation, duties and powers of the Prosecutor are 
(to a certain extent) clearly defined by Article 54 of the Statute. Paragraph 1, letter c) of 
Article 54 imposes upon the Prosecutor the duty to respect the rights of persons arising under 
                                                
15 See paragraph 3.2 of Chapter III. 
16 Article 15(3) of the Statute. 
17 This was the case of the preliminary examination of the situation in the Central African Republic (CAR), 
which went on for over two years. The CAR government referred the situation on its territory in December 2004 
but the investigation did not commence until May 2007. Similarly, Ivory Coast made a declaration pursuant to 
Article 12(3) of the Statute in 2003, but the Prosecutor requested authorization from the Pre-Trial Chamber to 
start an investigation only in 2011, see https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/preliminary-examinations.aspx.  
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the Statute. As far as suspects are concerned, the protection of their fair trial guarantees is 
enshrined in an number of Articles contained in Part V of the Statute, headed ‘Investigation 
and prosecution’. The most prominent provisions in this respect are Articles 55 (‘Rights of 
persons during an investigation ‘) and 59 (‘Arrest proceedings in the custodial State’), which 
have been analysed in section 2 of the present Chapter. 
At any time after the initiation of the investigation the Prosecutor may apply to a Pre-
Trial Chamber for a warrant of arrest or a summons to appear against an individual.18 It is 
important to note that the Statute does not impose a time limit on the Prosecutor for the 
completion of the investigation and for approaching the Pre-Trial Chamber with a request for 
an arrest warrant. As has been noted, this system ‘leaves wide discretion and has the 
advantage to permit an investigation without any ‘obstacles’, especially the intervention by a 
defense lawyer’.19 In the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the first 
arrest warrant against Thomas Lubanga was issued after two years from the commencement 
of the investigation in June 2004.20 
 
3.2 The supervisory role of the Pre-Trial Chamber: Article 57(3)(c) of the Statute 
 
The Rome Statute endows the Pre-Trial Chamber with a certain role in supervising the 
activities of the investigation.21 It has been observed that ‘[t]he interplay between the 
Prosecutor and the Pre-Trial Chamber at the early stages of the proceedings constitutes one of 
the more striking examples of the uniqueness of the ICC’s procedural law’.22  
Pursuant to Article 57(3)(c) of the Statute the Pre-Trial Chamber has the power to 
‘provide for the protection and privacy of victims and witnesses, the preservation of evidence, 
the protection of persons who have been arrested or appeared in response to a summons, and 
                                                
18 Article 58 of the Statute. 
19 Kai Ambos, ‘The Structure of International Criminal Procedure  : “Adversarial”, “Inquisitorial” or Mixed?’ in 
Michael Bohlander (ed), International Criminal Justice: A Critical Analysis of Institutions and Procedures 
(Cameron May 2007) 444. 
20 See https://www.icc-cpi.int/drc/lubanga 
21 Olivier Fourmy, ‘The Powers of the Pre-Trial Chambers’ in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta and John RWD 
Jones (eds), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: a Commentary, vol II (Oxford University 
Press 2002); Fabricio Guariglia and Gudrun Hochmayr, ‘Article 57’ in Otto Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2nd edn, Beck/Hart 2008); Christopher K Hall, ‘Article 58’ in 
Otto Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2nd edn, Beck/Hart 
2008); Guariglia F. and Hochmayr G., ‘Article 56’ in Otto Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court (2nd edn, Beck/Hart 2008); Morten Bergsmo, Jelena Peijć and Otto Triffterer, 
‘Article 15’, Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2nd edn, Beck/Hart 2008); 
Morten Bergsmo and Paul? Kruger, ‘Article 53’ in Otto Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (2nd edn, Beck/Hart 2008). 
22 Claus Kress, ‘The Procedural Law of the International Criminal Court in Outline: Anatomy of a Unique 
Compromise’ (2007) 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice 537, 606. 
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the protection of national security information’. According to Michela Miraglia, this provision 
‘envisions very general proprio motu powers that the Pre-Trial Chamber can exercise over the 
course of the pre-trial phase, paving the way for a more active and ‘interventionist’ attitude, 
beyond the minimum limits specified by the other provisions of the Statute’.23 
 Interestingly, the first ever decision of the Court was prompted by the necessity of the 
judges to control the unfettered prosecutorial discretion mentioned in the previous 
paragraph.24 After the investigation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) had been 
initiated,25 but before the request for an arrest warrant had been submitted, a controversy 
between the Prosecution and the Pre-Trial Chamber arose.26 On 9 November 2004, the 
Chamber held a meeting with representatives of the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) to discuss 
the progress of the investigation. Since the OTP refused to transmit certain confidential 
documents, the Pre-Trial Chamber issued a decision to convene a status conference pursuant 
to Article 57(3)(c) of the Statute in order ‘to provide inter alia for the protection of victims 
and witnesses and the preservation of evidence’.27 The Prosecutor vehemently opposed such 
decision, arguing that the status conference was unauthorized by the legal framework of the 
Court. Admittedly, neither the Statute nor the ICC RPE directly envisage the holding of a 
status conference at such an early stage of the proceedings. On the contrary, the Rules allow 
for this procedural mechanism to be resorted to prior to the confirmation hearing and the trial. 
28 More broadly, the Prosecution argued that the Pre-Trial Chamber had overstepped its 
powers: 
 
It is submitted that the interplay between Pre-Trial Chamber and Prosecution is a 
sensitive matter that lies at the heart of the compromises reached in Rome between 
different legal traditions and values, and must be approached with the utmost caution. In 
relation to the investigative activities undertaken by the Court, this compromise between 
different legal cultures is represented by two main features of the Statute: the 
independence and autonomy of the Prosecutor in conducting investigations, always under 
strict application of the principle of objectivity enshrined in Article 54 (1)(a), and the 
specific supervisory powers of the Pre-Trial Chamber. The system enshrined in the 
                                                
23 Michela Miraglia, ‘The First Decision of the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber International Criminal Procedure Under 
Construction’ (2006) 4 Journal of International Criminal Justice 188, 191. 
24 Miraglia (n 23). 
25 The investigation into the situation in the DRC started in June 2004. 
26 Miraglia (n 23); William A Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (4 edition, 
Cambridge University Press 2011) 270–272; Ambos (n 19) 443–444. 
27 Situation in the DRC, PTC I Decision to Convene a Status Conference, ICC-01/ 04, 17 February 2005. 
28 See Rules 121 and 132 RPE. 
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Statute is one where the investigation is not performed or shared with a judicial body, but 
rather entrusted to the Prosecution, as expressly provided for in Article 42 (1) of the 
Statute: the Office of the Prosecutor “shall be responsible for conducting investigations 
[...] before the Court”. At the same time, the system also includes a closed number of 
provisions empowering the Pre-Trial Chamber to engage in specific instances of judicial 
supervision over the Prosecution’s investigative activities. The Prosecution submits that 
this delicate balance between both organs must be preserved at all times in order to 
honour the Statute, and to enable the Court to function in a fair and efficient manner.29 
 
The Chamber dismissed the Prosecutor’s objections on merely procedural grounds and 
confirmed the status conference.30 The firm stance taken by the Court is commendable. 
Seventh months into the investigation without any known result, the judges gave a broad 
interpretation to Article 57(3)(c) of the Statute in order to ‘exercise a general control over the 
work of the Prosecutor’31, speed up the investigation and, by so doing, protect the interests of 
future suspects.32 
 
3.2 Situations and cases 
 
In order to make considerations about the responsibility of the Prosecutor towards an 
individual, it is important to clarify the steps that lead the Prosecutor to focus on a specific 
person as the subject of the investigation. In this respect, it is essential to distinguish between 
the notion of a ‘situation’ brought to the attention of the OTP with a referral or a 
communication, and that of a ‘case’ against an individual developed by the Prosecutor in the 
course of the investigation.  
Albeit the Statute does not define these concepts, they have assumed great importance 
in the practice of the Court. The Pre-Trial Chamber clarified the distinction in the following 
terms. According to the judges, situations ‘are generally defined in terms of temporal, 
territorial and in some cases personal parameters’ (…) and ‘entail the proceedings envisaged 
in the Statute to determine whether a particular situation should give rise to a criminal 
investigation as well as the investigation as such’. Cases, on the other hand, ‘comprise 
                                                
29 Situation in the DRC, Prosecutor’s Position on Pre-Trial Chamber I’s 17 February 2005 Decision to Convene 
a Status Conference, ICC-01/04, 8 March 2005, 4. 
30 Situation in the DRC, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Position on Pre-Trial Chamber I’s 17 February 2005 
Decision to Convene a Status Conference, ICC-01/04, 9 March 2005. 
31 Miraglia (n 23) 192. 
32 Ambos (n 19) 444. 
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specific incidents during which one or more crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court seem 
to have been committed by one or more identified suspects’ and ‘entail proceedings that take 
place after the issuance of a warrant of arrest or a summons to appear’.33 
From these definitions emerges that, in the view of the Chamber, situations encompass 
both the preliminary examination and the formal investigation until the issuance of a warrant 
of arrest or a summons to appear pursuant to Article 58, and that a case exists only after a 
warrant or a summons have been issued. 
It is submitted that the definition of a case given by the Court is in some way artificial. 
This is because, in practice, the OTP will most likely focus on individuals long before a legal 
case in the sense of Article 58 exists.34 The regulations of the OTP clarify that allegations 
against one or more specific individuals are bundled during the course of the investigation. 
Under Regulation 34 of the Regulations of the Court, a joint team of the OTP will review the 
information and evidence collected during the investigation and will ‘determine a provisional 
case hypothesis (or hypotheses) identifying the incidents to be investigated and the person or 
persons who appear to be the most responsible’. Such case hypothesis will include ‘a tentative 
indication of possible charges, forms of individual criminal responsibility and potentially 
exonerating circumstances’. 
In its recent Draft Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation, the OTP clarified 
that, following the decision to open an investigation into a situation or a judicial authorization 
to that effect:  
 
[t]he Office will develop a Case Selection Plan which identifies in broad terms the 
potential cases within the situation. Initially, the Plan will be based on the conclusions 
from the preliminary examination stage, including the potential cases identified therein. 
As investigations within a situation proceed, the Office will gradually develop one or 
more provisional case hypotheses that meet the criteria set out in this policy paper.35  
 
It must be noted, however, that the Statute does not require the Prosecutor to formalize the 
moment in which a person becomes a suspect (for instance by filing a document or 
notification to the Registry or Defense counsel). As a result, ‘practices on designating 
                                                
33 Situation in the DRC, PTC I Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS 1, 
VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 and VPRS 6, ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr, 17 January 2006, 65. 
34 Kai Ambos, ‘Preliminary Considerations: The Object of Reference of the Complementarity Test (Situation–
Case–Conduct)’, The Colombian Peace Process and the Principle of Complementarity of the International 
Criminal Court (Springer Berlin Heidelberg 2010) 38. 
35 OTP, Draft Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation (2016) 7. 
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suspects are a matter of unpublished internal policy, that involves neither the defense nor the 
Court’.36 As a matter of fact, the Statute does not even use the word ‘suspect’37, but only that 
of ‘accused’ at Article 61(9). 
The designation of suspects by the Prosecutor, therefore, remains unknown by the 
judges until the Prosecutor approaches the Pre-Trial Chamber requesting the issuance of an 
arrest warrant or a summons against an individual. Equally, the latter has no way of 
discovering whether s/he is being investigated until the warrant or summons has been issued. 
The only exception arises in case the Prosecutor proceeds to the interrogation of the suspect in 
the course of the investigation. According to Article 55(2), the interrogation of suspects - 
carried out either by the OTP staff or national authorities - requires certain guarantees, among 
which the right to have legal assistance of the person’s choosing and be questioned in the 
presence of counsel. 
In sum, it is useful to distinguish between a case in a strict legal sense, which arises 
after the issuance of an arrest warrant or a summons by the Pre-Trial Chamber, and a case in a 
broader sense, which commences at the moment the Prosecutor directs her/his investigative 
efforts towards a specific individual.38 Early on, the Court clarified that the ‘the principle of a 
fair trial applies not only to the case phase – on issuance of a warrant of arrest or a summons 
to appear – but also prior to the case phase’, where ‘there is no defendant as such, given that 
no individual has been issued with a warrant of arrest or a summons to appear’.39  
 
4. The right to challenge one’s detention before the ICC 
 
It is important to clarify from the outset the distinction between the possibility to challenge 
one’s detention and the possibility to ask for interim release. The latter is expressly provided 
and can be done either before national authorities at the moment of the arrest under Article 
59(3), or before the Court after the suspect has been transferred there pursuant to Article 
60(2). The challenges that cooperation poses to this right will be discussed later. 
In the present paragraph the focus is on the defendant’s right to challenge the 
lawfulness of his/her detention. This is not explicitly provided for by the Statute. As has been 
                                                
36 Amal Alamuddin, ‘Collection of Evidence’ in Karim AA Khan, Caroline Buisman and Chris Gosnell (eds), 
Principles of Evidence in International Criminal Justice (Oxford University Press 2010) 271. 
37 Zappalà (n 6) 1182 (footnote 3). 
38 Ambos (n 34) 38. 
39 Situation in the DRC, PTC I, Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for Leave to Appeal the Chamber’s 
Decision of 17 January 2006 on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 
3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 and VPRS 6, ICC-01/04, 31 March 2006, 35-36. 
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seen, national authorities are not allowed to review the warrant of arrest issued by the Pre-
Trial Chamber and under Rule 117(3) RPE prescribes that the arrested person shall bring any 
challenge as to the issuance of the warrant directly to the Pre-Trial Chamber. The Statute does 
not elaborate further. This is also true for the ad hoc Tribunals. As a matter of fact, neither the 
Statute nor the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of any of the international criminal courts 
and tribunals mention habeas corpus. However, international criminal defendants usually 
complain about violations of their habeas corpus rights by making challenges to the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal. At the ICC this faculty is envisaged by Article 19, which grants an 
accused or a person for whom a warrant of arrest or a summons to appear has been issued the 
possibility to challenge the jurisdiction of the Court. Interestingly, such challenges do not 
relate to human rights, but to the restrictions that the Statute imposes on the jurisdiction of the 
Court (i.e., the limitations ratione materiae, ratione temporis, ratione personae and ratione 
loci). In the Lubanga case, the Appeals Chamber has noted the sui generis character of 
jurisdictional challenges based on human rights grounds: 
 
Abuse of process or gross violations of fundamental rights of the suspect of the accused 
are not identified as such as grounds for which the Court may refrain from embarking 
upon the exercise of its jurisdiction (…). Notwithstanding the label attached to it, the 
application of Mr. Lubanga Dyilo does not challenge the jurisdiction of the Court (…) 
What the appellant sought was that the Court should refrain from exercising its 
jurisdiction in the matter in hand. Its true characterization may be identified as a sui 
generis application, an atypical motion, seeking the stay of the proceedings, acceptance 
of which would entail the release of Mr. Lubanga Dyilo.40 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that this type of habeas corpus challenge is not envisaged by the 
Statute, the Chamber considered that the overarching principle enshrined in Article 21(3), 
according to which the ICC Statute must be interpreted as well as applied in accordance with 
internationally recognized human rights, offers the proper legal basis for the Court to decide 
on the merits of such challenges, and relinquish its jurisdiction when it is just to do so. 
                                                
40 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga, AC Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the 
Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to Art. 19(2)(a) of the Statute of 3 
October 2006, Prosecutor v. Lubanga ICC-01/04-01-06 (OA4), 14 December 2006, 24; Amir Cengic, 
‘Commentary’ in in André Klip and Göran Sluiter (eds), Annotated Leading Cases of International Criminal 
Tribunals, Vol. XXIII, 182–184. 
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By linking the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction to internationally recognized human 
rights, the Lubanga decision has a great potential from a Defense perspective. As will be seen, 
however, when the Court examined the merits of the challenge, it did not live up to the 
expectations that it raised. Before moving on to this discussion, one last remark has to be 
made regarding a strictly procedural aspect that passed somehow unnoticed at the moment of 
the issuance of the Lubanga decision, but which then revealed to be of considerable 
importance for the outcome of subsequent jurisdictional challenges. 
Drawing on the Lubanga jurisprudence, the Appeals Chamber in Gbagbo clarified that 
a decision of the PTC addressing a request for a stay of proceedings based on allegations of 
violations of a suspect's fundamental rights is not jurisdictional in nature.41 Thus, it cannot be 
appealed under Article 82(1)(a) of the Statute. The correct legal basis for appealing such 
decisions is Article 82(1)(d), which requires the leave of the Pre-Trial Chamber.42 Since 
Gbagbo had not requested the leave of the Pre-Trial Chamber, his challenge has been found 
inadmissible and its merits were not considered.  
The following subparagraphs will examine the challenges to the jurisdiction of the 
Court submitted by some accused, as they provide the clearest example of the problems that 
states’ cooperation in arresting suspects raises with respect of the right to liberty. These 
examples are interesting because they bring up issues regarding the responsibility of the 
Prosecutor toward the accused from the opening of a preliminary examination on a situation 
to the request of the issuance of an arrest warrant from the Pre-Trial Chamber. Subsequently, 
in paragraph 4, the arguments used by the Court in its decisions concerning these challenges 
will be assessed, as they indicate how the ICC judges have intended their role and 
responsibilities in guaranteeing the right to liberty of defendants. 
 
4.1 Challenges to the jurisdiction of the Court 
 
So far, three defendants have challenged the jurisdiction of the Court alleging violations of 
their habeas corpus rights: Thomas Lubanga43 and Germain Katanga44 in the situation in the 
                                                
41 Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, AC Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Laurent Koudou Gbagbo against the 
Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I on Jurisdiction and Stay of the Proceedings, Prosecutor v. Gbagbo ICC-02/11-
01/11 (OA2), 12 December 2012, 101. 
42 ibid at 102. 
43 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Defence Application for Release, ICC-01/04-01/06, 23 May 2006. 
44 Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Defence Motion for a Declaration on Unlawful Detention and Stay of 
Proceedings, ICC-01/04-01/07, 2 July 2009. 
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Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Laurent Gbagbo45 in the situation in Ivory 
Coast. Both of these situations were referred to the Court by the accused’s state of nationality, 
that is, the very State that was supposed to exercise its jurisdiction over the persons in 
question. The situation in the DRC was referred on 3 March 2004 by President Joseph Kabila, 
whose government at the time was threatened by the presence of rebel militias in the 
northeastern region of Ituri. The investigation into the situation in Ivory Coast was technically 
opened at the Prosecutor’s initiative under Article 15 in 2011; however, the engagement of 
the Court in the country was prompted by a declaration accepting its jurisdiction under Article 
12(3) by the government of Ivory Coast in 2003 (government which, curiously, was then 
presided by Laurent Gbagbo). In December 2010, the newly elected President Alassane 
Ouattara confirmed the previous declaration and, in a subsequent letter dated May 2011, 
extended the declaration to cover the serious crisis that had followed the presidential elections 
of 31 October–28 November 2010, which had brought him to power. As can be seen, 
therefore, this case is de facto a state self-referral, comparable to that of the DRC. 
Moreover, the above-mentioned defendants are all political opponents of the 
government that submitted the referral to the Court. Lubanga and Katanga are warlords and 
commanders of militias that Kabila’s government was fighting at the time of the referral, and 
Laurent Gbagbo is the former president of Ivory Coast who has been defeated in the elections 
of 2010. 
The consistency of the practice of self-referrals with the letter and purpose of the 
Rome Statute has been discussed at length among scholars,46 and goes beyond the scope of 
this Chapter. However, when addressing habeas corpus rights of defendants, it is important to 
keep in mind the ‘friendly’ relationship between the Court and the referring State. 
Finally, in the cases in question, defendants had already been in the custody of 
national authorities when the Prosecutor applied for an arrest warrant to the Pre-Trial 
Chamber. Both Lubanga and Katanga had been initially arrested in relation to the killing of 9 
                                                
45 Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Defence, Corrigendum of the Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court on the Basis of Art. 12(3), 19(2), 21(3), 55 and 59 of the Rome Statute, ICC-02/11-01/11, 29 
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46 See generally Paola Gaeta, ‘Is the Practice of “Self-Referrals” a Sound Start for the ICC?’ (2004) 2 Journal of 
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MONUC peacekeepers on 25 February 2005.47 Katanga was arrested by Congolese 
authorities the very day after the incident, on 26 February 2005,48 whereas Lubanga was 
captured nearly one month later on 19 March 2005. Following their apprehension, both had 
been kept in detention and subsequently charged with additional and very serious crimes such 
as genocide and crimes against humanity. The Prosecutor’s request for arrest on behalf of the 
Court, therefore, came after ten and seventeen months of detention in national prisons 
respectively. Similarly, Gbagbo was arrested by forces loyal to the newly elected president 
Ouattara in April 2011 and detained in various locations before the issuance of an arrest 
warrant by the PTC on 23 November 2011 and his transfer to the Court one week later. 49 
Defendants complained that their initial detention by national authorities had been 
completely unlawful and motivated by political reasons. They lamented several violations of 
their basic rights by local authorities, such as being deprived of their liberty in the absence of 
an arrest warrant, without being informed of the charges against them, and being denied 
prompt access to a lawyer. Gbagbo’s Defense also alleged grave physical ill-treatment, 
abuses, and torture.50 As a consequence, defendants requested the Court to take responsibility 
for the above violations and dismiss its jurisdiction.51 This request was based on two 
arguments, which will be considered below. 
 
4.1.1 Prosecutorial misconduct 
 
Defendants complained of the Prosecutor’s violation of the statutory duty of care about the 
suspect because, by the time they became target of the ICC investigation, the Prosecutor must 
have been aware of the violations characterizing their detention before national authorities, 
but did nothing to stop them. Quite the contrary: s/he took advantage of them for her/his own 
investigations. 
The core argument of defendants’ submissions is that, once the accused becomes a 
principal suspect in the case and therefore a target of the activities of the Prosecutor, a duty of 
                                                
47 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga, Prosecution’s Submission of Further Information and Materials, ICC-01/04-
01/06, 25 January 2006, 8–10. 
48 Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga (n 44) 12. 
49 Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo (n 45), 8, 30 and 41. 
50 ibid., 20. 
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International Criminal Court, vol 41(Intersentia 2010). See also: Kelly Pitcher, Addressing Violations Of 
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care towards him/her arises by virtue of Articles 54(1)(c), 67(1)(c) and 21(3) of the Statute.52 
The first article obliges the Prosecutor to ‘fully respect the rights of persons’ during an 
investigation; the second endows the accused with the right to be tried without undue delay, 
and the third one is the overarching principle according to which every activity of the Court 
must be in compliance with internationally recognized human rights. 
A crucial issue that defendants had to face, therefore, was determining at which point 
in the investigations the Prosecutor's attention was drawn to them and they became suspects in 
the case. As has been seen, the Statute and the Rules do not regulate the matter and the 
Prosecutor has no obligation to formalize the moment in which a person becomes a suspect. 
Moreover, we have also seen how, in the view of the Court, a case in a legal sense arises only 
with the application of an arrest warrant by the Prosecutor. Katanga's Defence tried to show 
the limitations of this narrow view: 
 
In the time preceding the issuing of an arrest warrant by the ICC there was an increase in 
interest in the accused by the ICC. This is not a black and white situation. The successful 
application for a warrant of arrest would be an artificial point to measure the beginning 
of participation by the ICC in the situation of the accused. At some point during the 
preceding period of growing interest in the accused there was a formulation of intention 
on the part of the OTP to treat the accused as a principal suspect in the case concerning 
Bogoro. It is at that point that the prosecutor assumes a duty of care towards the accused, 
whatever his status in the DRC.53 
 
Along these lines, defendants endeavoured to show that they had become target of the 
investigation long before the request of the prosecutor of an arrest warrant to the Pre-Trial 
Chamber. They did so by quoting public statements and interviews of OTP staff released at 
the early stages of the investigation (and even during the preliminary examination) in which 
they explicitly referred to the fact that the Prosecution was monitoring the accused.54  
At the same time, defendants claimed that the Prosecutor must have been fully aware 
of their unlawful conditions of detention. They reported visits of the Prosecutor’s staff to their 
countries and meetings held between Prosecution representatives and national authorities that 
must have informed the OTP of their status. As Katanga’s Defence put it: 
                                                
52 Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga (n 44) 90. 
53 ibid at 80. 
54 Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo (n 45) 236–238. 
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The Prosecutor ought to have been in possession of sufficient information, in this 
particular case, to be aware that the accused’s detention in the DRC was inconsistent 
with international human rights standards. The fact that the arrest of the accused was not 
founded on evidence; that he had not been promptly brought before a judicial authority; 
that he had been kept in detention for an unreasonable time without any suggestion of a 
trial; that he was still in detention but with no reasonable prospect of a speedy trial; that 
he was deprived of the assistance of counsel while interviewed – these were all matters 
which ought to have been manifest to a Prosecutor acting diligently in his investigations 
of the accused, the activities of the DRC for admissibility, and on the basis of documents 
and information received from the DRC with respect to proceedings within the DRC.55 
 
In the Lubanga case, the Prosecutor’s knowledge about the defendant’s conditions of 
detention before national authorities was explicitly admitted by the Prosecutor himself. In 
submitting further information and materials to the Pre-Trial Chamber to complement his 
request of arrest and surrender, the Prosecutor stated that: 
 
The DRC proceedings against, among others, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo are the subject of 
serious and increasing criticism. The arrest of TLD by the DRC authorities took place in 
the context of international pressure, arising from the reaction to the killing of UN 
(MONUC) peacekeepers on 25 February 2005 [the so called Ndoki incident] (…) To the 
extent that information is available to the Prosecution, neither at the time of his arrest nor 
later has evidence emerged that clearly links TLD to the Ndoki incident (…) This 
situation has resulted in increased criticism from international NGOs, alleging that the 
detention of TLD and the other leaders of the political e/o military groups may be 
irregular56 
 
He then moved on to quote a report from Human Rights Watch documenting the breaches of 
international standards of due process by the DRC authorities in arresting the suspects of the 
Ndoki incident. Apparently, the Prosecutor’s only concern with respect to these allegations 
was the fact that they ‘may result in the DRC authorities soon being prepared to release 
                                                
55 Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga (n 44) 84. 
56 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga (n 47) 8–11. 
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TLD’.57 Hence, he claimed, the urgency of the issuance of an arrest warrant by the Pre-Trial 
Chamber. Regrettably, Lubanga’s Defense did not mention this in its motion challenging the 
jurisdiction of the case (although, with the benefit of hindsight, this probably would not have 
made much difference). 
Finally, in light of the argument above, defendants alleged that the situation of unlawful 
detention in their home country enabled their transfer to the Court, and that the Prosecutor and 
national authorities collaborated closely to this end. The government of their state wanted 
them to be prosecuted before the ICC out of internal political calculations, while the 
Prosecutor, on his side, was more than willing to take up their cases and take advantage of the 
readiness of local authorities to cooperate. Once again, they supported their allegations with 
circumstantial evidence: public statements of government officials expressing deference 
towards the Court's expectations and decisions; Prosecution's representatives expressing their 
preference for a trial before the ICC; NGOs reports suggesting that state authorities in the 
DRC have been keeping individuals in detention without charge merely for the benefit of the 
ICC (Katanga); the fact that the local prosecutor charged the accused with different crimes 
from those under the Rome Statute in order to enable the Court to step in; the fact that the 
ICC Prosecutor waited a long time before requesting the issuance of an arrest warrant to the 
Pre-Trial Chamber. With respect to the latter criticism, it has to be noted that, after the 
opening of an investigation in the DRC, the Prosecutor waited almost three years before 
approaching the Chamber with a request for a warrant against Lubanga and Katanga. Defense 
counsels pointed out that, in the meantime, the suspects were kept in unlawful detention by 
local authorities and, therefore, the Prosecutor had a duty to act with speed and diligence in 
requesting their transfer to the Court once he had determined that there were reasonable 
grounds to believe that they had committed crimes. 
 
4.1.2 Court’s responsibility as the last forum of adjudication 
 
Defendants argued that - irrespective of the negligence of the Prosecutor and her/his collusion 
with the government of their state - the Court should take responsibility for the violations of 
their rights committed by national authorities and dismiss its jurisdiction. Borrowing from the 
ICTR jurisprudence,58 Katanga’s Defense used the concept of ‘constructive custody’. 
According to this notion, once the warrant of arrest is issued, the accused falls under the 
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58 See further at paragraph 4.3. 
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constructive custody of the ICC with the consequence that ‘any continuing illegality becomes 
the shared fruit and responsibility of the DRC and the ICC’59. This is because the prior state 
of detention of the accused ‘serves the interests of, enables, and is in fact being taken 
advantage of by the ICC for the purpose of the accused eventual transfer to the ICC’60. The 
very fact that serious violations occurred, therefore, obliges the Court to review and supervise 
such violations without the need to conduct any inquiry into issues of knowledge and duty of 
care of the Prosecutor.  
Both Lubanga and Katanga's defense quoted the Barayagwiza jurisprudence of the 
ICTR, according to which, once it has been established that the human rights of the accused 
have been violated, it is irrelevant who is responsible for this violations and the accused must 
be afforded with a remedy.61  
Finally, defendants proposed a reading of Articles 55 and 59 consistent with this view. 
As has been seen, Article 55 endows the accused with the right not to be subject to arbitrary 
arrest and detention with respect to an ‘investigation under this Statute’, whereas Article 59 
regulates arrest and surrender proceedings in the custodial State and mandates the latter to 
ensure that due process rights of defendant are respected. 
With regard to Article 55, defendants invited the Court to adopt a broader 
interpretation of the terms ‘investigation under this Statute’, encompassing all the proceedings 
whose purpose is to bring the person before the Court, including those pertaining to the 
custodial State.62 This interpretation would allow to widen the scope of the accused’s 
protection and of the Court’s review of violations committed by national authorities.  
As far as Article 59 is concerned, defendants noted how this provision is drafted on 
the assumption that the accused would be at large, as local judicial authorities are mandated to 
review the respect of defendants’ rights in the execution of the request of the Court to arrest 
and surrender.63 As Gbagbo Defense pointed out, however, defendants cannot be stripped of 
their protection from unlawful arrest on the pretext that they were already in detention at the 
time of execution of the procedure prescribed by the Court. 64 Unlawful arrest proceedings 
occurred prior to the application for a warrant of arrest to the Court constitute a violation of 
Article 59(2) of the Statute. In such cases, therefore, the arrest to be taken into account by the 
Court in supervising the activities of national authorities is the one that took place in the 
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context of national proceedings, and not the one executed on behalf of the Court. Doing 
otherwise would create inequality between persons already in custody at the time the 
Prosecutor initiates proceedings, who would not be afforded statutory protection, and persons 
at large, towards whom the guarantees of Article 59 would apply.65  
 
4.2 Responsibility of the Court for violations committed by national authorities  
 
In its first decision on a challenge to the jurisdiction of the Court, the Appeals Chamber 
defined human rights law as an all-encompassing yardstick against which the provisions of 
the Statute and the proceedings of the Court must be measured, in accordance with Article 
21(3) of the Rome Statute: 
 
Human rights underpin the Statute; every aspect of it, including the exercise of the 
jurisdiction of the Court. Its provision must be interpreted and more importantly applied 
in accordance with internationally recognized human rights; first and foremost, in the 
context of the Statute, the right to a fair trial, a concept broadly perceived and applied, 
embracing the judicial process in its entirety.66 
 
With respect to the right to a fair trial, the Chamber firmly stated the non-derogable, absolute 
nature of this right: 
 
Where fair trial becomes impossible because of breaches of the fundamental rights of the 
suspect or the accused by his/her accusers, it would be a contradiction in terms to put the 
person on trial. Justice could not be done. A fair trial is the only means to do justice. If no 
fair trial can be held, the object of the judicial process is frustrated and the process must 
be stopped. 
 
The adamant tone of these initial statements led to hope that the Court would assume a full 
responsibility for the situation of defendants appearing before it. Implicitly, this approach 
seemed to deny any possible contextualization and adaptation of fair trial rights in light of the 
special circumstances under which the Court operates. Yet, ICC judges have constantly 
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dismissed the arguments brought forward by defendants in their challenges to the jurisdiction 
of the Court.67  
According to their view, Article 59 cannot be applied to the period of time before the 
receipt by the custodial state of the request for arrest and surrender by the Court ‘even in 
cases where the person may already have been in the custody of that state, and regardless of 
the grounds for any such prior detention’.68 From this reasoning it is clear that the Court 
considers the successful application for a warrant of arrest as the point to measure the 
beginning of its participation in the situation of the accused and, therefore, its responsibility 
towards him/her. Violations of habeas corpus rights occurred prior to this moment can be 
supervised by the Court only upon the proof of ‘concerted action’ between an organ of the 
Court (i.e., the Prosecutor) and national authorities in the commission of such violations. 
 
Violations of fundamental rights, however serious, can be said to constitute an abuse of 
process only insofar as they can be attributed to the Court. This means that they have to 
be i) either directly perpetrated by persons associated with the Court; ii) or perpetrated by 
a third person in collusion with the Court. Conversely, when a violation of the suspect’s 
fundamental rights, however grave, is established, but demonstrates no such link with the 
Court, the exceptional remedy of relinquishment of jurisdiction/staying of the 
proceedings is not available.69 
 
Six years earlier, the same Pre-Trial Chamber adopted a less categorical view by stating that, 
even in cases where no concerted action is established, ‘the abuse of process doctrine 
constitutes an additional guarantee of the rights of the accused’. At the same time, however, 
the Chamber recalled that this doctrine ‘has been confined to instances of torture or serious 
mistreatment [emphasis added] by national authorities of the custodial State in some way 
related [emphasis added] to the process of arrest and transfer of the person to the relevant 
international criminal tribunal’70 
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In all the above-mentioned cases the Court found no evidence that the arrest and 
detention of the accused prior to the issuance of the ICC arrest warrant was the result of any 
concerted action between the Prosecutor and local authorities. The Court clarified that ‘mere 
knowledge’ on the part of the Prosecutor of the investigations carried out by national 
authorities is no proof of his involvement in the way they are conducted or in the means 
applied therein. In the same vein, the mere fact that the Prosecutor was in contact with local 
authorities throughout the period of the preliminary examination and the investigation is not 
enough to demonstrate his/her complicity in the detention of the accused.71 
 
 4.3 The jurisprudence of the Court in relation to that of the ad hoc Tribunals 
 
The reasoning of the ICC judges clearly resembles the approach adopted by the ad hoc 
Tribunals in their case law regarding violations of defendants’ habeas corpus rights. Upon 
their transfer to the Tribunals, some defendants alleged that they had been previously detained 
by national authorities on behalf of the Tribunal and this detention had been unlawful for 
various reasons.  
The landmark case in this respect is the ICTR case of Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza. 
Barayagwiza had been subject to a long period of pre-trial detention in Cameroon during 
which his right to be promptly informed of the charges against him and the right to challenge 
the legality of his detention before a court of law were violated. The Prosecutor tried to 
diminish her own role in the prolonged pre-trial detention of the accused in Cameroon and the 
related violations of the accused’s rights, and to allocate responsibility to Cameroon. 
In the first appeal decision, the Appeals Chamber found that these violations were so 
grave that amounted to an abuse of process and ordered the termination of the proceedings as 
the only adequate remedy for the accused.72 Although the Chamber found that the Prosecutor 
played a significant role in the continuous violation of the accused’s rights, it also made the 
following groundbreaking statement: 
 
Even if fault is shared between the three organs of the Tribunal – or is the result of the 
actions of a third party, such as Cameroon – it would undermine the integrity of the 
judicial process to proceed. Furthermore, it would be unfair for the Appellant to stand 
trial on these charges if his rights were egregiously violated. Thus, under the abuse of 
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process doctrine, it is irrelevant which entity or entities were responsible for the alleged 
violations of the Appellant’s rights.73 
 
Consequently, when specifically addressing Barayagwiza’ s right to be promptly informed of 
the charges, it considered ‘irrelevant’ the fact that only a small portion of the total period of 
his provisional detention was attributable to the Tribunal, ‘since it is the Tribunal – and not 
other entity – that is currently adjudicating the Applicant’s claims. Regardless of which other 
parties may be responsible, the inescapable conclusion is that the Appellant’s right to be 
promptly informed of the charges against him was violated.’74 
Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber stressed the importance of its supervisory role 
over pre-trial human rights violations, as a means to provide a remedy for the violation of the 
accused’s rights, deter future misconduct, and enhance the integrity of the judicial process.75 
This decision is praised by scholars as an important step in the establishment of the 
principle requiring that international tribunals supervise every violation of individual rights 
that occurs in the framework of their proceedings (irrespective of who committed them), with 
the aim of preserving the integrity and the fairness of the trial.76 Indeed, this ruling raised 
hopes of a paradigm shift in how international tribunals conceptualize their responsibility for 
human rights violations that have occurred in the pre-trial phase. 
Regrettably, the Appeals Chambers findings have remained isolated. The Prosecutor 
appealed the decision and, in a second judgment, the Chamber found that, based on ‘new 
facts’ presented by the Prosecutor, it emerged that violations were not as serious as had been 
previously determined, and, most importantly, they were due more to Cameroon than to the 
Prosecutor.77 As a consequence, the Chamber held that, although the accused was entitled to 
some form of compensation, the remedy of relinquishment of jurisdiction was 
disproportionate. The appropriate remedy would have to be determined with the judgment on 
the merits as a reduction in sentence in case of conviction, or a financial compensation in case 
of acquittal.  
As has been noted, in expressly attributing its decision to the new fact that it was 
Cameroon, rather than the Prosecutor, that was responsible for the violations of the 
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defendant’s rights, the ICTR ‘appears to be implicitly reversing its earlier finding in the 
November 1999 decision that it was irrelevant which entity or entities were responsible for 
the alleged violations of the Appellant’s rights’.78 
In the subsequent case law of the ICTR and ICTY, the involvement of the Prosecution 
in the violations of defendants’ rights during arrest and surrender proceedings has always 
been considered essential for determining the responsibility of the Tribunal. As can be seen, 
the ICC requirement of ‘concerted action’ between the Prosecution and national authorities is 
perfectly consistent with the ad hoc Tribunals’ jurisprudence. However, it is argued that the 
law and the context in which the ICC operates are different from that of its predecessors and, 
thus, the ‘concerted action’ requirement is more problematic from the accused’s perspective.  
First, before the ad hoc Tribunals, demonstrating the involvement of the Prosecution 
in the infringement of the rights of defendants is much easier, due to the mechanism of 
provisional detention set forth by the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Tribunals, 
which the ICC does not have. Under Rule 40, the Prosecutor may request a State, as a matter 
of urgency, to arrest a suspect ‘provisionally’ and place him/her into custody. Subsequently, 
Rule 40bis enables the Prosecutor to request a judge to order the transfer and provisional 
detention in the premises of the Tribunal of a person arrested by a State pursuant to Rule 40. 
The above-discussed case law concerning habeas corpus rights before the Tribunals emerged 
in the context of the application of these rules, i.e., the violations of defendants’ rights were 
committed by national authorities that had been requested to provisionally arrest a suspect by 
the Prosecutor. Within this legal framework, considering the detention in a State as being ‘at 
the behest’ of the Tribunal is relatively easy.  
Second, it has to be noted that before the Tribunals the distinction between ‘suspect’ 
and ‘accused’ is clear. A suspect is a person who is not yet indicted. Rule 2 of the ICTR RPE 
defines a suspect as a person about whom the Prosecutor possesses reliable information which 
tends to show that the person may have committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal. He/she then becomes an ‘accused’ upon confirmation of an indictment against 
him/her in accordance with Rule 47 RPE. Within this framework, tracing the exact moment in 
which the Prosecutor becomes responsible for an individual is possible. This has been 
explicitly acknowledged by the ICTR Appeals Chamber in the Kajelijeli case, which involved 
facts that were virtually identical to the Barayagwiza case. Following a request of provisional 
detention by the Prosecutor pursuant to Rule 40 RPE, the defendant had been held in custody 
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by the Benin authorities for 85 days without charge and without being brought promptly 
before a judge, prior to his transfer to the ICTR. According to the Chamber, ‘by making a 
Rule 40 request for the urgent arrest of a suspect, the Prosecution is, by definition under Rule 
2 of the Rules, making the claim that it possesses ‘reliable information which tends to show 
that he may have committed a crime over which the Tribunal has jurisdiction’’.79 Thus, it is 
from this very moment that the Tribunal’s Statute and Rules pertaining to the rights of 
suspects become applicable, and the duty of diligence of the Prosecutor arises.80 In this 
respect, the Chamber clarified that, by setting the Tribunal proceedings in motion with Rule 
40 RPE, the Prosecutor shares a legal responsibility with national authorities that ‘the case 
proceeds to trial in a way that respects the rights of the accused’.81 According to the Chamber 
‘this flows from the rationale that the international division of labor in prosecuting crimes 
must not be to the detriment of the apprehended person’82. 
It is unlikely that a similar jurisprudence and a similar conceptualization of the 
prosecutorial duty of due diligence will be developed by the ICC. This is because of the 
different ways through which cooperation plays out before this Court, which are not properly 
acknowledged by the Statute’s legal framework governing arrest and surrender proceedings 
and by the judges exercising their supervisory role over the Prosecutor’s activities and 
national authorities. 
 
4.4 Final Remarks  
 
The ad hoc Tribunal’s founding instruments have been much criticized because they do not 
impose human rights obligations on states when arresting suspects on behalf of the Tribunals. 
The judges, however, managed to develop a consistent jurisprudence that sanctioned the 
Prosecution’s misconduct and held it accountable for not making requests under Rule 40 and 
40bis in a timely manner. This lack of diligence on its part made it complicit in the violations 
of habeas corpus rights perpetrated by national authorities. 
By contrast, the Rome Statute has been praised for representing a clear improvement 
in protecting the right to liberty of the accused, especially through Article 59(2), which 
mandates national judges to supervise the lawful execution of arrests on behalf of the Court, 
and Article 55(1)(d), which forbids unlawful arrest and detention in the course of an ICC 
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investigation. Nevertheless, the early practice of the Court has shown that these guarantees 
alone are not sufficient when the investigation of the Prosecutor inserts itself in ongoing 
national proceedings where suspects are already in the custody of local authorities.  
The drafters of the Rome Statute should have engaged more with the inherent tensions 
and limitations of the institution that they were about to establish and reflect more critically 
on how to avoid that they go to the detriment of the rights of the accused. In particular, they 
should have reflected more on the challenges that cooperation of states entails for the accused 
within the unique structural system of the ICC. 
It is submitted that the status of ‘suspect’ should be legally acknowledged by the 
Statute. As has been seen, Defense counsels have advocated for the imposition of a duty of 
diligence on the Prosecutor when s/he becomes aware of national proceedings involving a 
person whom s/he has targeted for the purpose of the investigation  (especially when the latter 
was triggered by a self-referral, and the accused happens to be a political opponent of the 
government which made that referral). This duty of diligence and transparency should be 
clearly spelled out in the Statute, along with specific rules governing the cooperation between 
the Prosecutor and states before the issuance of an arrest warrant against a person who is 
already in the custody of national authorities. Melinda Taylor and Charles Jalloh have 
exhaustively elaborated on the content of this duty, arguing, in particular, that the Prosecutor 
should notify the presence of detained suspects to the Pre-Trial Chamber.83 This would indeed 
represent a viable way to more carefully supervise the cooperation of the Prosecutor with 
national authorities for the purpose of transferring suspects to the Court, and would enable the 
judges to better assess the timeliness with which the Prosecutor requests the issuance of an 
arrest warrant. The latter, should request an arrest warrant from the Chamber in a timely 
manner, and should be held accountable in case s/he does not do so without providing a valid 
justification. 
As of the judges, it is submitted that the choice to acknowledge their responsibilities 
towards defendants only starting from the issuance of an arrest warrant is regrettable, as it 
fails to address the necessity of protecting the rights of persons who have been targeted by the 
Prosecutor long before the latter seeks an arrest warrant against them. Article 57 of the Statute 
bestows the duty to ‘provide for the protection (…) of persons who have been arrested’ upon 
the Pre-Trial Chamber. A meaningful protection of arrested persons necessarily implies that 
the judges supervise the violations of suspects’ rights occurring in the course of the 
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investigation and irrespective of a concerted action between national authorities and the 
Prosecutor, which should nonetheless be considered as an ‘aggravating factor’.84 This 
approach would also give a meaningful content to Article 85(1) of the Statute, which foresees 
an enforceable right to compensation to anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or 
detention. 
 
5. The right to interim release 
 
By interim release is meant the temporary release of an accused, upon specified conditions, 
for an extended period of time pending trial or judgment. The right to interim release 
emanates from the presumption of innocence, according to which the person is presumed 
innocent until proven guilty. The Rome Statute codifies this principle in Article 66. 
According to the first paragraph of this provision ‘[e]veryone shall be presumed innocent 
until proved guilty before the Court’, and, pursuant to the second paragraph, ‘[t]he onus is on 
the Prosecutor to prove the guilt of the accused’; finally, paragraph three states that [i]n order 
to convict the accused, the Court must be convinced of the guilt of the accused beyond 
reasonable doubt’.  
If the accused is presumed innocent until it is otherwise proven, restriction to liberty 
prior to the final sentence must be exceptional and subject to the principles of necessity and 
proportionality. In other words, liberty is the norm and detention must be the exception. This 
fundamental rule is enshrined in many international human rights instruments, such as the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights,85 the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights,86 the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms,87 the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights88 and the American 
Convention on Human Rights.89  
Yet, despite the unambiguous requirements under human rights law, before 
international criminal tribunals interim release has always been the exception. As one 
commentator has vividly put it ‘[i]nterim release is the Loch Ness monster of international 
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criminal justice: much discussed, rarely seen’.90 The Statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals did not 
contain any provision on pre-trial release. This omission has been explained with the 
exceptional characteristics of international criminal trials, such as the gravity of the crimes 
allegedly committed by the accused, the likelihood of retaliations against victims and 
witnesses, the risk that the accused would flee to escape a lengthy prison sentence, and the 
unavailability of in absentia proceedings.91 In addition, Rule 65(B) of the Tribunals RPE used 
to provide that interim release could only be granted in ‘exceptional circumstances’, thus, 
making continued custody the rule instead of the exception.  
It was only in 1999 (at the ICTY) and in 2002 (at the ICTR) that the judges amended 
Rule 65 so as to allow defendants to request interim release pending trial. With respect to the 
ICTY, commentators have noted that ‘increased co-operation with the successor states in 
Former Yugoslavia (and with SFOR and KFOR) has been the main factor in mitigating the 
initially restrictive attitude towards release pending trial’,92 making it possible for the 
Tribunal to be more receptive to international human rights standards.93 
Be that as it may, the excessive length of pre-trial detention before the ad hoc 
Tribunals has been harshly criticized by scholars and practitioners, who have denounced that 
this practice is in contrast with internationally protected human rights.94 Certainly, the 
exceptional circumstances and challenges faced by the ICTY and ICTR are equally present 
before the ICC. The drafters of the Rome Statute, however, departed from the precedent of the 
ad hoc Tribunals and expressly provided the possibility for the accused to be released pending 
trial both at the national level and, upon their transfer to the Court, before the Pre-Trial 
Chamber. 
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5.1 Before national authorities 
 
Article 59(3) of the Statute provides that the arrested person has the right to apply to national 
authorities for interim release pending surrender to the Court. Subsequent paragraph 4 creates 
a presumption in favor of custody by making detention the norm unless there are ‘urgent and 
exceptional circumstances to justify interim release’.95 Moreover, this provision mandates 
national judges to take into account ‘the gravity of the alleged crimes’ and the existence of the 
‘necessary safeguards’ to ensure that the custodial State is capable of surrendering the person 
to the Court.  
From this language, it appears that the Statute looks with suspicion to the possibility 
that national authorities release the person sought by the Court. The criteria applicable by the 
national authority appear more restrictive than those governing the ICC’s power to grant 
interim release.96 Moreover, they appear even more limiting than the ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ rubric previously contained in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ad 
hoc Tribunals. 
The Pre-Trial Chamber must be notified of any request for interim release and, before 
rendering a decision, the national authority must give ‘full consideration’ to its 
recommendations, including any on measures to prevent escape.97 Moreover, the Chamber 
can request periodic reports on the status of the interim release.98 
In reaching a determination on interim release, national judges are not entitled to 
review the warrant of arrest issued by the Pre-Trial Chamber. Article 59(4) prohibits national 
authorities to consider whether the warrant of arrest was properly issued in accordance with 
Article 58(1)(a) and (b). Under Rule 117(3) RPE, the arrested person shall bring any 
challenge as to the issuance of the warrant directly to the Pre-Trial Chamber. To date, two 
defendants, Bemba and Ngudjolo, have requested interim release before national authorities 
with no success.99 
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5.2 Before the Court 
 
After the suspect has been surrendered to the Court by the custodial State, s/he shall appear 
promptly before the Pre-Trial Chamber pursuant to Rule 121 RPE. At this first appearance, 
the person has the right to apply for interim release.100 Article 60 aims to provide the detainee 
with an early opportunity to contest his or her arrest and sequential detention and sets out the 
conditions for a continued deprivation of liberty.  
Pursuant to the second paragraph of this provision, the person shall continue to be 
detained unless the Chamber is satisfied that the conditions outlined in Article 58(1) for the 
emission of an arrest warrant are not met. In other words,  continued detention cannot be 
maintained, unless the judges are satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the 
person has committed the crimes charged,101 and that detention is necessary (i) to ensure the 
person’s appearance at trial; or (ii) to ensure that the person does not obstruct or endanger the 
investigation or the Court proceedings; or (iii) where applicable, to prevent the person from 
continuing with the commission of that crime or a related crime which is within the 
jurisdiction of the Court and which arises out of the same circumstances.102  
Interim release can be granted with or without conditions. The latter are listed at Rule 
119 RPE and may include limitations upon travel to certain places and contact with victims 
and witnesses, prohibition to undertake certain professional activities and the obligation to 
reside in a specific place. 
Pursuant to Regulation 51 of the Regulations of the Court, for the purposes of a 
decision on interim release, the Pre-Trial Chamber shall seek observations from the host State 
and from the State to which the person seeks to be released. Such consultations are a crucial 
moment of the interim release process, as the Court needs to know whether that State is 
willing to accept the person on its territory and whether it can provide guarantees of the 
person’s attendance at trial.103 
As will be seen, the willingness of States to accept provisionally released persons is 
indispensible to ensure the effectiveness of the right of suspects to be released pending trial. It 
must be noted that the Court is more likely to grant release to defendants outside of their 
countries of origin, as these are often politically unstable and geographically far removed 
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from The Hague. Moreover, defendants will have connections and support there. The 
unavoidable conclusion is that it will be on defendants to find a third State willing to accept 
them, failing which their application for release will be rejected.104 In this respect, it is useful 
to remind that the Rome Statute does not impose an obligation on States Parties accept 
provisionally released persons on their territories. As has been seen in Chapter II, this area of 
cooperation is left to voluntary agreements (the so called ‘framework agreements’) to be 
concluded by the Court and States.105 Regrettably, only Belgium has entered into an 
agreement on interim release with the Court so far.106 The Court has made clear that: 
 
the Agreement, far from witnessing to an unconditional availability and willingness on 
the part of the Kingdom of Belgium to accept that detainees from the Court be released 
on its territory or, even less, establishing an obligation on their part to do so, makes such 
acceptance explicitly conditional upon an assessment to be made ‘au cas-par-cas’ on the 
basis of the specific appreciation that the Belgian authorities may make of a given 
case.107  
 
Equally, pursuant to Article 47(1) of the Headquarters Agreement, the Netherlands are only 
obliged to facilitate the transfer of a released detainee to another State, but not to accept the 
person on their territory.108 
Article 60(3) and Rule 118(2) RPE, mandate the Pre-Trial Chamber to review its 
ruling on release or detention at least every 120 days on the request of the person or the 
Prosecutor. Upon such review, the Chamber may modify its ruling as to detention, release or 
conditions of release if it is satisfied that ‘changed circumstances so require’. The basis of the 
review, thus, is a change in the circumstances under which the original decision under Article 
60(2) was taken. The Appeals Chamber clarified that while the Prosecutor does not have to 
re-establish circumstances that have already been established, he must show that there has 
been no change in those circumstances.109 In light of the above, a Chamber carrying out a 
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periodic review of a ruling on detention must satisfy itself that the conditions under Article 
58(1) of the Statute setting forth the requirements for the issuance of a warrant of arrest 
continue to be met.110  
A second ground under which a detainee can be released arises in case of misconduct 
of the Prosecutor. Pursuant to Article 60(4), the Pre-Trial Chamber ‘shall ensure that a person 
is not detained for an unreasonable period prior to trial due the inexcusable delay of the 
Prosecutor’. If such delay occurs, the Court ‘shall consider’ releasing the person. This right is 
independent from that provided under Article 60(2). This means that, even if the detention 
was legitimate pursuant to the latter, the Chamber can still decide to release the person if it 
determines that the length of pre-trial detention was unreasonable due to a negligent behavior 
of the Prosecutor.111 The requirement that the unreasonable length of detention must be due to 
an unreasonable delay of the Prosecutor is problematic. Scholars have noted that, under 
human rights law, the assessment of existence of unreasonable period of detention is not made 
dependent upon this condition.112 
 
5.2.1 The reasonable duration of detention in the case law of the Court 
 
In a recent judgment, the Pre-Trial Chamber ordered the release of four suspects pursuant to 
Article 60(4) despite the absence of an ‘inexcusable delay’ of the Prosecutor. 113 According to 
the judge, the fact that the duration of the detention of the suspects is not due to the 
Prosecutor’s inexcusable delay does not relieve the Chamber of its ‘distinct and independent 
obligation (...) to ensure that a person is not detained for an unreasonable period prior to trial 
under article 60(4) of the Statute, which obligation is a corollary of the fundamental right of 
an accused to a fair and expeditious trial.’114 This reasoning was censored on appeal.115  
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The Appeals Chamber explained that the Pre-Trial Chamber incorrectly interpreted and 
applied Article 60(4) of the Statute, as this provision explicitly requires that the unreasonable 
length of the detention be caused by the delay of the Prosecutor. Subsequently, the Chamber 
clarified the correct legal basis under which judges can release defendants due to the 
excessive length of their detention. The relevant provision is Article 60(3) – regulating 
periodic reviews on detention - interpreted in light of ‘internationally recognised human 
rights’ under Article 21(3) of the Statute. According to the Chamber: 
 
[a] Chamber may determine that a detained person has been in detention for an 
unreasonable period, even in the absence of inexcusable delay by the Prosecutor, 
pursuant to article 60 (3) of the Statute. This provision, which governs the review of the 
detention in the present circumstances, must be interpreted and applied consistently with 
“internationally recognized human rights”, pursuant to article 21(3) of the Statute. 
Therefore, this provision is also a proper legal avenue to protect the right to liberty of a 
person, as well as the right to be tried within a reasonable period of time or to release 
pending trial.116  
 
According to the judges, the lapse of time in detention cannot be considered on its own to be a 
changed circumstance within the meaning of Article 60(3) of the Statute. Rather, it is one of 
the factors that need to be considered along with the risks listed in Article 58(1)(b) ‘in order 
to determine whether, all factors being considered, the continued detention stops being 
reasonable and the individual accordingly needs to be released’.117  
In other words, in the judges’ view, ‘interim release and the issue of the reasonableness of the 
period of detention are fact intensive and case specific’.118 In this respect, they recalled their 
previous finding under which ‘the unreasonableness of any period of detention prior to trial 
cannot be determined in the abstract, but has to be determined on the basis of the 
circumstances of each case’.119 
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5.3 The Bemba case 
 
On 23 May 2008, Pre-Trial Chamber III issued a warrant of arrest against Jean-Pierre Bemba, 
a Congolese national charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity for his actions as 
military commander in the Central African Republic in 2002 and 2003. On 24 May 2008, 
Bemba was arrested in Belgium and, on 3 July 2008, he was surrendered to the seat of the 
Court.  
Since his first appearance before the Trial Chamber on 4 July 2008, Bemba made 
three applications for interim release, all of which were denied.120 On 29 June 2009, after the 
charges against Bemba had been confirmed,121 the Single Judge Ekaterina Trendafilova held a 
hearing ‘for the sake of considering any issue related to the pre-trial detention of Mr. 
Bemba’.122 
At the hearing the Defence requested the interim release of Mr. Bemba, citing in 
support ‘changed circumstances’. The said circumstances included: (i) that the charges 
confirmed against the defendant significantly reduced his responsibility and consequently, if 
convicted, he would face a lighter sentence, (ii) that he would never abscond because of his 
personal security situation, (iii) that Bemba’s one year detention would be deducted from a 
possible sentence, thus reducing the likelihood of him absconding, (iv) his readiness to 
cooperate with the Prosecutor and to surrender voluntarily, and (v) the change in his financial 
situation due to he seizure and freezing of all of his assets  
In light of these changed circumstances, the Defence requested Pre-Trial Chamber to 
revisit the conditions that formed the previous 14 April 2009 decision and that Bemba be 
released to one of the following States, namely, Belgium, France, or Portugal.123 In the 14 
April decision the Single Judge had held that the continued detention of Bemba appeared 
necessary, as she assessed the risk of absconding as likely. Interestingly, a further 
circumstance that weighted against Bemba’s release was the fact that ‘none of the countries 
                                                
120 Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba, PTC III, Decision on application for interim release, ICC-01/05-01/08-73-
Conf; a public redacted version thereof was issued on 26 August 2008, ICC-01/05-01/08-80-Anx. This decision 
was confirmed on appeal, see Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of Mr. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo 
against the decision of PTC III entitled ‘Decision on application for interim release’, ICC-01/05-01/08-323, 16 
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Release, ICC-01/05-01/08-200-tEN and annexes, 16 December 2008, and Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba, PTC 
III, Decision on Application for Interim Release, ICC-01/05-01/08-403, 14 April 2009. 
121 Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba, PTC II, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute 
on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08-424, 15 June 2009. 
122 Pre-Trial Chamber H, Decision to Hold a Hearing pursuant to Rule 118(3) of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence", ICC-01/05-01/08-425, 29 June 2009. 
123 Later, in a related filing, the Defence requested that Germany, Italy and South Africa be added to the list of 
States that Bemba wished to be released to. See ICC-01/05-01/08-433 dated 2 July 2009 
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seemed willing to accept the applicant if conditionally released and accordingly they offered 
no guarantees which ensure the applicant’s appearance at trial’.124 In light of this, the Single 
Judge had stated that: 
 
[The Court] ibi on the cooperation of States, without which the applicant’s trial might be 
compromised. Moreover, in Boskoski, the ICTY Appeals Chamber upheld the finding of 
the Trial Chamber when it considered that the failure of the Croatian government to 
‘issue guarantees of the Appellant's appearance for trial’, combined with other factors, 
‘weigh[ed] heavily’ against his provisional release. These reasons justify a cautious 
approach by the Single Judge.125 
 
In its novel decision of 14 August 2009, the Single Judge reversed her position.126 At the 
outset, she recognized that the ICC Statute must be interpreted and applied in accordance with 
internationally recognized human rights standards, as provided for in Article 21(3) of the 
Statute. Moreover, she recalled that the review of her former decision would continue to be 
guided by the fundamental principle that ‘deprivation of liberty [before a sentence of 
conviction] should be an exception and not a rule’.127 Subsequently, the Judge went on to 
consider the events that took place since 14 April 2009 that she deemed worthy of a 
reassessment. Based on the defendant’s good behavior in detention, his demonstrated 
willingness to cooperate with the Court and his strong family ties, the Judge found that the 
continued detention of Mr. Bemba was no longer necessary to ensure his appearance at trial 
pursuant to Article 58(1)(b)(i) of the Statute. As a consequence, he had to be released.  
The implementation of the decision, however, was deferred pending a further decision 
of the Judge on the set of conditions to be imposed on Bemba, on the State to which he had to 
be released, and on all necessary arrangements.128 It is interesting to note that, this time, the 
Judge placed less emphasis on the circumstance that States had not provided guarantees of 
accepting the defendant in case of a conditional release. On the contrary, she emphasized that: 
 
                                                
124 Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba, PTC II Decision on Application for Interim Release, ICC-01/05-01/08-403, 
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126 Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba, PTC II Decision on the Interim Release of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo 
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The decision on interim release ultimately rests with the Single Judge, who is mandated 
to examine the prerequisites for any deprivation of liberty, based on the law exclusively 
and the specific circumstances of the case. The fact that States may have not provided 
guarantees cannot weigh heavily against Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba’s release. Neither are 
conditions of ‘guarantees’ proposed by the States a prior indispensable requirement for 
granting interim release; rather they provide assurance to the Single Judge.129 
 
The Prosecutor appealed the decision, arguing against the ‘two-tiered’ approach adopted by 
the Pre-Trial Chamber.130 According to the Prosecutor, identifying a State willing to accept 
the person concerned as well as to enforce conditions imposed by the Court is an essential 
prerequisite to granting conditional release.131 
On 2 December 2009, the Appeals Chamber unanimously upheld the appeal.132 On the 
one hand, it found that the Pre-Trial Chamber disregarded relevant facts in finding that a 
substantial change of circumstances warranted the interim release of Bemba. On the other 
hand, it specified the conditions required to grant interim release. According to the Chamber: 
 
in order to grant conditional release the identification of a State willing to accept the 
person concerned as well as enforce related conditions is necessary. Rule 119 (3) of the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence obliges the Court to seek, inter alia the views of the 
relevant States before imposing or amending any conditions restricting liberty. It follows 
that a State willing and able to accept the person concerned ought to be identified prior to 
a decision on conditional release.133  
 
Pragmatically, the Chamber acknowledged that the ICC ‘is dependent on State cooperation in 
relation to accepting a person who has been conditionally released as well as ensuring that the 
conditions imposed by the Court are enforced’. Therefore, in the absence of such cooperation, 
‘any decision of the Court granting conditional release would be ineffective’.134  
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130 Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba, Prosecution's Appeal against "Decision on the Interim Release of Jean-
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From a human rights perspective, the approach adopted by the Court is regrettable. It must be 
noted that this is not the only possible interpretation of the Statute. Even though the ICC’s 
legal framework does not explicitly oblige States to accept provisionally released defendants 
on their territory, Article 93(1)(l) of the Statute stipulates that States Parties shall comply with 
requests by the Court to provide, in relation to investigations or prosecution, ‘any other type 
of assistance which is not prohibited by the law of the requested State, with a view to 
facilitating the investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court’. It 
could be argued that hosting a provisionally released accused would be part of ‘facilitating the 
investigation and prosecution of crimes’ and that Article 21(3) of the ICC Statute requires an 
expansive interpretation in order to avoid potential human rights violations.135 
 
5.4 The case regarding the offences against the administration of justice related to the Bemba 
case 
 
On 20 November 2013, the Pre-Trial Chamber II issued arrest warrants against Bemba, two 
lawyers of his legal team (Aimé Kilolo Musamba and Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo) and 
two of his political associates (Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido) for their alleged 
responsibility for several offences against the administration of justice136 committed in 
connection with the case of the Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo. Among other 
things, the offences include corruptly influencing witnesses by giving them money and 
instructions to provide false testimony and presenting false evidence and giving false 
testimony in courtroom. 
According to Judge Cuno Tarfusser, acting as single Judge of the Pre-Trial Chamber, 
several factors justified the arrest of these individuals: the gravity of the offences, the risk of 
flight demonstrated by their possibility to travel freely and to benefit from Bemba’s network, 
and the risk for the administration of justice and of committing new offences demonstrated by 
the nature of the offences. Several applications for interim released were filed. In this respect, 
it must be noted that all suspects requested to be released either to their home country, 
Belgium for Kilolo and the DRC for Babala, or to countries where they had a legitimate right 
to return, the UK for Mangenda and France for Arido.137  
                                                
135 Van Regemorter (n 107). 
136 Article 70 of the Statute. 
137 Arido, a national of the Central African Republic, held a “document provisoire de séjour” of the French 
Republic, whereas Mangenda, a national of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, was the holder of a visa 
expiring in August 2015 for the United Kingdom. 
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On 26 September 2014, in its decision requesting observations from States,138 the Pre-
Trial Chamber considered that the duration of the suspects’ detention made it necessary for 
the Pre-Trial Chamber ‘to proceed motu proprio without delay to the review of such state of 
detention, in particular in light of the statutory penalties applicable to the offences at stake in 
these proceedings and of the paramount need to ensure that the duration of pre-trial detention 
shall not be unreasonable’.139 The Pre-Trial Chamber requested that the relevant States submit 
observations on ‘the possible conditional release of the suspects to their territory’ and their 
ability to enforce the conditions of rule 119 (1) RPE.140 
Pursuant to Regulation 51 of the Regulations of the Court, these States and the 
Netherlands submitted observations regarding a potential release of defendants on their 
territory. All of them refused. Belgium raised the lack of legal framework for the 
implementation of such release,141 while the DRC noted their inability to prevent the accused 
from committing new offences.142 On the other hand, France, the UK and the Netherlands 
signaled their opposition to accepting the accused without any further explanation.143 
This notwithstanding, on 21 October 2004, Judge Tarfusser ordered the release of 
Kilolo to Belgium, of Mangenda to the UK, of Babala to the DRC and of Arido to France.144 
The Judge only conditioned the release of the suspects to the signature of a document stating 
their commitment to appear when summoned and to the indication of their address, this being 
sufficient to ensure their appearance at trial. Since no additional conditions were imposed, the 
Judge found no need ‘to further consult with the relevant States, whether in writing or by way 
                                                
138 Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba et al, PTC II Decision requesting observations from States for the purposes 
of the review of the detention of the suspects pursuant to regulation 51 of the Regulations of the Court”, ICC-
01/05-01/13-683, 26 September 2014. 
139 ibid., 3. 
140 ibid., 5. 
141 Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba et al., PTC II Decision on the ‘Demande de mise en liberté provisoire de 
Maître Aimé Kilolo Musamba’, ICC-01/05-01/13-259, 14 March 2014. As has been seen, in March 2014, 
Belgium and the ICC signed an agreement on interim release. Such agreement, however, does not establish an 
obligation on Belgium to accept that detainees from the Court be released on its territory but makes such 
acceptance conditional upon an assessment conducted by Belgian authorities on a case by case basis. In fact, 
even after the conclusion of this agreement, Belgium continued to oppose the release of the suspects because it 
would be easy for them to leave the country and because they could not legally monitor their communications. 
See Van Regemorter (n 107). 
142 Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba et al., PTC II Decision on the "Requête urgente de la Défense sollicitant la 
mise en liberté provisoire de monsieur Fidèle Babala Wandu", ICC-01/05-01/13-258, 14 March 2014; Van 
Regemorter (n 107). 
143 Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba et al., PTC II Decision on "Narcisse Arido's request for interim release" 
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of a hearing’.145 For the same reason, the inability of the DRC authorities to enforce the 
conditions set forth under Rule 119 (1)(c) and (d) RPE was not deemed an obstacle to the 
release of Babala to its territory.146 Unfortunately, all the comments given by the States were 
confidential; therefore, it is not possible to speculate on the reasons why they changed their 
mind.147  
The four suspects were subsequently released from the custody of the ICC. Jean-Pierre 
Bemba, however, remained in detention in connection with ongoing proceedings in another 
case before the Court, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo.148 The Prosecutor 
appealed the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decisions.149 
 
5.4.1 Appellate proceedings 
 
On 29 May 2015, the Appeals Chamber reversed and remanded to the Trial Chamber the 
decision ordering the interim release of the four accused.150 As has been seen in paragraph 
5.2.1, in this judgment the Chamber reversed the ruling of the Pre-Trial Chamber and clarified 
the distinction and correct interpretation of Article 60(3) and (4) of the Statute. However, the 
Chamber found that, taking into account the length of time that has passed since their release, 
it would not be in the interests of justice for the suspects to be re-arrested. According to the 
judges: 
 
given the specific situation of the suspects in this case, i.e. that they were ordered to be 
released on 21 October 2014, to which suspensive effect was not granted by the Appeals 
Chamber, and the length of time that has passed since their release, the Appeals Chamber 
finds that it would not be in the interests of justice for the suspects to be re-arrested 
because of the reversal of the Impugned Decision. Accordingly, despite reversing the 
Impugned Decision, the Appeals Chamber decides, in view of the exceptional 
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circumstances, to maintain the relief ordered therein, i.e. the release of the suspects, 
pending the Trial Chamber’s determination on this matter.151  
 
Accordingly, on 17 August 2015, the Trial Chamber ordered the continued release of Aimé 
Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidèle Babala Wandu and Narcisse 
Arido with a number of conditions, including to be present in The Hague at their trial, 
scheduled to commence on 29 September 2015.152  
 
5.5 Final remarks 
 
Even with respect to interim release pending trial, the high-sounding statements of principles 
of the Court are not backed up by a coherent practice. The Court’s rulings in the Bemba cases 
demonstrate that the respect of the right to liberty of defendants can only be effective when 
States agree to cooperate with the ICC. In fact, the previous reviews of detention demonstrate 
that, without the identification of a State willing and able to implement the release of an 
accused, such release is not possible and that, therefore, the respect of the right to liberty is 
impossible as well.153 The present author shares the views of Havneet Kaur Sethi, who rightly 
argued that: 
 
‘the ICC has perverted the issue of interim release into a political as opposed to legal 
one. Indeed, States’ lack of cooperation is often cited as a reason to deny interim release, 
resulting (…) in the Court’s conflation of its legal duties with that of States’ political 
motivations to deny the accused entry into their respective territories. The Court 
politicizes itself by predicating its decisions to deny interim release on State cooperation, 
whose own decisions are sometimes arbitrary, capricious and contingent on policies of 
changing governments. This inevitably leads to uncertainty and lacunae in the law, and 
may result in a Court that espouses a political – as opposed to truly legal – rhetoric, 
which ignores the rights of the accused, and which, ultimately, may even arguably render 
the defendants in front of the ICC the new victims of international criminal justice.154 
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6. Conclusion 
 
Although the legal framework set forth by the Statute represents an improvement if compared 
to the ad hoc Tribunals, the actual safeguards for the right to liberty are still not sufficient in 
view of the structural characteristics of the ICC and the mode in which cooperation plays out 
in practice. The legal framework of the Statute is based on the assumption of a clear 
separation between national proceedings and proceedings of the Court. However, most often, 
this is not the case. As has been seen, this artificial distinction is upheld by the Judges in their 
considerations of the challenges to jurisdiction and admissibility of cases brought forward by 
defendants.  
Moreover, under the ICC Statute, practices on designating suspects are a matter of 
unpublished internal policy, which involves neither the Defence nor the Court. There is no 
significant judicial oversight of the Prosecutor’s activities until the issuance of an arrest 
warrant or a summons to appear, and thus, no protection of the rights of the persons targeted 
by the investigation until that moment. This lack of protection is exacerbated by the great 
discretion with which the Prosecutor is endowed with respect to the time frame of the 
investigation. 
CHAPTER V 
THE IMPACT OF COOPERATION ON THE EQUALITY OF ARMS 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Equality of arms between the Prosecution and the Defence is a central principle of modern 
international criminal justice. Although the founding instruments of international criminal 
tribunals and human rights treaties do not incorporate it as such, the case law of international 
courts and the ensuing doctrine widely acknowledge equality of arms to be a key element of 
the right to fair trial.1 Moreover, the UN Human Rights Committee has defined it as an 
implicit guarantee of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).2 
This Chapter considers equality of arms with regard to access to cooperation from the 
Defence. Like the Prosecutor, the Defence has two ways to carry out its investigations: a 
request for assistance to States and non-state actors, or direct execution of investigative 
measures on the territory of a State (on-site investigations). The assistance of national 
authorities is indispensible for both. However, for the Defence, obtaining the cooperation it 
needs to build its case is often much more difficult.  
The present Chapter examines the principle of equality of arms in cooperation 
proceedings at the ICC in light of the structural characteristics of this Court. First, the Chapter 
defines the meaning of the principle of equality of arms and its significance in the procedural 
context of the ICC. It then moves on to consider the institutional position of the Defence in 
the framework of the Court. Third, it assesses how the Defence is involved in and participates 
during the various stages of the investigation (passive position); fourth, it investigates whether 
and to what extent the Statute endows the Defence with adequate means to conduct its own 
investigations (active position). The goal is to individuate the major handicaps in the current 
cooperation regime (i.e., general and Defence-specific deficiencies), as far as the conduct of 
investigations and collection of evidence are concerned, and how these can best be remedied. 
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2. The right to equality of arms 
 
Any individual accused of criminal conduct is entitled to a fair trial. Central to the fair trial 
guarantee is the concept of equality of arms. This requires that in criminal proceedings the 
defence shall never be placed at a ‘substantial disadvantage’ relative to the prosecution, in 
terms of its ability to present its case.3 
As Richard Wilson has noted, ‘the most important and comprehensive of the cases to 
deal with procedural equality of arms was the 1999 decision of the Appeals Chamber in the 
first appeal from the first trial before the Tribunals, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic. There, the 
defence’s lead argument was that the defendant’s right to fair trial had been denied when lack 
of cooperation from the Republika Srpska prevented defence lawyers from properly 
presenting their case at trial. Specifically, most defence witnesses were Serbs still residing in 
the Republika Srpska, which refused cooperation with any aspect of the operation of the 
ICTY, while prosecution witnesses were Muslims residing in countries in Western Europe 
and North America whose governments cooperated fully with the tribunal (…) The Appeals 
Chamber ultimately rejected the defence contention, but not before it had gone far in 
determining the scope and content of the principle of equality of arms (..) It concluded that 
‘equality of arms obligates a judicial body to ensure that neither party is put at a disadvantage 
when presenting its case’. It found, however, that the ICTY did not enjoy the same authority 
as does domestic tribunals, ‘if not directly, at least through the extensive enforcement powers 
of the State, to control matters that could materially affect the fairness of the trial’. Thus the 
ICTY has no authority to respond in the manner suggested by the defence against a state that 
refuses to cooperate. It can only report such non-cooperation to the UN Security Council.’4 
The Rome Statute does not explicitly mention equality of arms, but codifies the 
principle at Article 67, enshrining the rights of the accused at trial. Pursuant to paragraph 1, 
letter b) of this provision, the accused must be granted ‘adequate time and facilities for the 
preparation of the defence’, as well as the possibility to communicate freely with counsel of 
his/her choosing in confidence. Moreover, according to subsequent letter e), the accused has 
the right ‘to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his or her behalf under the 
same conditions as witnesses against him or her’. 
                                                
3 Jens Dieckmann and Christina Kerll, ‘Representing the “General Interests of the Defence”: Boon or Bane? – A 
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2.1 Equality of arms in the pre-trial phase 
 
The pre-trial phase of the ICC proceedings is clearly inspired by the adversarial model, in that 
the parties need to gather evidence in order to build and present their case at the confirmation 
hearing5 and at trial.6 In view of the structural inequalities between the Prosecutor and the 
Defence in terms of resources and access to states cooperation, this procedural choice can 
cause significant disadvantage to the Defence.  Moreover, one must not forget that, given the 
structure of ICC proceedings, defence counsel usually enters the case at a very late pre-trial 
stage, long after the Prosecutor’s investigation has commenced, when the OTP team has 
already gathered much evidence.  
The drafters of the Statute, thus, made considerable efforts to expand the dimension of 
the Defence into the investigation process of the Prosecutor. Firstly, they imposed upon the 
Prosecutor the duty to investigate incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally 
pursuant to Article 54(1)(a). Moreover, they included in the Statute provisions that mandate 
that the Defence be involved into some of the crucial moments of the investigation, and 
envisage a strong role for the Pre-Trial Chamber in the supervision of the activities of the 
Prosecutor and in the protection of the rights of the Defence. As has been stated, without 
some form of judicial involvement at the investigation stage, an accused would be incapable 
of effectively collecting evidence and preparing his/her defence.7 
The Prosecutor has a clear mandate to investigate and prosecute the persons allegedly 
responsible for the international crimes that fall within the jurisdiction of the Court and, to 
this end, has been given specific powers and independent resources as a distinct and 
independent organ of the Court. Conversely, the Defence is not equipped with investigative 
powers similar to those of the Prosecutor (and even less resources), but it is only entitled to 
‘adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defence’ pursuant to Article 67(1)(b) of 
the Statute. This means that the Defence capacity to collect evidence is limited in scope and 
tailored to react to the Prosecution’s case.8 The Statute does not rule out independent fact-
finding by the Defence. In principle, the Defence is free to conduct its own investigation, for 
it cannot be required to rely exclusively on the investigative activities of the Prosecutor, 
                                                
5 Art. 61(3) of the Statute. 
6 Art. 67(1)(e) of the Statute. 
7 Fabricio Guariglia and Gudrun Hochmayr, ‘Article 56’ in Otto Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the Rome 
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8 Gabrielle McIntyre, ‘Equality of Arms Defining Human Rights in the Jurisprudence of the International 
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despite their necessary objectivity.9 As has been argued, ‘no proper criminal justice system 
puts its faith solely in the Prosecutor to get things right, nor in the judges to understand 
perfectly the points for both sides in every case’.10 Thus, the adequate time and facilities for 
the preparation of the defence necessarily implies adequate resources for defence teams to 
conduct independent investigations at the scene of the alleged crimes and collect evidence. 
 
2.1.2 The role of the Pre-Trial Chamber 
 
‘The establishment of the PTC stems from the Civil Law tradition, where prosecutorial and 
investigative activities frequently undergo judicial scrutiny. Nevertheless, it must be 
emphasized that the PTC is not an investigative chamber. In contrast to the ‘juge d’ 
instruction’ of civil law systems, the PTC has no investigative powers of its own nor is it 
responsible for directing or supervising the investigations of the Prosecutor. Rather, the 
Statutes establishes a hybrid system of proceedings which lacks precedents at the international 
level.’11 
The Pre-Trial Chamber has an important role in the protection of the Defence in the 
pre-trial phase. In this respect, the relevant provisions of the Statute are Article 56, on the 
intervention of the Chamber in ‘unique investigative opportunities’, and Article 57(3)(b), 
governing the issuance of cooperation orders on behalf of the Defence. In addition, Article 
57(3)(c) holds that, where necessary, the Pre-Trial Chamber is responsible to provide 
protection for the persons arrested or who appeared in response to a summons (along with the 
protection of victims and witnesses, national security information and the preservation of 
evidence). This provision is complemented by Regulation 48(1) of the Regulations of the 
Court, according to which the Pre-Trial Chamber may request the Prosecutor to provide 
specific or additional information or documents that the Chamber deems necessary in order to 
exercise its functions under Articles 53(3)(b),12 56(3)(a), and 57(3)(c) of the Statute. Article 
56 and 57(3)(b) will be thoroughly discussed in the following paragraphs. For now, it is worth 
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11 Fabricio Guariglia and Gudrun Hochmayr, ‘Article 57’ in Otto Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (2nd edn, Beck/Hart 2008) 1118–1119. 
12 According to this provision, the Pre-Trial Chamber may, on its own initiative, review a decision of the 
Prosecutor not to proceed with an investigation if the latter is based solely on considerations relating to the 
interest of justice. 
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mentioning an interesting application that the Chamber made of 57(3)(c) of the Statute in the 
Lubanga case. 
On 15 November 2006, the Defence requested the Pre-Trial Chamber to order the 
Prosecution to obtain and disclose a number of NGO’s notes and transcripts of interviews 
concerning witnesses on which the Prosecution intended to rely at the confirmation hearing.13 
The Defence had made such request pursuant to Rule 76 RPE, governing pre-trial disclosure 
relating to prosecution witnesses, according to which the Prosecutor shall provide the Defence 
with the names of witnesses whom s/he intends to call to testify and copies of any prior 
statements made by those witnesses. 
The Chamber found that the materials sought by the Defence did not refer to ‘prior 
statements’ within the meaning of Rule 76 RPE, because they consisted in ‘notes taken by 
certain journalists, non-governmental organisations and MONUC officials of their interviews 
with witnesses’14 that the Prosecutor intended to call at the confirmation hearing. Moreover, 
the relevant witnesses did not have an opportunity to re-read such notes and did not sign 
them.15 
The Chamber, however, in the capacity of ‘the ultimate guarantor of the rights of the 
Defence’, found in Article 57(3)(c) – combined with Articles 67(1)16 and 87(6)17 of the 
Statute – the appropriate legal basis to resort to the cooperation regime between the United 
Nations and the Court18 in order to obtain items which can be material for the Defence’s 
preparation of the confirmation hearing, even if they do not fall within the Prosecution’s 
disclosure obligations pursuant to article 67(2) of the Statute and Rules 76 and 77 RPE.19 
Accordingly, the Chamber ordered the Registrar to send a cooperation request to the 
United Nations in order to obtain notes of those interviews of MONUC officials with the 
witnesses concerned.20 
 
 
                                                
13 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga, Defence Requests for Disclosure of Materials, ICC-01/04-01/06-701-Conf., 
15 November 2006. 
14 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga, PTC I Decision on Defence Requests for Disclosure of Materials, ICC-01/04-
01/06, 17 November 2006, 4. 
15 ibid. 
16 This provision lists the rights of the accused at trial. 
17 Pursuant to this provision: ‘[t]he Court may ask any intergovernmental organization to provide information or 
documents. The Court may also ask for other forms of cooperation and assistance which may be agreed upon 
with such an organization and which are in accordance with its competence or mandate’. 
18 As has been seen, such regime is comprised of Article 2 of the Statute, the Cooperation Agreement between 
the United Nations and the Court and the Memorandum of Understanding between the MONUC and the Court. 
19 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga, PTC I Decision (n 14) 5. 
20 ibid., 6. 
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3. Institutional in(equality) 
 
The Rome Statute does not include the organization of defence services in its legal 
framework. According to Article 34 of the Statute, the Court is composed of four organs: the 
Presidency, the Pre-Trial, Trial and Appeals Divisions, the OTP, and the Registry. Legally 
speaking, therefore, the Defence is not an organ of the Court. Admittedly, this is nothing new. 
Starting with the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, international courts have always failed to 
set up the necessary structure to ensure the realization of defence rights (with the significant 
exception of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon established in 200721).22 In contrast, those 
same instruments spell out in great detail the institutional role of the other organs of the 
tribunals, namely, the Prosecution, Chambers, and the Registry. 
As Charles Jalloh has pointed out, this failure is mainly due to sovereignty concerns 
and to the traditional prerogative of states to prosecute international crimes committed on 
their territory or by their nationals. ‘In an environment in which international prosecution 
efforts must be justified, legalized, and legitimated for state consent to be given, concerns for 
defence rights have largely been overshadowed by prosecution concerns. This is particularly 
true given that the defence routinely challenges, both within and outside of these trials, the 
legality and the legitimacy, of the tribunals purporting to assert jurisdiction over the 
defendants.’ Similarly, Elise Groulx described how the international push to end impunity led 
‘to a focus on the prosecution of alleged perpetrators and compensation of victims. The 
system was built very rapidly without including the legal profession in an organized and 
continuous manner, in the design of the system – or looking critically at the methods of 
protecting the rights of individuals accused of committing heinous crimes.’23 
The Rules of Procedure and Evidence and the Regulations of the Court, however, 
provide a legal basis for the provision of institutional support for defendants, in an effort to 
fill in the omissions in the Statute. In particular, Rule 20 sets out the ‘responsibilities of the 
Registrar relating to the rights of the Defence’ and mandates the Registrar to, inter alia, 
provide support, assistance and information to all defence counsel and professional defence 
investigators, and equip the Defence with the adequate facilities for the performance of its 
                                                
21 Charles Chernor Jalloh, ‘The Special Tribunal for Lebanon: A Defense Perspective’ [2014] Florida 
International University, Legal Studies Research Paper Series 786. 
22 Borrowing Elise Groulx’s words, president of the International Criminal Defense Lawyers Association, ‘the 
institutional basis for a truly independent body of defense lawyers is very much lacking in the Statutes of these 
courts, even though the rights of the accused are clearly articulated on paper’, Elise Groulx, ‘Equality of Arms: 
Challenges Confronting the Legal Profession in the Emerging International Criminal Justice System’ (2010) 
2010 Revue Quebecoise de Droit International 21, 22, cited by Jalloh (n 21) 787. 
23 ibid 23. 
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duties.24 Furthermore, Rule 20(2) states that the Registrar must carry out its duties, including 
the Registry’s financial administration, in such a manner that the independence of the Defence 
is upheld.  
 
3.1 Support structures for defence services 
 
At the ICC, the institutional support for defendants operates through two main channels: the 
Counsel Support Section (CSS) – a unit created within the Registry, with the task of providing 
logistical and administrative support to both defence and victims’ counsel – and the Office of 
Public Counsel for the Defence (OPCD), a permanent unit of the Court, which falls within the 
Registry only for administrative purposes, but is otherwise a wholly independent office.25 The 
CSS was created by the Registrar in 2009. It manages the List of Counsel eligible to practice 
before the ICC and provides training and support for counsel on the list; it also administers 
the legal aid scheme of the Court on behalf of the Registrar. 
The most significant effort to remedy an imbalance between the prosecution and the 
Defence in terms of institutionalization, however, is represented by the creation of the OPCD. 
The latter was established in accordance with Regulation 77 of the Regulations of the Court 
and its tasks include: i) representing and protecting the rights of the defence during the initial 
stages of the investigation; ii) providing legal advice and research to defence teams and 
defendants; iii) advocating for the general interests of the defence in connection with internal 
and external policies and agreements. 
OPCD members work independently26 and are governed, in the exercise of their 
duties, especially as regards respect for confidentiality, by the Code of Professional Conduct 
for Counsel. The OPCD is the voice of the Defence before the ICC and serves the purpose of 
fostering the principle of equality of arms at an institutional level. Moreover, it represents a 
significant advancement to the practice of the Court’s predecessors, where no formal structure 
existed to represent the interests of the Defence.27 
                                                
24 Rule 20 (1)(b) and (e) RPE. 
25 Support for victims and their legal representatives is provided by the Victims Participations and Reparations 
Section (VPRS), attached to the division of the Court Services and the Office of Public Counsel for Victims 
(OPCV), the counterpart of the OPCD mandated to provide legal support and advice to victims and legal 
representatives. 
26 Pursuant to Regulation 114 of the Regulations of the Registry ‘the members of the Office shall not receive any 
instructions from the Registrar in relation to the discharge of their tasks as referred to in regulations 76 and 77 of 
the Regulations of the Court’. 
27 At the ICTY, the general interests of the defence were represented by an external partner of the Tribunal, the 
Association of Defense Counsel at the ICTY (ADC-ICTY). 
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3.1.1 Representing and protecting the rights of the defence during the initial stages of the 
investigation 
 
Regulation 77(4) of the Regulations of the Court entrusts the OPCD with the protection of the 
rights of the defence both during the preliminary examination under Rule 47(2) RPE, and 
during the formal investigation pursuant to Article 56, governing the proceedings concerning 
a ‘unique investigative opportunity’. Moreover, OPCD may be appointed to serve as ad hoc 
counsel for the general interest of the defence ‘when the interests of justice so require’ 
pursuant to Regulation 76(1) and (2). 
 
3.1.2 Assistance to defence teams 
 
As mentioned, the OPCD assists defence teams and defendants with legal advice and research 
pursuant to Regulation 77(5) of the Regulations of the Court. In the absence of any further 
elaboration by the Court’s legal instruments, the 2010 Report of the Registry provides the 
most insightful information regarding the actual contents of this task.28 
According to it, the OPCD provides new defence teams with manuals and memoranda, 
which enables them to acquaint themselves with the complex legal framework and 
jurisprudence of the Court. Subsequently, the defence teams may also request the OPCD to 
conduct research into legal and procedural issues arising in their case.29 Through these 
activities, the OPCD seeks to create a ‘collective defence memory’ and ‘resource centre’. 
Moreover, it endeavours to achieve an equality of arms between individual defence teams and 
prosecution teams, which are assisted by a separate appellate and legal advisory section.30  
The Report further explains that, through its access to all public decisions and 
transcripts, the OPCD has compiled various legal digests on specific subject matters (such as 
victim participation, oral decisions on trial procedures etc.) which it updates on a regular basis 
and disseminates to all defence teams to ensure that they are familiar with the most recent 
legal precedents issued in other cases. Moreover, by virtue of its insight into all the 
proceedings before the ICC, the OPCD has been invited by different Chambers to file 
                                                
28 ICC Registry, ‘Behind the Scenes: the Registry of the ICC’ (2010), available at: https://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/docs/behindTheSce.pdf. The section on the OPCD has been written by Xavier-Jean Keïta, 
Principal Counsel OPCD & Melinda Taylor, Legal Advisor OPCD. 
29 Keïta and Taylor, ‘Behind the Scenes: the Registry of the ICC’ (2010), 69-71. 
30 ibid. 
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observations concerning the development of protocols regulating the system of disclosure 
between the parties, which could have significant ramifications for all future defence teams.31  
The relationship between OPCD and external counsel is a very delicate one. As the 
Registry has emphasized, ‘the OPCD is not a public defender’s office per se, it exists to 
supplement rather than replace the role of external defence counsel’.32 On the one hand, the 
OPCD must be careful not to interfere with the strategy of individual defence teams, which 
are ultimately responsible for the contents of defence filings and submissions. On the other 
hand, the OPCD must avoid the possibility of conflicts of interest arising from assistance 
provided to different defence teams. For this reason, the OPCD does not provide any advice 
or assistance in relation to factual issues, nor does it seek or receive instructions from the 
defendants.33 
 
3.1.3 Representation of the rights of the Defence in ICC policies 
 
In this capacity, the OPCD represents the rights of the Defence in deliberations regarding ICC 
policies and procedures, so as to ensure that they are formulated in a manner which is 
consistent with fair trial rights. For example, the OPCD has provided input on issues related 
to intermediaries, victim participation and legal aid. 
Additionally, the OPCD engages with external partners, namely NGOs and States, to promote 
awareness on defence-related issues, such as the importance of equality of arms and the role 
of defence counsel. 
 
3.2 The appointment of counsel 
 
The Rome Statute foresees the right to counsel both at the investigation stage and after an 
arrest or a summons have been issued (case stage). However, there is no general right to 
counsel at the investigation stage, as this is limited to the questioning proceedings. 
Conversely, after a person has been arrested or has appeared voluntarily, his/her right to 
counsel is guaranteed throughout all procedural stages following arrest.34 
                                                
31 ibid. 
32 ibid.,69. 
33 For these reasons, the OPCD informed the Pre- Trial Chamber in the Thomas Lubanga Dyilo case that it 
would not be consistent with its mandate to file factual submissions on behalf of a defendant, who was at that 
time, represented by another defence counsel. 
34 Kenneth S Gallant, ‘The Role and Powers of Defense Counsel in the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court’ [2000] The International Lawyer 21, 22; Dieckmann and Kerll (n 3) 107. 
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The relevant provisions are the following. Article 55(2)(c), guarantees to all persons 
who are under investigation by the Prosecutor and who are to be questioned the right ‘to have 
legal assistance of the person’s choosing, or (…) to have legal assistance assigned to him or 
her, in any case where the interests of justice so require’. Questioning must be carried out in 
the presence of counsel ‘unless the person has voluntarily waived his or her right to 
counsel’35. 
Pursuant to Rule 117(2) RPE, at any time after the arrest, the person may make a 
request to the Pre-Trial Chamber for the appointment of counsel to assist with proceedings 
before the Court. Once a person has been charged with a particular crime or crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court, his or her status shifts from that of a suspect to an accused. 
According to Article 67(1), in the determination of any charge the accused shall be entitled to, 
inter alia, b) communicate freely with counsel of his/her own choosing; and d) conduct the 
defence in person or through legal assistance of his/her own choosing, or to have legal 
assistance assigned by the Court in case s/he lacks sufficient means to pay for it. 
The Rome Statute, thus, enshrines the principle that a defendant may freely choose 
counsel to represent them, provided that the counsel in question meets certain qualifications.36 
Rule 21(2) RPE provides that defendants may choose counsel from a list maintained by the 
Registrar, or can choose any ‘other counsel who meets the required criteria and is willing to 
be included in the list’.  
Counsel, however, may also be appointed as duty or ad hoc counsel in particular 
circumstances. Pursuant to Regulation 73(2) of the Regulations of the Court, duty counsel 
may be appointed by the Registrar ‘if any person requires urgent legal assistance and has not 
yet secured legal assistance, or where his or her counsel is unavailable’. In appointing duty 
counsel, the Registrar must take into account the wishes of the person, and the geographical 
proximity of, and the languages spoken by, the counsel.  
Pursuant to Regulation 76(1) and (2) of the Regulations of the Court, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber may appoint defence counsel ‘in the circumstances specified in the Statute and in 
the Rules’ as well as ‘when the interests of justice so require’. The latter type of appointment 
is especially relevant where there is no person charged but investigative activities are being 
carried out by the Prosecutor.37 
 
                                                
35 Article 55(2)(d) of the Statute. 
36 See Rule 22 RPE. 
37 IBA Report, ‘Counsel Matters at the International Criminal Court’ (2012) 12. 
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3.2.1 Appointment of ad hoc counsel to represent the general interests of the Defence 
 
Traditionally, from the Defence’s point of view, the proceedings become relevant after a 
suspect is identified38 and the Prosecutor needs to carry out an investigative act that requires 
the presence of counsel, such as the interrogation of the suspect pursuant to Article 55(2)(c) of 
the Statute. As has been seen in the previous Chapters, the Court has clarified that the 
issuance of a warrant of arrest or a summons to appear marks the transition from the situation 
to the case stage. However, proceedings taking place prior to the issuance of an arrest warrant 
may affect the case against the future defendant in various ways.  
As soon as it is decided to open an investigation, the OTP may send over a team of 
investigators to interview potential witnesses and collect evidence with the assistance of local 
authorities. By the time the defence lawyer comes into the picture – which is usually after the 
warrant of arrest or the summons to appear have been issued- the Prosecutor might have been 
involved in the case for years. The Statute, therefore, expressly envisages a role for defence 
counsel at the situation stage of the investigation and, in certain circumstances, even earlier, 
during the preliminary examination. 
As noted by Dieckmann and Kerll, prior to the establishment of the Court there were 
only two ways in which criminal lawyers could participate in proceedings before an 
international tribunal: either as defence counsels representing suspects and accused, or as 
amicus curiae appointed to assist on a particular matter.39 
The Rome Statute creates a new type of counsel (the so called ad hoc counsel), 
appointed to represent the general interests of the Defence at a very early stage of the 
investigation, where no suspect has yet been identified or charged. The need for such 
representation stems from the unique and novel jurisdiction of the Court, which is exercised 
not only over individual cases, but also over situations.40 Importantly, proceedings taking 
place in the context of a situation, such as those regarding victim participation or evidentiary 
issues – each of which involve the participation of the Prosecutor – may affect the cases 
against individual accused yet to be identified by the Court.41 
The Statute empowers the Pre-Trial Chamber to appoint ad hoc counsel both during 
the preliminary examination under Rule 47(2) RPE, and during the formal investigation 
                                                
38 Christoph Safferling, ‘The Rights and Interests of the Defence in the ICC Pre-Trial Phase’ (2011) 9 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 651, 653. 
39 Dieckmann and Kerll (n 3) 105–106. 
40 ibid 109. 
41 War Crimes Research Office, ‘Protecting the Rights of Future Accused During the Investigation Stage of 
International Criminal Court Operations’ (2008) 1. 
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pursuant to Article 56, governing the proceedings concerning a ‘unique investigative 
opportunity’. In these instances, Regulation 77(4) of the Regulations of the Court mandates 
that ad hoc counsel be selected among the members of the Office of Public Counsel for the 
Defence (OPCD). 
Additionally, pursuant to Regulation 76(1) and (2) of the Regulations of the Court, the 
Pre-Trial Chamber may appoint defence counsel ‘when the interests of justice so require’. In 
such cases, counsel may be chosen either from the list maintained by the Registry pursuant to 
Rule 21 RPE, or from the OPCD. By appointing ad hoc defence counsel to represent the 
general interests of the future accused, the Court’s legal instruments strive to ensure equality 
of arms throughout the proceedings, and ultimately to protect the fairness of any resulting 
cases against individuals.42  
 
3.2.1.1 The preliminary examination 
 
As has been seen, in the preliminary examination stage the Prosecutor analyses the reliability 
of the information received through a referral or a communication. In this stage, the 
Prosecutor is not explicitly granted investigative powers. However, pursuant to Article 15(2) 
of the Statute s/he might decide to receive ‘testimonies’ at the seat of the Court.  
Rule 47(2) RPE foresees a potential role for ad hoc counsel for the Defence when 
there is a serious risk that it might not be possible for the testimony to be taken subsequently. 
In such case, the Prosecutor ‘may request the Pre-Trial Chamber to take such measures as 
may be necessary to ensure the efficiency and integrity of proceedings and, in particular, to 
appoint counsel or a judge from the Pre-Trial Chamber to be present during the taking of the 
testimony in order to protect the rights of the Defence’.  
Nevertheless, it is difficult to assess what role defence counsel might actually have at 
such an early stage of proceedings. The Prosecutor is not investigating but merely evaluating 
the reliability of the information received in order to decide whether or not to start an 
investigation, and a suspect will normally not yet have been identified. As is the case with 
Article 56 (see below), the purpose of this provision is to make sure that the evidence will be 
available at the confirmation hearing and at trial, should the Prosecutor decide to rely on it. 
However, information under Article 15(2) is most likely to be used for the purpose of the 
hearing in which the Pre-Trial Chamber authorizes the commencement of the investigation 
                                                
42 Dieckmann and Kerll (n 3) 109; War Crimes Research Office (n 41) 2. 
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pursuant to Article 15(4). Given the different standard of proof (which is formulated as..) and 
distinct purpose of Article 15 hearing, and the limited ways in which information can be 
gathered at this stage, it may not be possible to obtain it in a form that would render it 
admissible for subsequent proceedings.43 
 
3.2.1.2 Unique investigative opportunity 
 
Article 56 provides for a mechanism to protect the rights of the future defendant in relation to 
the collection of evidence that is not likely to be available in the future. According to this 
provision, when the Prosecutor comes across a ‘unique opportunity to take testimony or a 
statement from a witness, or to examine, collect or test evidence’, s/he has a duty to inform 
the Pre-Trial Chamber, which may take the necessary measures to ‘ensure the efficiency and 
integrity of the proceedings and, in particular, to protect the rights of the Defence’.  
Article 56(2) sets forth a non-exhaustive list of measures that the Pre-Trial Chamber 
may take. From a Defence perspective, the most important is the one envisaged by letter d), 
according to which the Pre-Trial Chamber may i) authorize counsel for the person arrested or 
appeared in response to a summons to ‘participate’, or ii) in case there has not yet been such 
an arrest or appearance, or counsel has not been designated, appoint another counsel to ‘attend 
and represent the interests of the Defence’.  
As can be seen, thus, this provision protects the rights of future accused both at the 
situation stage, where a suspect has not been yet identified, and at the case stage, following 
the arrest or the appearance of the person. The presence of counsel serves the purpose of 
ensuring that the evidence taken during the investigation will be admissible at trial.44 
It must be stressed that, where counsel is appointed in the absence of an arrest or 
designation of counsel by the person, counsel may have no actual client.45 This means that the 
future accused may not be available for to give instruction to counsel and discuss a defence 
strategy with him/her. In this case, thus, counsel protects the ‘general interests of the 
Defence’, rather than the rights of a specific defendant.46 What is more, in this situation 
conflicts of interests are likely to arise. As explained by Gallant: 
                                                
43Broomhall et al., Informal Expert Paper: Fact-finding and Investigative Functions of the Office of the 
Prosecutor, Including International Co-operation, 8. 
44 Guariglia and Hochmayr (n 7) 1109; Claus Kress, ‘The Procedural Law of the International Criminal Court in 
Outline: Anatomy of a Unique Compromise’ (2007) 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice 537, 608; 
Safferling (n 38) 660. 
45 Gallant (n 34) 23. 
46 Safferling (n 38) 662. 
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several persons, some with conflicting defences, may have evidence given against them 
during a single “unique investigative opportunity”. Where the targets of the investigation 
are clear, separate counsel may be appointed for each potential accused. The court, 
however, may not know in advance the identity of those against whom evidence will be 
given. For this reason, “defence” counsel may be placed in the position of attempting to 
protect the interests of more than one potential accused, who at later stages may try to 
blame each other for the alleged crimes.47 
 
Safferling, however, has highlighted the important function that defence counsel still serves in 
this context, which is making sure that proceedings are conducted in accordance with the ‘rule 
of law’, meaning that counsel has the function to guard over issues such as the adherence to 
procedural provisions, the legitimacy of investigatory measures, and the coordination of 
several national legal orders and the ICC.48 
 
3.2.1.3 The investigation 
 
The Pre-Trial Chamber appointed ad hoc counsel to represent the interests of the defence both 
at the situation and at the case stage of proceedings. With respect to the case stage - which is 
concerned with the conduct of identified individuals and takes place after the issuance of a 
warrant of arrest or a summons to appear – the Chamber deemed it necessary to appoint an ad 
hoc counsel where the person was not represented by defence counsel49 (for example, because 
the person was still at large). Moreover, the Pre-Trial Chamber has appointed ad hoc counsel 
both from the list of attorneys maintained by the Registrar (list counsel) and from OPCD 
lawyers.50 
The reasons for the appointment were various. In the situation of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC), Pre-Trial Chamber I appointed an attorney pursuant to Article 
56, following the Prosecutor’s notification of a ‘unique investigative opportunity to carry out 
forensic examinations’ to be carried out by the Dutch Forensic Institute.51 
In the same situation, the Chamber appointed a second lawyer as ad hoc defence 
counsel for the purpose of responding to applications from victims seeking to participate in 
                                                
47 Gallant (n 34) 23–24. 
48 Safferling (n 38) 662–666. 
49 Dieckmann and Kerll (n 3) 124. 
50 ibid 112–115; War Crimes Research Office (n 41) 25–47. 
51 Situation in the DRC, PTCI Decision on the Prosecutor’s Request for Measures under Art. 56, ICC-01/04-21, 
26 April 2005. 
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the proceedings pursuant to Rule 89(1) RPE.52 This provision provides that victims wishing to 
participate in proceedings before the Court must submit a written application to the Registrar, 
and that copies of all such applications will be provided to the Prosecutor and the Defence, 
who shall be entitled to reply. Although this rule does not expressly require the appointment 
of ad hoc counsel, the Chamber deemed it necessary to use its power under Regulation 76(1) 
of the Regulations of the Court to represent and protect the interests of the defence during the 
application proceedings of Rule 89 RPE, so as to respond to victims’ applications.53 
In the situation in Darfur, Pre-Trial Chamber I appointed defence counsel to respond 
to the amicus curiae observations submitted by Louise Arbour and Antonio Cassese pursuant 
to Rule 103(1) RPE,54 which states that the Chamber may ‘invite or grant leave to a State, 
organization or person to submit, in writing or orally, any observation on any issue that the 
Chamber deems appropriate’. 
Finally, in the case against Joseph Kony et al. (situation in Uganda), Pre-Trial 
Chamber II initiated proprio motu proceedings under Article 19(1) of the Statute to determine 
the admissibility of the case.55 In inviting the Republic of Uganda, the Prosecutor and 
particular victims to submit their observations on admissibility, the Chamber also appointed 
ad hoc counsel arguing that: ‘in the present circumstances, where none of the persons for 
whom an arrest warrant has been issued is yet represented by a defence counsel, appointment 
of a counsel for the defence (…) is in the interest of justice’.56 
 
3.2.2 Limits and scope of ad hoc defence counsel’s mandate 
  
The lack of detailed provisions concerning ad hoc counsel in the legal texts of the Court gave 
rise to controversies and confusion with regard to the scope of ad hoc counsel’s mandate in 
                                                
52 Situation in the DRC, PTC I Decision on Protective Measures Requested by Applicants 01/04-1/dp, ICC-01-
04-73, 21 July 2005, 5. Article 68(3) of the Statute provides that ‘where the personal interests of the victims are 
affected, the Court shall permit their views and concerns to be presented and considered at stages of the 
proceedings determined to be appropriate by the Court and in a manner which is not prejudicial to or inconsistent 
with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial’.  
53 Pre-Trial Chamber II, following the rationale employed by Pre-Trial Chamber I, also appointed ad hoc counsel 
to represent the interests of the Defence by responding to victims’ applications to participate in the Uganda 
situation, see Situation in Uganda, PTC II Decision on legal representation, appointment of counsel for the 
defence, protective measures and time-limit for submission of observations on applications for participation, 
ICC-02/04-01/05-134, 1 February 2007. 
54 Situation in Darfur, Sudan, PTC I Decision Inviting Observations in Application of Rule 103 RPE, ICC-02/05-
10, 24 July 2006. 
55 Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony et al., PTC II Decision initiating proceedings under Article 19, requesting 
observations and appointing counsel for the defence, ICC-02/04-01/05-320, 21 October 2008. 
56 ibid., 8. 
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each of the above-mentioned circumstances. The lawyers appointed as ad hoc counsel 
interpreted their mandate as being much broader than intended by the Pre-Trial Chamber. 
In the situation of DRC, the appointed counsel made a submission challenging not 
only the existence of a unique investigative opportunity, but also making ‘preliminary 
remarks on issues of jurisdiction and admissibility’.57 The Chamber held that ad hoc counsel 
for the defence had no procedural standing to challenge the jurisdiction of the Court and the 
admissibility of the case pursuant to Article 19(2)(a) of the Statute, as this can only be made 
by an accused person against whom a warrant of arrest or a summons to appear has been 
issued.58 
Similarly, the appointed counsel in the Darfur situation, rather than filing a response to 
the amicus curiae observations, submitted a request that the Pre-Trial Chamber determine 
questions of jurisdiction and admissibility prior to take any further action with respect to the 
situation in Darfur.59 The Pre-Trial Chamber rejected the request for the same reasons adopted 
in the previous finding in the DRC situation.60 
A few weeks later, noting the Prosecutor’s expressed intention to visit 14 individuals 
in custody on Sudanese territory, appointed counsel requested that the Pre-Trial Chamber 
permit him to attend those meetings and, more generally, allow defence counsel to attend all 
proceedings in the situation in Darfur relating to ‘questioning, interviewing witnesses and 
victims, witness confrontations’ and so on. 61 The Defence further requested that the Chamber 
order the Prosecution to inform them of any envisaged proceedings and to invite them to 
attend and participate therein. In denying this request, the Chamber clarified that the mandate 
of ad hoc counsel is ‘strictly restricted’ by the terms of his/her appointment and does not 
extend automatically to other proceedings at the pre-trial stage set out in the Statute and the 
Rules.62 
Finally, in Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony et al., the Pre-Trial Chamber did not appoint 
counsel for the situation, but rather for the case against the four defendants, who remained at 
                                                
57 Situation in the DRC, PTC I Decision following the Consultation on the Prosecutor’s Submission on 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ICC-01/04-93, 10 November 2005, 2-3(summarizing the confidential submission 
received by defence counsel). 
58 ibid., 4. 
59 Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Ad hoc Counsel for Defence conclusions aux fins d’exception d’incompétence et 
d’irricevibilité, ICC-02-05-20, 9 October 2006. 
60 Situation in Darfur, Sudan, PTC I Decision on the Submissions Challenging Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 
ICC-02/05-34-tENG, 22 November 2006. 
61 Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Ad Hoc Counsel for Defence, Application requesting the presence and 
participation of the ad hoc counsel for the defence during proceedings that the OTP will undertake in Sudan, 
ICC-02-05-41-tEN, 18 December 2006. 
62 Situation in Darfur, Sudan, PTC I Decision on the ad hoc counsel for the defence request of 18 December 
2006, ICC-02-05-47, 2 February 2007. 
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large.63 Counsel contended that the terms of the mandate as outlined in the decision of the 
Chamber were very broad and ambiguous.64 He claimed that the decision mandated him to 
‘represent’ the four defendants. Thus, all defendants were in fact his clients within the 
meaning of Article 2(2) of the Code of Professional Conduct for counsel.65 The foreseeable 
conflict of interest resulting from the representation of four defendants in the same criminal 
proceedings constituted a breach of Article 12 of the Code of Conduct (governing 
impediments to representation) and thus also endangered the rights of each of the defendants 
to be represented effectively.66 
The matter was settled by the Appeals Chamber on 16 September 2009.67 It clarified 
the difference in the mandate of counsel appointed to represent suspects individually, as his 
clients, as opposed to the mandate of counsel appointed to represent more generally the 
interests of the Defence. It held that the mandate of the latter is of a sui generis nature’, in 
that: 
 
In circumstances where the suspects are at large and counsel is appointed to represent 
their interests generally in proceedings, such counsel cannot speak on their behalf. A 
client and counsel relationship does not exist between them, and counsel does not act for 
or as agent of the suspects. Counsel’s mandate is limited to merely assuming the defence 
perspective, with a view to safeguarding the interests of the suspects in so far as counsel 
can, in the circumstances, identify them. The provisions of the Code of Conduct 
regarding representation are therefore not directly applicable to such counsel.68  
 
 
 
 
                                                
63 On 28 October 2009, counsel for the Defence, while not declining his appointment, requested the Presidency 
to review the decision of the Registrar relating to his appointment. See… He also applied to the PTC for a 
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case under Article 19(1) of the Statute, ICC-02/04-01/05-350, 18 November 2008, 33. 
65 Article 2(2) Code of Conduct provides that “[i]n this code... ‘client’ refers to all assisted or represented by 
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66 Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony et al., Defence Counsel’s Submission (n 64) 33. 
67 Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony et al., AC Judgment on the Appeal of the Defence against the ‘Decision on the 
admissibility of the case under Article 19(1) of the Statute’ of 10 March 2009, ICC-02/04-01/05-408, 16 
September 2009. This judgment upheld the PTC II Decision on the admissibility of the case under Article 19(1) 
of the Statute, ICC-02/04-01/05-377,10 March 2009. 
68 ibid., 56. 
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3.4 Final remarks 
 
Notwithstanding the existing support structure, the defence lacks the institutional autonomy 
and visibility enjoyed by the Prosecution. ‘Whilst the creation of the OPCD has been an 
important step forward, the defence still does not have the same structural powers as the 
Prosecution: the defence cannot enter into agreements with States and organizations for 
cooperation, they cannot formulate their budget needs or lobby the State parties for their own 
budget requirements, and they have no direct representation in committees which decide upon 
the legal and administrative policies of the Court. True equality of arms will thus only be 
achieved when the defence are recognized in principle and in practice as a pillar of the ICC.’ 
‘One view is that the establishment of a fifth organ would remedy this perceived anomaly. A 
contrary view is that defence issues should be dealt with by an independent, representative, 
and external body of counsel in order to safeguard the fairness and legitimacy of ICC 
proceedings and the rights of accused persons’. 
‘The lack of financial autonomy is one of the major limitations to the effective functioning of 
the current defence office at the ICC. Both the CSS and the OPCD are financially dependent 
on the Registry, and, unlike the OTP, do not enjoy the autonomy to determine their 
operational budget. The ability to determine and manage the budget is key to an office’s 
independence.’69  
As has been seen, the Court considers the appointment of ad hoc counsel to be ‘in the 
interest of justice’ both when suspects have not yet been identified at the situation stage, and 
when identified suspects remain at large and do not appear before the Court following the 
issuance of an arrest warrant against them. However, the mandate of ad hoc counsel is 
extremely confined. The Court has consistently interpreted the general interests of the defence 
as limited to the specific issue that justified the appointment of counsel; ad hoc counsel may 
in any case not exceed the scope of their appointment by asserting the general defence 
interests of possible future accused persons.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
69 IBA Report, ‘Fairness at the International Criminal Court’ (2011) 34. 
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4. Defence access to cooperation 
 
As has been noted, ‘Defence efforts to obtain information held by sovereign states, non-
governmental entities, or international organizations have proven to be one of the most 
enduring challenges confronted since the IMT’.70 The practice of the ad hoc Tribunals has 
shown that State cooperation with the Defence has been far less forthcoming in comparison to 
cooperation with the Prosecutor.71 
At the outset, the institutional inequality between the Prosecution and the Defence 
must be mentioned. Article 86 imposes on States Parties an obligation to ‘cooperate fully with 
the Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes’. As has been seen, the Defence is not 
an organ of the Court. Legally speaking, therefore, States Parties do not have an obligation to 
comply with requests of assistance sent by the Defence, which makes them wholly dependent 
on the States’ good will. In any event, requests for assistance coming from the Defence might 
also be disregarded by the national authority in charge of its execution or they might be 
executed less diligently than a request coming from an organ of the Court.72 
Second, many national civil law jurisdictions may not be familiar with the concept of 
defence investigations, which is a typical feature of the adversarial model, and, therefore, 
might not be prepared to respond to the Defence’s requests for assistance.73 A consequence of 
this institutional inequality is the perception of defence counsel and defence activity by 
national authorities. As a prominent defence lawyer put it, unlike the Prosecutor, Defence 
counsel is not perceived to act on behalf of the international community, but merely on behalf 
of his/her client, with whom s/he is associated.74  
At a closer look, however, the reasons of the defence disadvantage are mostly 
political. Certain States do not wish to assist certain defendants, given their political positions 
in the past, as they are perceived as a threat after a regime change. ‘Unique structure and 
jurisdiction of the ICC, which renders it vulnerable to the political interests of those who 
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74 ibid 246; Fedorova (n 71) 187; Kay and Swart (n 10) 1424–1425.
 162 
support and instrumentalise it’.75 Referrals of conflict situations by States Parties and the 
UNSC have de facto resulted in one-sided prosecutions, which reflect the preferences of those 
who refer the situation.76 The Prosecutor himself has encouraged States Parties’ referrals in 
the expectation that the referring State would subsequently be cooperating with the 
investigation. Of the eight situations currently before the Court, five are the results of self-
referrals from the governments of States on whose territory the crimes were committed. In 
many of the situations currently before the Court, the Prosecutor and the government in power 
are on the same side. Against this backdrop, it is not difficult to assume that local authorities 
will not be particularly willing to provide Defence teams with information and access to sites.  
The Statute does not mention a Defence’s ‘power’ to directly request assistance to States and 
international organizations, similar to the one granted to the Prosecutor. In practice, however, 
the Defence sends requests for cooperation to States and non-state actors exactly as its 
counterpart. The early practice of the Court has shown that such requests are often ignored, 
prompting counsel to request the assistance of the Registry. The Registry then transmits the 
Defence’s request with a cover letter or note verbale to the relevant State or organization. If 
Registry-backed requests are ignored, counsel then turns to the Court.77 As a matter of fact, 
the strongest legal grounding for cooperation requests by the Defence is an order of the Pre-
Trial Chamber pursuant to Article 57(3)(b) of the Statute, which will be discussed in the 
following paragraph.  
 
4.1 The power of the Pre-Trial Chamber under Article 57(3)(b) of the Statute 
 
Article 57(3)(b) of the Statute empowers the Chamber to assist the person arrested or 
summoned with the preparation of his/her defence. It states that, upon the request of an 
arrestee or a person who has appeared pursuant to a summons, the Chamber may, ‘issue such 
orders, including measures such as those described in article 56,78 or seek such cooperation 
pursuant to Part 9 as may be necessary to assist the person in the preparation of his or her 
defence.’ 
The power granted to the Pre-Trial Chamber to assist the Defence and the procedural 
right given to the Defence to obtain such assistance is meant to balance, at the pre-trial stage, 
                                                
75 Alana Tiemessen, ‘The International Criminal Court and the Politics of Prosecutions’ [2014] The International 
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76 ibid., 2. 
77 IBA Report (n 69) 36. 
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the situation of the Defence with that of the Prosecution in the collection of evidence. It is 
meant to ensure some degree of equality of arms in the collection of evidence at the pre-trial 
stage, giving effect to the right of the accused, pursuant to Article 67(1)(b) of the Statute, to 
have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his or her defence.79 
The possibility of the Defence to request an order for cooperation from the Pre-Trial 
Chamber is particularly useful in preparation for the confirmation hearing. After confirmation 
and the transfer of the case to the Trial Chamber, the Defence will still be entitled to request 
cooperation orders from the Trial Chamber, which, pursuant to Article 61(11) of the Statute, 
‘shall be responsible for the conduct of subsequent proceedings and may exercise any 
function of the Pre-Trial Chamber that is relevant and capable of application in those 
proceedings’. 
The possibility of requesting an order from the Court, however, is subject to various 
threshold requirements, which are set out in Rule 116(1) RPE. This provision stipulates that 
the Pre-Trial Chamber shall issue an order or seek cooperation under this provision where it is 
satisfied that: (a) such an order would facilitate the collection of evidence that may be 
material to the proper determination of the issues being adjudicated, or to the proper 
preparation of the person’s defence; (b) sufficient information to comply with Article 96(2) of 
the Statute has been provided. Moreover, pursuant to Rule 116(2) RPE, the Chamber has the 
discretion to seek the Prosecutor’s view before granting the order, since s/he might have 
already collected the evidence sought by the Defence.  
The requirement under letter a) is the one of ‘relevance’. It refers to the evidence 
sought by the Defence and is meant to provide a bar against frivolous requests. At the same 
time, however, the drafters of the Rules were conscious of the fact that only limited 
information might be available to counsel before obtaining the cooperation sought and, 
therefore, intentionally left the threshold relatively low, as is suggested by the use of the 
conditional form.80 The relevance requirement has not been particularly controversial so far 
and, at the time of writing, no Defence request under Article 57(3)(b) has been denied by the 
ICC for lack of relevance. 
The requirement under letter b) is the one of ‘specificity’. It refers to the way in which 
Defence requests must be formulated and to their content. The Defence seeking the 
cooperation order has to provide sufficient information to comply with Article 96(2) of the 
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Statute, according to which the request should, inter alia, contain a concise statement of the 
assistance sought, as much detailed information as possible about the location or 
identification of any person or place that must be found or identified, and a concise statement 
of the essential facts underlying the request, along with the reasons and details of any 
procedure to be followed.  
The reason for this requirement is twofold. First, it is necessary to enable the Court to 
make a request for cooperation in accordance with the provisions of Part 9 of the Statute, 
while, at the same time, it enables the requested government or entity to identify the material 
sought.81 Second, it is meant to avoid the so-called ‘fishing expeditions’, meaning requests for 
overly broad categories of investigative acts to be conducted that are lacking sufficient 
information such as names, dates, places, etc.82 The case law of the court has shown how 
these requirements have been interpreted. 
 
4.1.1 The ‘necessity’ requirement of jurisprudential creation 
 
In the case against Katanga and Ngudjolo, the Defence for Mr Katanga requested that the Pre-
Trial Chamber seek cooperation from the DRC under Article 57(3)(b) of the Statute, in order 
for it to collect information material to the preparation of the Defence.83 The Pre-Trial 
Chamber rejected the request in relation to three items sought by counsel.84 Despite the 
absence in Rule 116 RPE of any reference to a requirement concerning the necessity of the 
Court’s cooperation request on behalf of the Defence, the Chamber considered the issuance of 
an order not to be necessary at that stage.85 This decision is particularly important as it was 
the first one concerning the application of Article 57(3)(b) of the Statute. 
According to the Chamber, some documents sought by the Defence were ‘likely to be 
in the possession or control of the Prosecutor’ and, therefore, the Defence should have first 
approached him pursuant to Rule 77 RPE.86 This Rule governs the ‘inspection of material in 
possession or control of the Prosecutor’, and states that the latter shall allow the Defence to 
                                                
81 Håkan Friman, ‘Investigation and Prosecution’ in Roy SK Lee (ed), The International Criminal Court: 
elements of crimes and rules of procedure and evidence (Transnational Publishers Inc 2001) 510. 
82 Newton (n 70) 410. 
83 Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo, Defence Application pursuant to Article 57(3)(b) of 
the Statute to Seek the Cooperation of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)’ICC-01/04-01/07-371-Conf-
Exp., 7 April 2008. 
84 The content of these items is confidential. 
85 Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo, PTC I Decision on the ‘Defence Application pursuant 
to Article 57(3)(b) of the Statute to Seek the Cooperation of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)’, ICC-
01/04-01/07, 25 April 2008. 
86 ibid., 6. 
 165 
inspect any evidence which is material to the preparation of the Defence or is intended for use 
by the Prosecutor for the purpose of the confirmation hearing or at trial. 
As to another item sought by the Defence concerning the execution of the warrant of 
arrest against Katanga, the Chamber explained that, since ‘the Registry is the competent organ 
of the Court for the execution of the Court’s warrants of arrest’, the Defence could file a 
motion requesting the Chamber to order the Registry to provide the relevant information.87 
Since the necessity requirement was not met, the Chamber did not enter into the analysis of 
whether the conditions of specificity and relevance were satisfied.88 
The Court considered the necessity requirement as additional to those prescribed by 
Rule 116(1) RPE, but did not give an explanation for this interpretative choice. Presumably, it 
did so on the basis of the letter of Article 57(3)(b) itself, which enables the Court to seek such 
cooperation ‘as may be necessary’, and the case law of the ICTY and ICTR. Indeed, the ad 
hoc Tribunals have consistently required the party requesting an order for cooperation to 
show a sufficient prior effort to obtain the material sought independently. Judge Anita Usacka 
filed an interesting dissenting opinion.89 According to her: 
 
the conclusion of the majority that the specific information requested could be obtained 
from another source is not only not supported by the record, but also sets the threshold 
too high for granting a cooperation request, and appears to create an unnecessary 
additional requirement for article 57(3)(b) requests. The conclusion of the majority seems 
to be that if there is any other source of the information besides the State, the Defence is 
not entitled to seek cooperation from a State.90 
 
This ‘additional requirement’ created by the majority unduly infringes on the suspect’s right 
to have adequate facilities for the preparation of his defence pursuant to Article 67(1)(b) of 
the Statute.91 In particular, she highlighted that imposing a mandatory requirement for the 
Defence to seek its evidence from the Prosecution prior to turning to the Chamber contrasts 
with the purpose of Rule 116(2) RPE, according to which the Pre-Trial Chamber has the 
discretion – and not the obligation - to seek the view of the Prosecutor before granting the 
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order. The discretion accorded to the Chamber in deciding whether to involve the Prosecution 
serves the purpose of protecting the right of the Defence not to reveal its strategy. As Judge 
Usacka put it: ‘if the Defence is required to seek its evidence from the Prosecution prior to 
making a cooperation request, it renders rule 116(2) meaningless’.92  
Judge Usacka’ s reasoning is particularly convincing given the fact that the Chamber 
had dealt with the Defence’s application on an ex parte basis, given the sensitive nature of 
some of the documents sought.93 Moreover, the Defence had already requested the documents 
concerned from the Prosecution twice, receiving no response.94 
More broadly, Judge Usaka took issue with the obligation that the majority’s decision 
imposed on the Defence to request the information from an organ of the Court before 
approaching the Chamber for an order on cooperation from States. As she remarked: ‘[t]he 
majority’s solution does not appear to take into account that even if the Prosecution and the 
Registry provide information relevant to these items, it would not satisfy the Defence’s 
interest in also receiving the DRC’s version of the information’.95 Accordingly, the purpose of 
Rule 116 RPE would be that of granting the Defence the possibility of ‘seek[ing] the same 
information from several sources in order to compare or corroborate’.96  
Subsequently, the necessity of an order of the Court on behalf of the Defence was 
debated in the Banda and Jamus case (situation in Darfur, Sudan). Interestingly, this 
requirement was given a particular interpretation in connection with the phase of the 
proceedings in which the order of the Chamber was sought, i.e., prior to the confirmation 
hearing.97 
Defence counsel had filed an application pursuant to Article 57(3)(b) of the Statute for 
an order for the preparation and transmission of a cooperation request to the Government of 
the Republic of Sudan.98 To that end, the defence had made various attempts to secure the 
cooperation of Sudan both by way of a request to the Registry and requests directly addressed 
to the Republic of Sudan, all of which had been unsuccessful. The Single Judge, however, 
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deemed an order of the Chamber not necessary at that stage ‘in particular in light of the 
strategy pursued by the Defence in respect of the forthcoming confirmation hearing’.99 In fact, 
the Defence had filed a joint submission with the Prosecutor stating that it would have not 
objected to the charges nor presented evidence for the purpose of the confirmation hearing. 
This decision is regrettable. The Pre-Trial Chamber has unduly restricted the scope of 
Rule 116(1) RPE, which makes no distinction between the confirmation hearing and the trial 
for the purpose of assisting the Defence in obtaining cooperation from States. Moreover, this 
reading of Article 57(3)(b) of the Statute infringes upon the Defence’s right to freely choose a 
strategy in the presentation of its case. It has been rightly argued that ‘agreeing not to 
challenge the charges at the confirmation of charges stage does not mean the defence is 
conceding the allegations and that it will not challenge the charges when the case goes to 
trial’.100 
Following the confirmation of the charges on 7 March 2011,101 the Defence reiterated 
its request to the Trial Chamber.102 In rejecting the request, the Chamber further clarified the 
content of the necessity requirement.103 Endorsing the Pre-Trial Chamber’s finding in the 
Katanga and Ngudjolo case, the Chamber definitively established that an order pursuant to 
Article 57(3)(b) of the Statute can be deemed ‘necessary’ only when the following two 
conditions are met: i) the Defence has exhausted all the other possibilities to seek the 
cooperation from the State, such as direct contact with the local authorities and the assistance 
of the Registry; ii) the Defence has explored possible alternatives, short of a request for 
cooperation to the State, such as approaching the Prosecutor, taking into account her/his 
obligation to ‘investigate incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally’ pursuant to 
Article 54(l)(a) of the Statute.104 The Banda and Jamus decision is very important and will be 
thoroughly analysed in the following paragraphs.  
 
 
 
                                                
99 Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo, PTC I Decision (n 97) 3. 
100 Fedorova (n 71) 209. 
101 Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo, PTC I Corrigendum of the "Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges', ICC-02/05-03/09, 7 March 2011. 
102 Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo, Defence Application pursuant to Article 57(3)(b) 
of the Statute for an order for the preparation and transmission of a cooperation request to the Government of the 
Republic of the Sudan, , ICC-02/05-03/09-145 and public annexes A to F, 11 May 2011 
103 Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo, TC IV Decision on ‘Defence Application 
pursuant to articles 57(3)(b) & 64(6)(a) of the Statute for an order for the preparation and transmission of a 
cooperation request to the Government of the Republic of the Sudan’ ICC-02/05-03/09, 1 July 2011. 
104 ibid., 26 and 31. 
 168 
4.2 The Defence’s request for assistance to the Court in the Banda and Jamus case 
 
The Banda and Jamus case arises out of the situation in Drafur, Sudan. As has been seen, the 
Government of Sudan refused the engage with the Court in any way, denying access to its 
territory to any person connected with the Court, including the Prosecution.105 Mr Banda and 
Mr Jamus are rebel commanders, enemies of the government of Omar al-Bashir, charged with 
crimes arising from an attack against the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) at the 
Haskanita Military Group Site (MGS Haskanita). 
On 16 June 2010, the defendants appeared voluntarily before the Court in response to 
summonses to appear issued under seal on 27 August 2009 and unsealed on 15 June 2010. 
The charges against them were confirmed on 7 March 2011. For the preparation of its case, 
the Defence requested the assistance of the Trial Chamber in order to let a defence team enter 
the territory of Sudan for carrying out on-site investigations and locate and interview 
witnesses.106 To that end, the defence had made various attempts to secure the cooperation of 
Sudan both by way of a request to the Registry and requests directly addressed to the 
Republic of Sudan, all of which had been unsuccessful.107 
A great part of Banda and Jamus’ defence strategy hinged on the proof that the attack 
on MGS Haskanita was in fact lawful, and that the AMIS is not a peacekeeping mission in 
accordance with the UN Charter.108 Accordingly, the Defence submitted that, ‘[i]n order to 
carry out even the most basic investigation into this case, it is essential that the Defence visit 
[a number of] locations’ in the vicinity of Haskanita and other sites of AMIS bases in 
Darfur.109 As the Defence pointed out, ‘inevitably, a significant number of witnesses to the 
attack, to the events leading up to the attack and to the broader situation in the region are still 
located in the vicinity of Haskanita’.110 Similarly, ‘[i]t is likely that witnesses to the activities 
of AMIS at these bases still reside in the vicinity of these bases.’111 Finally, the Defence 
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requested access to the camps for internally displaced persons within Sudan, since it had 
‘reasons to believe’ that persons who witnessed the Haskanita attack and who could offer 
evidence relating to the operation of AMIS bases in Darfur could be found at these camps.112 
Importantly, the Defence noted that it could not provide further information, as revealing its 
strategy in advance of trial would be detrimental to the accused.113  
In a different application, the Defence requested the Chamber’s assistance in acquiring 
several documents from the African Union.114 As an international organization, the African 
Union itself is not a party to the Rome Statute and is not under an obligation to cooperate with 
the Court. As has been seen, however, the Court may ask any intergovernmental organization 
to provide information or documents under Article 87(6) of the Rome Statute. 
 
4.2.1 The Court’s decisions 
 
In addressing the Defence’s requests, the Trial Chamber developed a test for evaluating them. 
The Chamber considered that it might seek cooperation from a State or an international 
organization on behalf of the Defence when the requirements of (i) specificity, (ii) relevance, 
and (iii) necessity have been met.115  
The Trial Chamber rejected the Defence request to seek cooperation from the 
Government of Sudan due to lack of specificity. Defence counsel had requested that defence 
investigators be allowed to visit ‘a non-exhaustive list of localities in Darfur and other regions 
of Sudan’ in order to interview persons that were ‘likely’ to still be located in the conflict 
area.116 According to the Chamber, far from providing the information required under Article 
96(2)(b) of the Statute, the Defence had required a ‘permission to undertake an open-ended 
                                                
112 Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo, Defence Application (n 102) 32. 
113 Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo, Defence Application (n 102) 34. 
114 Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo, Defence Application pursuant to Articles 
57(3)(b) and 64(6)(a) of the Statute for an order for the preparation and transmission of a cooperation request to 
the African Union, ICC-02/05-03/09-146, 11 May 2011. 
115 Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo, TC IV Decision on ‘Defence Application 
pursuant to articles 57(3)(b) & 64(6)(a) of the Statute for an order for the preparation and transmission of a 
cooperation request to the Government of the Republic of the Sudan’ ICC-02/05-03/09, 1 July 2011; Prosecutor 
v. Abdallah Banda and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo, TC IV Decision on Defence Application pursuant to Articles 
57(3)(b) and 64(6)(a) of the Statute for an order for the preparation and transmission of a cooperation request to 
the African Union, ICC-02/05-03/09-170, 1 July 2011 (not public); Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda and Saleh 
Mohammed Jerbo, TC IV Public redacted Decision on the second defence's application pursuant to Articles 
57(3)(b) and 64(6)(a) of the Statute for an order for the preparation and transmission of a cooperation request to 
the African Union, ICC-02/05-03/09, 21 December 2011. 
116 Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo, TC IV Decision, 1 July 2011 (n 115) 22. 
 170 
expedition to the Sudan in order to find out whether there might be something or someone 
potentially useful to the defence case’.117   
Importantly, the Chamber criticized the Defence for having made ‘an indiscriminate 
request to execute all measures unhindered and unmonitored by the Government of Sudan or 
any agency of the State’.118 Recalling that the general regime applicable to the execution of 
requests for assistance under Part 9 of the Statute presupposes the execution by state 
authorities, and that on-site investigations are strictly subject to the conditions under Article 
99(4), the Chamber clarified that, even in the circumstances contemplated in the latter 
provision, ‘measures sought need to be specific enough to allow for the consultations required 
therein’.119 
Since the condition of specificity required in Rule 116(1)(b) RPE was not met, the 
Chamber did not deal with the condition of relevance under Rule 116(1)(a). However, it 
deemed useful to express some observations on the requirement of ‘necessity’, which it 
derived from the wording of Article 57(3)(b) of the Statute, according to which the Chamber 
may seek such cooperation ‘as may be necessary’.120 This part of the decision has been 
addressed in the previous paragraph.  
The Trial Chamber equally rejected the Defence request to seek the cooperation of the 
African Union.121 It found that only some of the documents the Defence sought to obtain had 
been identified to the requisite standard, while others had ‘not been sufficiently identified’ so 
as to meet the requirement of specificity, since they referred to broad categories of documents 
without any type of limitation, be it temporal or otherwise.122 
Moreover, while the Chamber was satisfied that the Defence had exhausted the steps to obtain 
the cooperation from the African Union, it considered that it had not explained which steps, if 
any, it had undertaken to explore whether the documents in question or documents of similar 
value could be obtained from the Prosecutor. The Chamber thus concluded that the defence 
should first attempt to obtain these documents in accordance with Rule 77 RPE, before 
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seeking the assistance of the Chamber. Upon a second application by the Defence,123 the 
Chamber reversed its finding in relation to some documents sought by counsel.124 The above 
examined case law makes clear that orders under Article 57(3)(b) of the Statute may be issued 
only when the Defence has already identified the specific evidence (such as one or more 
documents, material items or potential witnesses) that it needs. Requests are deemed 
‘specific’ only when they identify with sufficient clarity the documents or the persons sought. 
This makes it impossible for the Defence to make use of Article 57(3)(b) to conduct 
investigations in an ordinary sense, that is, to access the State’s territory and search for 
potential witnesses and material evidence. In other words, orders under Article 57(3)(b) 
cannot operate as a legal basis for on-site investigations by the Defence.  
The specificity requirement is particularly burdensome in the pre-trial phase, where 
there has not yet been any disclosure from the Prosecutor and defence investigations aimed at 
identifying and interviewing potential witnesses might be essential to challenge the 
Prosecutor case at the confirmation hearing. However, the specificity requirement is in line 
with the general regime of the ICC investigations, according to which on-site investigations 
are confined within the strict limits of Articles 99(4) and 96 of the Statute.125 
The necessity requirement is not contained in the ICC Statute and Rules. The Court 
derived it from the letter of Article 57(3)(b) of the Statute according to which the Pre-Trial 
Chamber may seek such cooperation on behalf of the Defence ‘as may be necessary’. In the 
Court’s interpretation, the necessity requirement relates to the order of the Chamber, which 
has to be the last available option for the Defence. In other words, the defence needs to show 
that all its attempts to obtain the specific information or documents - a direct request to the 
State, a request to the State through the Registry, or a request to the Prosecutor - have been 
unsuccessful.  
This is in contrast with the wording of the Statute and the Rules. As opposed to the 
legal instruments of the ad hoc Tribunals, the ICC Statute and Rules do not contain any 
reference to the ‘sufficient prior effort’ condition. Article 57(3)(b) should be interpreted in 
light of Rule 116 RPE, according to which the Chamber must be satisfied that its order 
‘would facilitate the collection of evidence’. Arguably, the drafters of the Statute purposely 
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defence’s application pursuant to Articles 57(3)(b) and 64(6)(a) of the Statute for an order for the preparation 
and transmission of a cooperation request to the African Union, ICC-02/05-03/09, 21 December 2011. 
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lowered the threshold in view of the experience and difficulties for the Defence before the ad 
hoc Tribunals in obtaining cooperation from states.   
Instead, the approach adopted by the Court seems to create a heavy burden on the 
already disadvantaged Defence. The requirement that an order of the Chamber ‘would 
facilitate the collection of evidence’ is sufficiently broad and leaves room for a decision to be 
taken on a case-by-case basis. The necessity of an order of the Chamber may depend on the 
situation. For example, if the evidence sought is in possession of the Prosecutor, but the 
Defence does not want to give her/him any insight into its strategy, then an order of the 
Chamber might be necessary. 
Another aspect that must be taken into account is the relationship between the State 
and the Court and, in particular, the relationship between the government in power and the 
defendant. Asking the Defence to exhaust all possible efforts to obtain cooperation from a 
State whose government is notoriously hostile to the accused might be unfair and excessively 
time consuming for the Defence.  
 
4.3. Defence access to cooperation from international organizations 
 
4.3.1 Disclosure of exculpatory evidence 
 
Article 54(3)(e) of the Statute provides that the Prosecutor may ‘[a]gree not to disclose, at any 
stage of the proceedings, documents or information that the Prosecutor obtains on the 
condition of confidentiality and solely for the purpose of generating new evidence, unless the 
provider of the information consents’. A similar provision is contained in Article 18(3) of the 
NRA, which authorizes the United Nations and the Prosecutor to agree that documents and 
information be provided confidentially and that ‘such documents or information shall not be 
disclosed to other organs of the Court or to third parties, at any stage of the proceedings or 
thereafter, without the consent of the United Nations.’ 
The early practice of the Court revealed the difficulty of balancing these provisions 
with the right of the accused to the disclosure of exculpatory evidence under Article 67(2) of 
the Statute, according to which ‘the Prosecutor shall, as soon as practicable, disclose to the 
defence evidence in the Prosecutor’s possession or control which he or she believes shows or 
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tends to show the innocence of the accused, or to mitigate the guilt of the accused, or which 
may affect the credibility of prosecution evidence’.126 
In the Lubanga case, the Prosecution had collected significant information pursuant to 
Articles 54(3)(e) of the Statute and 18(3) NRA, which it subsequently submitted that it was 
unable to disclose to the Defence or even to the Chamber because the information provider 
(i.e., MONUSCO and other organizations) had not consented to disclosure. 
The Trial Chamber took the view that the trial could not proceed under these 
conditions, finding that the ‘trial process had been ruptured to such a degree that it [was] 
impossible to piece together the constituent elements of a fair trial’.127 The Chamber observed 
that Article 53(3)(e) was only intended to be used in ‘highly restricted circumstances’ with the 
sole purpose of ‘generating new evidence’, but that the Prosecutor had used that provision 
extensively and inappropriately.128 While the Court recognized that there is a potential 
conflict between Articles 54(3)(e) and 67(2) of the Statute, it also stressed that if the 
Prosecutor had entered into Article 54(3)(e) agreements only in appropriate circumstances, 
the tension between the two articles would be ‘negligible’.129  
Very importantly, the Chamber was also greatly concerned by the fact that the 
Prosecutor had agreed not to disclose the relevant documents to the Chamber as well, in that 
this had prevented it from exercising its duty to determine whether or not the non-disclosure 
of potentially exculpatory evidence constituted a breach of the accused’s right to a fair trial 
pursuant to Article 67(2) of the Statute.130 The Appeals Chamber upheld the Trial Chamber’s 
decision. However, it reversed the staying of the proceedings because the information 
provider had, in the meantime, consented to the disclosure of the information. 
 
5. Defence on-site investigations in the Rome Statute: a legal vacuum 
 
The possibility for the Defence to investigate on the territory of States where crimes were 
committed is essential. As Steven Kay has pointed out, visits to the crime scene are 
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128 ibid., 71-72. 
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‘necessary to familiarize the lawyer with the areas that feature in the evidence of the case, to 
check the accuracy of evidence relied upon by the prosecution, and to search for evidence that 
is relevant to the defence’.131  
Despite the crucial importance of on-site investigations, however, the Statute is at best 
unclear regarding the right of the Defence to conduct them. Pursuant to Article 99(4), the 
direct execution of measures on the territory of States is lex specialis within the general 
cooperation regime of Part 9, to be applied under the strict terms and conditions set out in that 
provision. Accordingly, the Prosecutor may only perform non-coercive investigative acts on 
the territory of States, such as voluntary interviews and visits to public sites.  
Article 99(4) however, does not provide the Defence with a similar possibility, as it is 
framed exclusively from a prosecutorial perspective.132 It has been argued that ‘since even the 
Prosecutor does not automatically have the right to investigate on the territory of a State 
Party, it is hard to see how the Defence would have such a right in the absence of any specific 
or implicit provision to that effect’.133 
The practice of the ICC, however, indicates that Defence investigations in the field 
occur in nearly all cases and that defence attorneys usually consider this to be an essential part 
of their tasks.134 Moreover, despite the absence of any explicit reference in the Statute of the 
ICC, the need for Defence investigations is implicitly acknowledged by the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, particularly, at Rule 20 dealing with the responsibilities of the 
Registrar relating to the rights of the Defence. According to its letter b), the Registrar shall, 
inter alia, ‘provide support, assistance, and information to all defence counsel appearing 
before the Court and, as appropriate, support for professional investigators necessary for the 
efficient and effective conduct of the defence’.  
Elaborating on this Rule, Regulation 119(1)(a) of the Regulations of the Registry 
provides that the Registrar shall ‘assist counsel and/or his or her assistants in travelling to the 
seat of the Court, to the place of the proceedings, to the place of custody of the person entitled 
to legal assistance, or to various locations in the course of an on-site investigation. Such 
assistance shall encompass securing the protection of the privileges and immunities as laid 
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 175 
down in the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the Court and the relevant 
provisions of the Headquarters Agreement.’ 
 
5.1 Privileges and immunity of Defence counsel 
 
As has been seen in Chapter I, Article 48 of the Statute, setting out the privileges and 
immunities of the Court, stipulates that defence counsel ‘shall be accorded such treatment as 
is necessary for the proper functioning of the Court’, in accordance with the APIC.135 
The APIC largely compensates for the inequalities contained in the Statute with 
respect to privileges and immunities of defence counsel. Expanding upon the provisions of 
Article 48, the Agreement attributes to defence counsel and his/her assisting persons a set of 
privileges and immunities ‘to the extent necessary for the independent performance of their 
functions’136; by so doing, the Agreement attributes to defence counsel prerogatives that are 
similar to those of the Deputy Registrar, the staff of the OTP and the staff of the Registry as 
stipulated in Article 16 of the Agreement. 
According to Article 18(1) of the APIC, counsel and assisting persons are given 
personal immunity from arrest and detention, as well as functional immunity from 
prosecution in respect of words spoken or written and all acts performed in their official 
capacity. Importantly, they also enjoy inviolability of papers and documents relating to the 
exercise of their functions, and the right to communicate with their clients in whatever form. 
The ability to communicate with their clients in confidence and maintain the confidentiality of 
their files and channels of communication is particularly important during the investigation 
stage of the proceedings, when counsel and client are located in different countries.137 Finally, 
defence counsels are exempt from immigration restrictions and inspection of personal 
baggage; they are also granted fair treatment of currency and exchange, and repatriation 
facilities in times of crisis.  
Art. 18(2) provides that, upon appointment, counsel shall be provided with a 
certificate signed by the Registrar for the period required for the exercise of her/his functions. 
Even though the document in question is referred to as a certificate, it provides the same 
protections as those contained in the laissez-passer which is issued for the Prosecutor and 
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her/his staff.138 The ability to travel freely to the region where the crimes occurred as well as 
to other destinations where potential witnesses might be located is essential for the 
performance of the counsel’s function.  
This right to travel, however, does not automatically entail the freedom of movement 
within a State to collect evidence and interview witnesses. Thus, it does not compensate for 
the absence of a legal basis for defence on-site investigations in the Statute. This has been 
referred to as ‘the most important inequality of arms’.139 
 
5.2 The support of the Registry to defence teams 
 
According to the Report of the Bureau on cooperation of the ASP released in November 2009, 
‘most of the instances of cooperation and assistance requested to States by the Registry on 
behalf of the Defence are related to defence investigative missions in the field’.140 Practically, 
the support of the Registry consists of requests for visa for counsel and members of their 
teams to national authorities in order to enable them to travel to the respective countries, 
issuance of notes verbale to facilitate defence missions to meet witnesses in prisons, issuance 
of official certificates under Article 18 of the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of 
the Court (APIC) etc.141 According to the Report, once they are in the field, ‘defence counsel 
and their teams receive the same security, logistical and administrative assistance as Court 
staff. Such assistance is primarily provided by the Court's field offices, but also by UN offices 
and States’.142 
More recently, the issue of cooperation with the Defence was thoroughly addressed by 
a Briefing Paper annexed to the Report of the ASP Bureau on Cooperation of 21 November 
2014. At the outset, the paper emphasizes that: 
 
[i]n order to respect the principles of fair trial and equality of arms enshrined in the Rome 
Statute, it is crucial importance that defence teams can effectively obtain cooperation 
from States and international organizations in the conduct of their activities, as the Office 
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of the Prosecutor does, notwithstanding the fact that the Defence is not listed in article 34 
of the Rome Statute as being an organ of the Court.143 
 
The paper moves on to consider the assistance of the Registry to defence teams, which covers 
three main areas: 
 
(a) Facilitating the work of the Defence by inter alia ensuring that their privileges and 
immunities will be respected, organizing their travels to different States, facilitating their 
meetings with government officials, liaising with States to transmit, respectfully of the 
applicable procedures, their various requests (i.e. requests for obtaining information, 
documentation, visit to specific places, interview of witnesses, including of detained 
persons);  
(b) Liaising with States in order to encourage the signature of interim and provisional 
release agreements, as well as sending ad hoc requests in the absence of such agreement; 
(c) Liaising with States to request their assistance in order to facilitate the appearance and 
the protection of Defence witnesses.144  
 
In practice, the assistance of the Registry to Defence on-site investigations consists in: i) 
preparing ‘the necessary certificate under the signature of the Registrar enabling counsel to 
benefit from the relevant privileges and immunities during the period required for the exercise 
of their functions in accordance with article 18 of the APIC and Article 25 of the 
Headquarters Agreement’;145 (ii) coordinating with the competent authorities via note verbale 
on upcoming missions of the Defence unless a specific arrangement was agreed upon with the 
State.;146 and (iii) providing necessary travel arrangements, such as requesting UN security 
clearance, requesting assistance from the UN (for example with MONUSCO flights), 
arranging for visas to travel to The Hague or the field, etc.147  
In order to obtain the cooperation of a State Party, the Defence teams have to respect 
the general provisions rules set forth by Article 87 of the Rome Statute and Rule 176 of the 
RPE. In this respect, the Registry may advise the defence teams on which States accept direct 
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requests from defence teams. The Registry also assists by following up with requested States 
to monitor the status of implementation of these requests. According to the Briefing Paper, in 
2013, the Registry transmitted 11 requests on behalf of the Defence and conducted 85 follow-
up activities on Defence requests across situation countries.148  
 
5.3 Inability to conduct on-site investigations in Darfur: Defence request to stay the 
proceedings 
 
In the case against Banda and Jamus the Defence requested a temporary stay of the 
proceedings due to the impossibility of accessing the territory of Sudan for the purpose of 
defence investigations.149 The Government of Sudan, in fact, has been totally uncooperative 
with the Court since the issuance of the first arrest warrants in the investigation in Darfur.150 
Not only has the Bashir government refused to let either the Prosecutor or Defence teams on 
its territory, but it went so far as obstructing the work of the Court, criminalizing cooperation 
with it by individuals (such as potential witnesses) and NGOs.  
For these reasons, although the Defence had identified numerous potential witnesses 
who were believed to reside in Darfur, it was unable to travel there to conduct interviews or to 
identify and locate other potential witnesses.151 Interestingly, the Defence submitted that 
although the Prosecution was also impeded in its own investigations in the Sudan, these 
impediments prejudiced the Defence more than its counterpart, and that the Defence would 
have been unable to obtain the attendance and examination of defence witnesses under the 
same conditions as the Prosecution witnesses. This is due to the fact that, of the 15 witnesses 
selected by the Prosecution, at least 12 were based outside the Sudan. In the Defence’s view, 
these witnesses would provide a narrow view of the contested facts, one based solely on the 
perspective of the AMIS personnel who were within the base when it was attacked.152 
Conversely, gathering contrary evidence on these key aspects would have been impossible for 
the Defence, due to the volatile security situation and the active obstruction of the 
Government of Sudan. 
According to the Defence, the minimum guarantee of ‘adequate facilities’ for the 
preparation of the Defence under Article 67(1)(b) of the Statute ‘grants [it] the right to all 
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resources and access which are  necessary to prepare the defence for trial. This necessarily 
implies a right to carry out defence investigations at the scene of the alleged crimes.’153 
Equally, the right to obtain the attendance of witnesses pursuant to Article 67(1)(e) must 
necessarily imply a right to investigate: without first being able to investigate, and hence to 
identify and interview witnesses, the Defence would never be able to obtain the attendance of 
witnesses’.154 
Finally, counsel submitted that, within the ICC regime, any investigative difficulties 
experienced by the Defence should, in part, be offset by the Prosecution’s duty under Article 
54(1) of the Statute to investigate incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally and to 
ensure that such investigations are effective. However, because of Sudan’s stance against the 
Court and the Prosecution’s inability to investigate in the country, the OTP has only been able 
to discharge part of its Article 54 obligations by focusing its investigations on a limited part of 
the incriminating circumstances of the case, without undertaking any investigations into the 
exonerating circumstances.  
 
6.3.1 The Trial Chamber Decision 
 
The Trial Chamber, however, rejected this interpretation and reiterated that the direct 
execution of requests for assistance on the territory of a State is lex specialis to be applied 
under the terms and conditions of Article 99(4) of the Statute. Therefore, in the Chamber’s 
view, Part 9 of the Statute does not foresee ‘an absolute and an all-encompassing right by the 
prosecution and the defence to on-site investigations’.155  
Accordingly, ‘the Chamber should not automatically conclude that a trial is unfair, and 
stay proceedings as a matter of law, in circumstances where States would not allow defence 
(or prosecution) investigations in the field even if, as a result, some potentially relevant 
evidence were to become unavailable.’156 Doing otherwise would amount to render the 
prosecution of the most serious crimes contingent upon a State’s choice to cooperate or not 
cooperate with the Court.157  
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Therefore, when on-site investigations are impossible, the Court needs to be satisfied 
that the accused has been provided with adequate facilities for the preparation of his/her 
Defence and the opportunity to obtain the attendance of witnesses on his/her behalf ‘by means 
other than on-site investigations [emphasis added]’.158  
Once again, the Chamber imposed on the Defence the particularly burdensome 
requirement of ‘specificity’. According to the judges, ‘the unavailable evidence must be 
identified with sufficient specificity by the defence in light of the information available to it at 
[the] stage’.159 The Defence, however, failed to properly substantiate the claim that lines of 
defence and exculpatory evidence would have become available had it been allowed to enter 
the Sudan. As a consequence, the high threshold set out for a stay of proceedings was not 
met.160 
With respect to this remedy, the Chamber stressed its exceptional character. A stay of 
proceedings can be resorted to only where the Chamber is convinced that the situation 
motivating the request for the stay cannot be resolved at a later stage or cannot be cured 
during the Chamber’s conduct of the trial.161 At that moment, a stay would have been 
unjustified, in that ‘the Chamber may take into consideration the difficulties encountered by 
the defence when weighing the entirety of the evidence at the end of the trial, in order to 
resolve any unfairness towards the accused’.162 
In a situation like that of Sudan, the only hope for the Defence seems to be the 
assistance of the Prosecutor. Although the judges acknowledged that it’s ultimately the 
witnesses’ choice to speak or not with the Defence, ‘given the difficulties experienced by the 
defence to conduct on-site investigations, the prosecution should spare no efforts to secure 
defence access to these individuals’.163 The Chamber, thus, encouraged the Prosecution to do 
more than ‘just put the scenario to them and let them decide. 
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 CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
 
The present study has located the challenges faced by defendants during cooperation 
proceedings in the context of the unique structural system of the ICC, and the inherent 
tensions and limitations that characterize the its functioning. Chapter II addressed the ICC 
dependence on cooperation from an institutional, a political and a normative dimension, 
exploring the salient features of the Court as an international organization founded by a treaty, 
and its relationship with the world in which it operates (namely, States Parties to the Rome 
Statute, States non-parties, and international organizations). As the ad hoc Tribunals, the ICC 
relies on an indirect enforcement system and is dependent on the cooperation of States and 
international organizations for conducting investigations and arresting suspects. Therefore, 
just like its predecessors, the ICC is bound to be faced – and in fact, on several occasions, has 
been faced - with instances of non-cooperation.  
Unlike the ad hoc Tribunals, however, the Court is an independent international 
organization that does not have the backing of the UN Security Council. Its jurisdiction is not 
related to one geographically limited area/conflict, but can potentially cover crimes 
committed in every part of the world. Moreover and most often, the ICC intervenes in the 
midst of a conflict, where many other political actors are involved and conflicting interests are 
at stake. From a normative perspective, the ICC cooperation regime is ‘weaker’ than that of 
the ad hoc Tribunals. The Prosecutor has more limited powers to access the territory of States 
and the Court has no power to compel witnesses to testify before it. However, the Chapter has 
endeavoured to demonstrate that the real weakness of the ICC cooperation system lies 
elsewhere. Regardless of the norms enshrined in the Statute, the effectiveness of the ICC is 
largely dependent on whether the broader interests of the requested State coincide with those 
of the Court, and, should that fail, on the support of the international community. 
Chapter III delved into the connection between cooperation and jurisdiction. The 
complementarity nature of the ICC implies that the Court is allowed to step in only in case 
national authorities remain inactive or, where there are domestic proceedings, those 
authorities appear unwilling or unable to genuinely prosecute international crimes themselves. 
Cooperation with an international court that has a complementary jurisdiction unfolds 
differently, and poses unique challenges to the rights of defendants whose conduct the 
Prosecutor decides to investigate and charge. The Chapter critically evaluated the ‘positive 
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approach’ to complementarity endorsed by the Office of the Prosecutor in order to enhance 
states cooperation, highlighting the consequences that this has had for the selection of cases. 
Moreover, it scrutinised the judges decisions on the challenges to the admissibility of the case 
made by some accused. 
The second part of the study addressed the impact that cooperation occurring in the 
above-explained context has on the selected rights of defendants. It analysed the ICC’s law on 
the right to equality of arms and the right to liberty, as well as the practice regarding 
allegations of violations of these rights brought forward by some defendants. Chapter IV 
addresses cooperation in relation to the right to liberty of defendants. It addresses two specific 
components of the right to liberty: the right not to be subject to arbitrary arrest and detention 
(i.e., habeas corpus rights) and the right to interim release. With respect to the former, the 
Chapter assessed whether the law and practice of the Court sufficiently acknowledge the 
position of suspects detained by national authorities throughout part of the ICC investigation, 
and the risks to their liberty that the division of labour between the Court and States entails. 
With respect to interim release, the Chapter measures the advanced protection afforded to this 
right by the Statute against the reality that States Parties are not obliged to accept 
provisionally released persons on their territories. The Bemba case (as well as the cases 
regarding the offences against the administration of justice related to it) demonstrate that, 
despite the protection afforded to this right ‘on paper’, the willingness of States to accept 
provisionally released persons on their territory is ultimately the only factor capable of 
ensuring the effectiveness of the right of suspects to be freed pending trial.  
Chapter V addressed cooperation in relation to the principle of equality of arms. First, 
it assessed the structural inequality between the Prosecution and the Defence within the 
institutional framework of the Court and critically analysed the features of the ICC’s support 
structure for the Defence. Second, the Chapter assessed whether the law and practice of the 
Court endows the accused with ‘adequate time and facilities’ for the preparation of his/her 
defence. In particular, it scrutinised the Court’s interpretation of Article 57(3)(b) of the 
Statute, empowering the Pre-Trial Chamber to assist the person arrested or summoned with 
the preparation of his/her defence; subsequently, it addressed the difficulties encountered by 
the Defence in conducting on-site investigations in Sudan, in the absence of a clear legal 
framework of the Statute to that effect, and given the sheer non cooperation from the 
Government of the country. 
 
 
